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JOHN COCKBURN



HIS BOOK

for John A Cockburn Esq
With the Author's Compliments

May 1903

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THE ELEMENTS OF MIND

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THE ELEMENTS OF MIND

BEING AN
EXAMINATION INTO THE NATURE OF THE
FIRST DIVISION OF THE ELEMENTARY
SUBSTANCES OF LIFE

BY

H. JAMYNN BROOKS

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TO
PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES
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DR. J. BEATTIE CROZIER
TO WHOSE KINDLY ENCOURAGEMENT
AT A CRITICAL PERIOD
THE APPEARANCE OF THIS WORK
IS DUE

P R E F A C E

MY reason for the appearance of this work is the persuasion that I am enabled to take the student of nature, whatever science he may be interested in, into fresh fields of experimental research, wherein, by a fortuitous train of thought, I believe I have discovered the elements of Mind, which, when compounded with those of Force and Matter, constitute the mysterious substance we call Life.

But although in this I claim to have found the solution of a great and world-old problem, I do not expect my readers to at once accept my views. On the contrary, I anticipate considerable opposition to them. But I nevertheless plead for an exhaustive investigation of my theory, in order that it may stand or fall by its merits.

I may say, however, without egotism, that in this work I have the expressed good wishes of several of the most distinguished contemporary mental scientists, whose helpful encouragement has decided me to overcome the diffidence which otherwise would have prevented me courting publicity for ideas which are, perhaps, antagonistic to those of some of the profoundest thinkers the world has produced.

The subject under investigation in this work, being, as above mentioned, the substance called life, leading to the investigation of the ultimate composition of matter, the student is necessarily taken into the realms of metaphysics, which, as a science, has the reputation of being the most visionary and useless of all the sciences, and is consequently looked upon with something like alarm by the majority of persons. Yet I think the Physicist, the Chemist, the Psychologist, and the Physiologist would each be in error if he thought that Metaphysics was outside and apart from his own particular science. None of these sciences can stand alone, all will be found to merge into one another.

No exhaustive or practical study of life can be made unless the research includes investigations into each of the sciences of Physics, Psychology, and Chemistry. Metaphysics should therefore include the study of Physical Science and Chemistry equally with that of Psychology.

The Atomic theory of the Chemist and the theories of sound, light, heat, and electricity, will be found to be closely allied to Metaphysics—are, in fact, part of that science; and the student will find these questions treated in this work from the peculiar metaphysical point of view whence this theory takes its stand. Hence the writer believes that if there is anything in this work which gives another view of life, or of nature generally, it will be found to be as useful to the Chemist and the

Physicist as to the Metaphysician and Psychologist.

I would ask readers who may object to my theory because it destroys a preformed ideal, to consider whether it bears the impress of fact. Because if it does, the ideal which it overthrows must be founded on error, and it would be a mistake to support that error.

I take this opportunity to thank my friends for the help they have always been ready to extend to me, and if I single out one helper more than another it must be Mr. J. Lionel Tayler, who devoted a considerable portion of his time, during a period of over two years, to assisting me to elucidate the various problems we had occasion to deal with, and to put my supposed solution of these problems to crucial tests.

Should any of my readers be able to devise further tests I shall be pleased to hear from them.

17A RADNOR PLACE,
HYDE PARK, W.

PROLEGOMENA

As one who was reared in the orthodox English faith, I used to believe that the instigation to perform virtuous actions came direct from the Almighty, and that all evil, or vicious, deeds and thoughts were incited by the direct promptings of a personal devil.

It did not occur to me, at the time of which I write, that this conventional credence was in any way open to question, and when I, almost unconsciously, attempted to distinguish between good and evil, right and wrong, and to separate the promptings of God from those of the devil, and to trace them back to their starting-points, it did not appear to me that I had undertaken a very difficult task.

Vicious impulses seeming to be more tangible than those of the opposite character, I decided to begin my analysing with one of the common vices, and so for my initial experiment, I selected gluttony.

Accordingly, I set to work to discover the devil's methods, in tempting his victims to indulge in this vice, when, to my surprise, I found myself baffled at the very outset, by the obvious fact that the initia-

tive step to gluttony is appetite, which, so far from being a vice, is a physiological advantage.

Then I thought that, possibly, the first part of the temptation might come at a later period, when a sufficiency of food to satisfy the natural appetite had been eaten. But short consideration made it clear that at that stage, the natural appetite, instead of increasing, diminishes to vanishing point, and the virtue of moderation in eating can only be exercised by the intervention of reason, while still some appetite remains.

Thinking that I had been unfortunate in the choice of a subject for my preliminary trial, I took another, and another, and still another, but each time with the same result, which forced upon me the conviction that, however mischievous the human vices may be, the majority of them are but virtues carried to extremes; consequently, the impulses which initiate them must be natural, and therefore wholesome.

Hence it appeared that the elementary impulses leading to, and developing into, the vices, are necessary in the formation of the perfect man.

Turning then to the virtues, I found an even greater surprise awaiting me than my investigation of the vices had provided, for examination of them disclosed the fact that, although of course they are necessary in the perfect man, they are generally nothing more than merely vicious impulses under the restraint of moderation—that is to say, outside

the limit of moderation, the virtues degenerate into qualities which are more or less mischievous to the possessor and his fellows, consequently they become vices.

Thus thrift, which, as we all know, is accepted and taught as one of the virtues, when carried to extremes, becomes parsimony, from which it is but a step to the vices of miserliness and avarice. Similarly, liberality in excess becomes extravagance ; pride becomes arrogance ; self-respect becomes vanity ; humility becomes self-abasement ; love becomes jealousy ; piety becomes fanaticism, and so on, *ad infinitum*.

These curious developments show that the impulses leading to good and evil climaxes respectively, are not necessarily antagonistic, and that both are necessary in the perfect man—that, in fact, a man with all good, and only good, impulses (as the world understands them) would be unfitted for practical life.

The hypothesis thus presents itself that there can be no elementary (original) sin ; that, so far from there being evil originally in man's nature, up to a given point all his nature is good ; but beyond that point all is evil.

Further investigation convinced me that all the virtues and vices are of complex nature when fully developed ; but taking any individual virtue or vice in its emotional aspect, and tracing it backwards to the point immediately before it became its opposite, I found it to be less complex ; and tracing it still

further back, to its first stage as an initial prompting, discovered it to be of the simplest character.

The hypothesis then presented itself that these individual initial promptings, leading in every instance to a distinctive emotion, constituting the resultant virtue or vice, as the case might be, are the elements of Mind.

Thus every active and distinctive virtue, not being merely a vice restrained, and every active and distinctive vice, would possess its distinctive elements, to each of which we could give distinctive names.

If these really be the elements of Mind, then it seems to me that when they join with those of matter and force, they must constitute the elements of life, and that, consequently, the missing link at last is found.

The elements of matter were already numbered and named—perhaps not quite accurately—and the elements of physical forces were also known, though in a less degree; but with regard to the elements of mind, apart from the other divisions of force and matter, it does not seem to have ever been suggested that they exist.

My hypothesis is, therefore, that life is a compound, or commonwealth, of these elements of mind, allied with the elements of matter and the elements of physical force.

And that the elements of mind like those of matter and force are actual technical elementary substances.

The reader may feel surprised at the use of the term “substance” as applied to mind instead of essences or elements, but I am fully conscious of the responsibility which the use of this particular word entails. These substances constitute the foundation of my theory and the reason of the use of the term will be fully explained later on.



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ELEMENTS OF MIND

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THIS chapter is intended to be a key to the understanding of what is believed to be an original theory, which in the succeeding pages of the volume is explained in detail. I have realised the necessity of this explanation from the fact that certain scientists to whom I am indebted for reading my work in manuscript form, experienced a difficulty in differentiating the parts containing the views for which I claim originality, from others to which I make no such claim, although I have availed myself of the latter in the working out of my theory.

As the theory described in this work is generally spoken of as the Greater Mind Theory, the student will naturally inquire: What is meant by Greater Mind? I may here state that the term "Greater Mind" does not imply a new mind; it is simply a new name—a comprehensive one—given to well-known mental and physical phenomena exhibited in a greater or less degree by every kind of organism, whether animal or vegetable.

Modern scientists generally agree that life is comprised of mind, matter, and force, each of which it may be assumed possesses its own various elements, and by Greater Mind I mean all the initiative forces in life, whether they be those of mind, matter, or of physical force. Thus Greater Mind here implies not only the mind of the brain, but also all the initiative forces which are instrumental in the performance of all the functions of life, such as the processes of digestion, the circulation of the blood, &c. And it also includes the forces which promote the growth of the tissues and bones, and so on.

But in this theory Greater Mind does not represent the whole of life. It represents life's essence —that which in all forms of life is equivalent to what is commonly supposed to be confined to mankind, namely, the soul.

In the first part of this work an attempt is made to set a limit upon speculative metaphysics, and only the known is considered. But in the later chapters the Greater Mind is speculatively regarded, and analysed, and an endeavour is made to explain, through its medium, the mysteries of the universe.

The position I take in the first part is that, so far from this Greater Mind theory being speculative, its existence is firmly established by experimental analyses.

The fundamental part of my theory is confined to Mind and Life; it argues that the ultimate con-

stitution of the universe, and what is generally called the unknowable, is herein considered to be only of subsequent importance, and to be regarded rather as a test whether the theory is capable of offering a solution of the difficult problems it deals with.

What I claim to be entirely of my own finding in this theory are the hitherto unknown substances which constitute the elements of mind ; and it is the discovery of these elements (apart from those of matter and force)—which will be described subsequently—upon which my theory is built ; and for its proper understanding it is necessary that the inquirer shall conceive their existence, and fully comprehend their nature and character.

Of these elementary substances, seeing that they are new to science, the student can have no previous knowledge ; and therefore, in the absence of an intimation that such substances are in existence, and a sort of general idea of what they are, he would of course be unable to follow the author in his researches into their nature and character.

Under the conditions, as I have stated them, there must of course be many points wherein the Greater Mind theory follows other, and older, theories. But the former also sets forth views which are nowhere else to be found.

Among the discoveries which I claim to have made, and which I here summarise, are :—

First, that of the differentiated substances of which Mind is composed, as distinct from the elementary

substances of matter, and the elementary substances of force (*vide Prolegomena*, and Chapter ii.).

Secondly, the nature and character of those elements (*vide Chapter ii.*).

Thirdly, the compounding of those elements of mind, matter, and force, into the phenomenon we call life (*vide Chapter ii.*).

Fourthly, a method whereby all those elements may be compounded, and thus temporarily lose their individual character (*vide Chapter ii.*).

Fifthly, that all sensations, emotions, and thoughts (while they are in process of being thought only) are compound substances, compounded of mind, matter, and force (*vide Chapter ii.*); and

Sixthly, the constitution of those elements into an Unity (*vide Chapter iii.*).

These six new propositions are the foundation of my theory, and from their peculiar character it naturally follows that the structure which I have raised upon them is in itself peculiar.

I do not claim originality for the idea (in the *Prolegomena*) that there is no evil in man's nature, and that good is only the mean between two extremes; for Aristotle advances a very similar conception. But I claim originality for the further theory leading from it, that all evil is composed solely of good and useful elements, which have developed into evil through being permitted by their kindred elements to become too prominent. As dirt has been happily described as matter in

the wrong place, so, I suggest, evil is nothing else than certain combinations of the elements of life being allowed temporarily to occupy a dominant position in the brain, detrimental to the organism.

Seeing that the psychologist, the chemist, and the physicist, very generally confine their scientific studies to mind, matter, and physical force, respectively, and as all those substances are manifestly compounded in what we call life, it follows that no one professor of either of those three subjects, can hope—unless he extends his inquiries beyond his own particular domain—to successfully define what life is. Generally, the effort to solve that great problem is left to the physiologist, who, on his part, seldom attempts to carry his researches sufficiently deep into mind, matter, and force, and never, into their elements; and he, therefore, is in no better position to explain what life is than are the students of psychology, and chemistry, and physics.

Of all the sciences, psychology has made the least progress, for its students and professors have not attempted—or at any rate have been unable—to reduce mind into its elements, and to differentiate, define, and describe their nature and characteristics. This is what, thanks to a fortuitous accident, I claim to be enabled to do, and so, to have made it possible to analyse, and define, the substance called life; that is to say, I profess to have discovered, and in this work to explain, the various

elementary substances which comprise the composite substance called mind, and also the smaller compound substances called thoughts, which, of course, are included in mind.

So thoroughly and exhaustively, indeed, can such analysis be performed, that only time, and an analytical mind, are necessary to enable the psychological student to prepare a catalogue of the elementary substances of Mind, and assign to each a name—which, as the substances to be named are newly discovered ones, must necessarily be new.

One of my difficulties in producing this work has been to find suitable terms for the elements which, according to my theory, constitute mind. To give them names which are commonly employed to express other meanings would obviously cause confusion; while to invent entirely new names for them would have the disadvantage of not immediately and clearly giving the sense which I wished to convey. But I hope—and believe—that I have temporarily overcome this obstacle by defining the meanings I attach to such words as Mind, Ego, Personality, &c.

In psychology, generally the word mind is employed in three different ways, namely:—

(1.) Meaning (and including) everything that is not matter.

(2.) Meaning an intelligence below consciousness, as “the unconscious mind.”

(3.) Meaning the mind which is focussed by the brain, and is limited to consciousness.

I also attach three meanings to this word, thus :—

(1.) Mind I use to imply all that is initiative ; everything that is not matter.

(2.) The Conscious Mind signifies the mind as focussed by the brain, and

(3.) Mind, prefixed by the adjective Greater, I employ to indicate the unification of all the intelligences of life, and not only those of the brain.

The word Life I use in its ordinary sense, except when I refer to it as that initiative intelligence which is generally supposed to represent the working of an Almighty Power, and then the term Greater Life implies life in its highest aspect, with all its *a priori* intelligence and everlasting existence.

I also use the word Ego in three senses, namely :—

By Ego I mean that which is known as the personality of the brain.

By Greater Ego I mean man as he is, not as he thinks he is, nor as he appears to be ; but man with all his forces, visible and invisible ; with all his organs, nerves, and tissues, with all their peculiar intelligences.

I know of no alternative term which describes the Greater Ego, that unity of mind, matter, and force which is at the same time both subjective and objective.

By the Universal Ego I mean the unity of the universe, its Personality ; the aggregation of all its

elements, some of which comprise the substance we know as life. This is the natural corollary of the unification of mind, matter, and force, forming one Universal Unity, possessing within itself all the elements of life.

In addition to the term Personality I use that of Greater Personality. The one, however, differs but very slightly from the other.

Personality I employ in the ordinary sense of a person's physical and mental characteristics.

By Greater Personality I mean not only all the physical and mental characteristics which are visible, and by which the individual is gauged and judged, but also those in him which are hidden.

The Personality, therefore, more nearly approaches the Greater Personality than the Ego approaches the Greater Ego, or the Mind approaches the Greater Mind.

With regard, however, to Mind and Greater Mind, Life and Greater Life, Ego and Greater Ego, Personality and Greater Personality, I advance no claim to originality for them, but I have given them new names, in order that, by combining various parts under single headings, I may simplify the working out of my theory, and make it more readily understandable.

I advance the hypothesis that the Elements of Mind are real elements. I use the word "Elements" in its technical sense—that is to say, I mean by it substances which cannot be resolved

into more simple forms, as, for instance, oxygen, carbon, iron, and so on. Therefore when I say the elements of mind are real, I mean they are as real as oxygen, carbon, and iron. I do not employ the word (as is often the case when it is applied to mind and thought) in a figurative way, as "the elements of letters," "the elements of arithmetic," "the elements of finance," &c.

The inference is in favour of Mind having technical, and not merely figurative, elements, for the elements of the other divisions, matter, and force, are all technical elements and are therefore substances.

Thoughts, while they are being thought—in which state they are a compound of life's elements, namely, Mind, Matter, and Force—must be carefully distinguished from thoughts after they have been thought, and which are but a manifestation, and not a compound, of life's elements.

A confusion often occurs with regard to the distinctions between a substance, a manifestation, and an accident.

A substance is philosophically described as that which exists and remains. And as, according to this theory, the elements of life exist and remain, they must consequently be substances; and when a given number of these elements of life combine, the resulting compound must be a substance, though the manifestations of these compounds may be accidents.

Unfortunately our language does not appear to contain words which adequately convey every desired fine distinction of terms. Thus, we know how an organism can be disturbed by such emotions as love, and jealousy, and anger ; but to describe these emotions as substances [would, to some, be unsatisfactory ; while to] call them manifestations of mind, in the sense that artificial light might be called a manifestation of (say) gas, is not sufficient. We want a descriptive term, not only for the manifestation, but also for the thing itself. The word manifestation is misleading. If love be a manifestation of something, we want to know what the something or substance is which it is a manifestation of. We certainly know that it is not a manifestation of physical force, nor of inert matter ; and to say that it is a manifestation of mind is no explanation, and leaves us where we were before, without hope of enlightenment until we learn all we can know about mind, and the emotions, and in what relation they stand to one another.

Therefore, whenever any of the emotions are herein alluded to as substances, it is the various compounds of elements which form the mind and which in turn form the emotions that is meant, and not the manifestations themselves.

It is impossible to anticipate all the difficulties which crop up in unaccountable ways and prevent the student from understanding the peculiar character of the theory ; some of these, however,

which have been pointed out to me I may here consider.

One of my critics suggests that the theory should be simply and concisely explained right away in the beginning, without any side issues. But a little reflection will show that this is an impossibility, for a great and complex phenomenon will necessarily require an extensive explanation, however simple the various processes may be.

Now this theory begins with, and is founded upon, the simple elementary substances which make up the complex substance called life; it then goes on to explain the still more complex substance which forms the universe. Now it is very evident that any explanation which adequately explains such complex substances as life and universal noumena, must be complex also, though the elementary substances themselves are simple.

Another critic says he wants to know what the elementary substances of mind really are, on which point, he says, I have not enlightened him; but can anybody tell what any elementary substance really is? Take one of the simplest for instance—iron. Can any one tell us what this element really is beyond telling us that it is an element and therefore a substance which cannot be reduced to simpler forms? All other explanations can go no further than to explain the behaviour of this substance under various conditions; thus the chemist will tell us how it can be reduced to liquid and vapour, the

weight under certain conditions, the various colours it assumes, and many other qualities, but we are still in the dark as to what iron really is.

Take, again, electricity, which has a greater likeness to the elementary substances of mind. Can the physical scientist tell us what it really is? That it is a substance is an undoubted fact, and its behaviour is fairly well known; but quite as much as this can be said about my elementary substances of mind. Their behaviour under certain circumstances may be accurately told; they can be differentiated, named, felt, and actually seen; can much more be said according to our present knowledge of any elementary substances?

But although man, with his limited capacity, may never know what an element really is, yet he may learn much more about elements than is known at present. If the hypothesis—being one of the results of our investigations, that every element has some degree of sentiency, and that when in combination with certain other elements has the power of actively using this sentiency—will stand the test of further investigation, an important advance is made in the knowledge of an element.

When this theory is described as the Greater Mind *theory*, the word “theory” must not be taken in its metaphysical sense as “a hypothesis supported by a large amount of probable evidence”; it must rather be taken in its scientific sense as “an explanation of phenomena which accounts for them so

satisfactorily that there is a high probability that the true cause of their occurrence has been pointed out."

I believe my theory comes under the heading of the latter definition, because after describing the hitherto unknown elementary substances composing mind, it is mainly engaged in describing a series of practical experiments tending to show how the elements of all three groups may compound and produce all the states of consciousness as well as all the states of unconsciousness; in fact, all the phenomena life is capable of showing.

It is certainly not a hypothetical theory like, for instance, the theory of the transmigration of souls; it deals with things much more matter of fact, and it would be impossible to describe the theory until the foundations upon which it is built, namely, the hitherto unknown elementary substances of mind, are described.

But perhaps the principal obstacle to the proper understanding of the theory, as herein set forth, lies in the fact that the student naturally thinks I am mistaken in supposing that I have made a discovery of new elements. He thinks it will be found that my alleged discovery is contained in some of the older theories, but dished up with new names.

Consequently the reader overlooks all that which I claim to be new; he is always on the look-out for some indication of one or more of the older theories

in a new disguise. Let me therefore beg the reader to suppose for the time being that it is possible that a discovery of some sort has been made, and I think he will be rewarded for his pains.

I feel it is necessary to give this warning as the reader may fall into the error which others have already fallen into of being so engrossed in looking for a hypothetical theory, which is supposed to explain everything, that he misses the true import of the experiments.

This theory of life is in full accord with natural science, and with the theories of evolution, natural selection, and the origin of species; it formulates explanations which tend to corroborate them, but it is peculiar in that it does not come under any of the headings by which other theories on the subject are classified; and although no doubt it may have a semblance—slight or otherwise—to some of them, fundamentally it will be found to differ from them all.

This theory recognises nothing in the universe as primary but its own elements; nor in any organism but the same elements—all thought, emotion, will, intellect, instinct, virtue, vice, &c., being *secondary combinations* of these elements.

While to the mental scientist's view that "the brain is the one bodily condition of the mental elements," it extends only provisional agreement, namely, when these elements are considered solely to represent consciousness, it goes beyond that

dogma by maintaining that the community of the elements of mind with those of force and matter which constitute the unity is independent of the brain, the latter being only one of its many organs.

CHAPTER II

THE EXAMINATION OF THE ELEMENTARY SUB- STANCES FORMING GREATER MIND

PROCEEDING now to the examination of those hitherto unknown elements of life, the elementary Substances of Mind (as apart from the elementary substances of matter and of physical force), we have the alternative, either to enter the dark gateway of the occult, and speculate on the composition of noumena, original and present; or to direct our investigation to known substances. These, although we may have every reason to believe that they ultimately become blended into one substance, yet apparently present certain distinctive differences. But whatever the composition of noumena may be, it seems tolerably clear that in what we call life, we have to deal with its three active substances, namely, mind, matter, and force, since differentiated though they be, they evidently in that form compound with one another, and work together in thorough unity.

Here I wish to impress upon my readers what has already been stated in the previous chapter, that this theory maintains that all feelings, thoughts, and every phenomena of mind are compound *substances*, composed of elementary substances, whose

various natures and characters are easily understandable.

But care must be taken to distinguish between a thought, or a feeling, whilst it is still being evolved, and as such is a compound substance composed of the elementary substances of which mind, matter, and force are composed, and the result of the thought or feeling. Thus, a thought after it has been thought, is no longer a substance, and therefore cannot possess any but figurative elements. The thought that prompts one person to shake the hand of another, is a compound substance, but the shake of the hand is no more a substance than the kiss of two billiard-balls.

If a hand-shake or the kiss of billiard-balls may be said to have elements, they are figurative elements, totally differing from the technical elementary substances which constitute the feelings which prompt two persons to shake hands.

If mind is not a substance elementary or compound, it must be nothing, and consequently cannot be composed of elements. It cannot possess any activity; it would only resemble a shadow, which, of course, is not a substance, being only the absence of the substance called light, therefore any effort to analyse mind, if not a substance, must end in stultification.

In using the word "substance" as applied to mind and force I do not suggest that mind and force ought to be placed under the head of matter; long

custom has confined the term “matter” to a certain class of phenomena. Moreover, there are peculiarities which completely differentiate the substances of the three divisions.

To acquire a knowledge of the elements of life, it is obvious that we must first make acquaintance with the elements of its all-composing substances. The elements of matter will not give us the elements of either mind or force ; the elements of force will not give us the elements of either mind or matter ; and the elements of mind will not give us the elements of force or matter.

Chemists have indicated the elements of matter with some degree of accuracy ; and scientists, with somewhat less success, have described the elements of force. But philosophers have hitherto been baffled in their endeavours to analyse mind into its elements. And there is little hope that we shall ever discover the elements of life until, in addition to distinguishing the elements of force and matter, we are able to analyse mind alone, and separate it into its various substances.

The elements of Mind, being those of the higher class, I claim to have discovered hidden in what are perhaps best described as “feelings.”

Seeing that, before the meaning of my theory can be grasped, it is necessary that the existence of these elements be recognised, it will be desirable to examine into their reality.

Several conclusions present themselves with

regard to the feelings, which I here reduce into their original elements, namely:—

- (1.) That there are such “things” as feelings.
- (2.) That these feelings are distinct from one another.
- (3.) That they are not elements, but compounds of elements.
- (4.) That each feeling has a principal element, or essence, which imparts to it its peculiar character; and
- (5.) That such elements are the elements of Mind.
(Some metaphysicians would use the word “Soul.”)

With regard to the first of these conclusions, little need be said, since the existence of feelings is too obvious for any doubt to be entertained about it; indeed, if there be in life anything which can rightly claim to be real, it surely must be a feeling.

The second conclusion, like its predecessor, also requires but small consideration, as the distinctive nature of the feelings leaves no room for question, as love, hate, anger, compassion, and so on.

With regard to the third conclusion, very few persons now suppose that the feelings are separate entities, or elements; the different aspects they present, and their manner of merging from one phase into another, necessarily precluding any such belief.

To the fourth conclusion, greater importance attaches. The three previous conclusions having resulted in the hypotheses that there are such phe-

nomena as feelings ; that such feelings are distinct from one another, and that they are compounds, it follows that each feeling has one or more of those elements from which it obtains its distinctive character.

Whatever is elementary in nature must have real existence : every mental conception employs some elementary unanalysable entity. Hence every conception of the mind carries with it some real existence in nature ; otherwise the conception would represent a *creation* of mind, which is inconceivable.

Therefore every name of anything which appears to contain some element peculiar and distinctive to itself, must be assumed to stand for some reality in nature ; consequently, if feelings, such as love, hope, awe, veneration, &c., each possesses these distinctive characteristics, there must be some natural element from which this feeling has in each instance been derived.

The fifth conclusion is the hypothesis which we are about to examine, and endeavour to prove.

What I consider to be the elements of life are not wholly mental, nor wholly material, nor wholly physical—for the elements of mind only partly constitute the elements of life.

The elements of mind are not ideas, feelings, units of consciousness, nor souls, nor monads, nor atoms, nor molecules ; they have nothing to do with spiritualism ; they are not cells, and therefore have not an arch cell ; they are not protoplasm, nor cor-

puscles, nor are they the grey and white matter of the brain, nor are they nerves : but all these may represent various combinations of some of these elements.

So far as I am aware, the elements of mind, as technical substances, have never in any way been even remotely suggested in any previous work, psychological or other, and as this theory has these elements for its foundation, the initial question is simplified into : Are these elements of mind existent? and if so, do they constitute one of that group of three, mind, matter, and force, which, as all scientists agree, form the substance we call life ?

As it has been pointed out, a theory which is not founded upon successful experiment can be of very little value. I claim for the Greater Mind theory that it is founded upon successful experiment, and that the matters which have been experimented upon in the interest of its foundation, are common to every human being.

Although the Greater Mind theory rejects the dogma that feelings, virtues, and vices, are distinct entities, it maintains that there is a separate definite emotion for every virtue and vice, and (to repeat a part of the Prolegomena) every emotion, when traced back, becomes less and less complex, until we arrive at the unconscious mind, where we find the emotion being evolved by the various elements comprising the emotion, the dominant, and distinctive element gathering to itself its affiliated elements, and becoming a compound. This being the basis of my experiments,

I submit that a feeling is as much a distinctive compound substance as is the grey matter of the brain, than which it is certainly no more difficult to analyse.

The distinctive feeling of a thief in the act of stealing, is analytically different from the distinctive feeling of a person who is lying, which again analytically differs from the feeling of a person who is bestowing charity ; and I submit that the elementary substances of these various distinctive feelings may be distinguished by experimental analysis.

There is no reason why experimental analysis should be confined to physics, and I differ from those who believe that the elements of mind can be discovered by psychologists who confine themselves to analytically experimenting upon the physical part of it—the which, indeed, may be likened to attempting to discover the elements of steam by analytically examining the mechanism of a steam engine.

As in order to discover the elements of steam it will be necessary to analyse the steam itself, so, if we would discover the elementary substances of Mind, we must subject the mind itself to analysis, and not its machinery only. To be sure, objection to this has been raised by the remark that, “With mind you have nothing to take hold of.” “If,” the argument proceeds, “mind were physical substance, it would be different, as you can take hold of that.” My reply is that mental substances are even more easy to handle than are their co-ordinate physical substances. Compare, for instance, the results of

the examination of such definite mental composite substances as love and hate, or avarice and generosity, being the elements of life from their mental aspect, with those of the grey and white matter of the brain, and the composite substance of protoplasm. The two latter have defied the efforts of analysts to discover the differentiations which are known to exist in them, while the former mental compounds can be reduced by analysis into their original elements.

Herein, then, begins the claim of the Greater Mind theory to the initiation of a new departure, the which is the discovery of a method of analysing the mental compounds into the elementary substances of mind, and hence, having come to the elements of mind, all of which may be numbered and named, one of the most difficult obstacles to psychological research has been overcome.

The experimental part of my theory of mind begins with those abstract nouns which express, or describe, some particular feeling in the subject, although, of course, I do not suggest that an abstract noun is anything more than a name; each of these abstract nouns has generally but one meaning applied to it; and even when it has two, or more, meanings, as a rule only one of them is in common use, the other, or others, usually becoming obsolete.

Another characteristic of these nouns and their feelings, is that they can hardly be described in their various degrees of strength otherwise than by adjectives. Some of the exceptions—and even

they are doubtful—are dislike and hate, acquisitiveness and theft, anger and rage; dislike, acquisitiveness, and anger, being perhaps only milder forms of hate, theft, and rage.

Although the great majority of these nouns have the quality of being both subjective and objective, at present only the subjective ones need be considered, since objective abstract nouns often produce in the object a feeling different from that which is in the subject.

All distinctive abstract nouns relating to the subject, represent distinctive feelings and emotions, being, from the standpoint of this theory, the result of combinations of the Greater Mental elements or elementary substances of mind, and they can be classified as :—

(1.) Those in which the resultant combination is produced by outside influence through the sensory nerves, and

(2.) Those in which the resultant combination is produced by inward stimuli.

But no precise line can be drawn between the two, because the inward stimulus is often the result of the environment.

The character of some of these nouns is vague and general, as love, interest, &c.; and in order to particularise the feeling produced by them, we have to suggest the sort of love or interest intended to be indicated, as love of children, interest in business, interest in a friend's or a neighbour's affairs,

&c. Others are merely general terms for the results in intellectual or manual labours, as philosophy or gardening ; and to make the feeling relate to the subject, we have to prefix them with such terms as love of, or interest in ; and we thus obtain the feelings of interest in philosophy or in love of gardening. Others represent the disorganisation of the organs of the greater mental elements, as madness, hysteria, intoxication, &c., and, in a lesser degree, anguish, grief, and so on.

Some of them are less complex than others, and approach very nearly to the elements of mind themselves, as aerial flight, the feeling of which would be the inclination to fly through the air, while hunger is the feeling of the elements of the stomach in need of food.

In every abstract noun relating to the subject there is a distinctive feeling, or perhaps more than one. In the following table the first column (A) is devoted to a few of these nouns relating to subject, a complete list of which would comprise the whole of mind, and indicate every initiative in the individual.

In the second column (B) we have the feeling, or emotion, while it is being experienced, and of which the abstract noun, or quality, is the result ; and in the third column (C) we have the feeling analysed into a number of elements, among which there is always a definite dominant element, just as there is in a chemical compound, of which the special characteristic is determined by a dominant element,

or it may be that the dominant element is a group of the elements closely affiliated, which gives a special colouring to the particular mental compound.

Table of Analysis of the various distinctive states of feeling which suggest some elementary or fundamental difference.

A.	B.	C.
Abstract nouns which represent distinctive feelings.	The feeling being a compound, made up of elementary Greater Mental forces, of which one element (or it may be more than one) is dominant, and gives its distinguishing character to the compound.	The elementary dominant Greater Mental force, which, by compounding with kindred elements, produces a given feeling.
Awe.	Feeling (used as a present participle) awestruck.	No name has yet been given to the element, but it is obviously the fundamental element (or elements) in the compound, so long as that compound lasts.
Tenderness.	Feeling tender.	Ditto, but of a different character.
Disgust.	Feeling disgusted.	Ditto.
Love.	Feeling loving.	Ditto.
Generosity.	Feeling generous.	Ditto.
Anger.	Feeling angry.	Ditto.
Theft.	Feeling a desire to steal.	Ditto.
Dislike.	Feeling of disliking.	Ditto.
Penitence.	Feeling penitent.	Ditto.
Perception of space.	The feeling of perceiving space.	Ditto.

The majority of the qualities described by abstract nouns when subjective are only the result of these emotions. It is easy enough to distinguish the leading spirit in love, but not that in dignity, as we may display dignity without feeling dignified. Nevertheless I imagine that there will be found a leading spirit in dignity which is striving to assert itself.

The study of abstract nouns is peculiarly interesting: in the first place it reveals the fact that they comprise the whole mind, the entire subject world, and all the states of consciousness.

To make objective abstract nouns apply to subject, we must generally turn the substantive into a verb, as: the inclination to fight; the inclination to love.

In some of the simple feelings the dominant element is clearly observable, as in awe, theft, &c., but in others, such as the feeling of the perception of heat, it is difficult to determine whether there is a single dominant element in the feeling, or whether it is simultaneously felt by the collective states of the whole Greater Mind.

But difficult though it is to discover in every instance the dominant element in some of these feelings, it is easy enough to discover the elements which do not belong to the combination; for instance, it will be obvious that the dominant element in dislike cannot find a place in the feeling of affection, nor can the dominant element in humility have a place in the feeling of arrogance.

We will now dismiss the abstract nouns in favour of the feelings which they describe, and the elements which comprise the feelings.

In the development of this theory it will be necessary to determine the number and names of these elements. This task, however, I have not as yet thought it necessary to accomplish.

However psychologists may differ with regard to what an idea, and the transcendental ego, are, and whether such things as they exist, at least they will all agree about what theft, and fear, are, and that they exist.

It is particularly noticeable, that while the feelings have been given names, which are fixed, and, as it were, inelastic, the feelings themselves are infinite in their degrees of intensity, and of infinite variety. How many differences there are, for instance, in the feeling called love—the passionate, the passive, the brutal, the gentle, the impulsive, the patient, the despairing, the sanguine, and so on ; and yet, vary as they may, from extreme to extreme, there is but one stereotyped name for the emotion, or feeling, in all its widely differing and ever-changing phases ; and thus all nature's kaleidoscopic effects of the feeling are condensed into a hard, inflexible monosyllable.

An introspective examination will show us that every feeling remains fully developed and intact in the brain for a momentary space of time only ; it then begins to decay, to dissolve into nothingness,

and its elements return to inner consciousness, or what is now generally described as the unconscious mind. In this it resembles the birth of the feeling ; rising apparently from nothing, it develops, and presently arrives at full maturity in the brain. It may be likened to a snowflake, which, presently joined by others, becomes a mass of snow, and anon disappears.

Only the fully developed feelings have been given names, and then very often imperfect ones. There is never anything in the name of a feeling to distinguish it at its birth, or during its development, or at its decay, and demise ; and yet its dominant element, or essence, is there all the time. If the feelings are distinct from one another at the period of their full development, they—or their essences—are equally so at their births, and in their decadence.

If there be a given number of fully developed feelings, there must previously have been the same number of them undeveloped ; and so, if a person possess all the fully developed feelings, he must have previously possessed all their elements.

The endeavour to elucidate the secrets of mind through physiology, is what to a large extent has led to its stultification ; as well might we attempt to discover the beauties of an oil-painting by analytically examining its colours and canvas. No doubt a full knowledge of physiology is advantageous to the psychologist, even as a knowledge of colours and canvases is to the artist ; but those materials

are only the physical means by which the artist works out, and perpetuates, his ideas ; and in the same way physiology is the means which psychology uses to reveal some of the otherwise hidden and unfathomable secrets of nature. Therefore, I maintain, that to learn what mind is, we must seek out its elements, and endeavour to examine them independently of those of matter and force, and not be content with merely examining its outward and physiological aspect.

Every thought, all the virtues and vices, all feelings, emotions, sensations, all pains and pleasures, all the forces which dominate the organs ; everything that is mental, in short, all mind, is made up of these elements, and is included in what is called life.

A feeling at, or before, its birth, is simply its dominant element, like the initial flake in a snow-ball—in which, however, the first grain of snow is but a particle in an aggregate. While the leading spirit in the feeling is actually compounded with its kindred Greater Mental elements.

Our investigations will force us to the conclusion that in every normal human body there is a colony of the elementary substances of mind, comprising the Greater Mind ; and it is easily conceivable that they can, by compounding, form practically endless trains of thoughts and feelings, as myriads of variations may be produced by the interchanging of the twelve notes of the musical scale.

We have now arrived at the hypothesis, that in the normal human body there is a fairly numerous colony of elementary forces, or substances, distributed throughout the entire organism, and not confined to the brain ; and our next endeavour will be to portray their character.

That it is impossible for them to be endowed with full intelligence will be obvious when we come to the question of self-compounding of elements. All the evidence, so far, goes to show that the elements have but a single intelligence—that is, only a portion of an idea. Select any one of the feelings, hate, for instance ; deprive it of speech and action, of all facial and bodily expression ; even deprive it of reason, and render it apparently absolutely impotent, yet still the element will be there. The elementary substances are, therefore, when taken separately, evidently void of the complex intelligence of what we know to be life. But each one would have a solitary inner consciousness of its own, which, however, has no power unless compounded with other elements, but this compound may then be conscious of what is going on in the organism.

The intention of this argument is to show that the Greater Mind is a colony of single-intelligenced elementary substances working generally without a substratum of brain, but capable of compounding with themselves, and becoming outwardly conscious when the compound obtains possession of some of the organs of the brain.

The effects of stimuli upon the elements of life, and which, generally, is immediately shown by a movement of the motor muscles, or by a sensation in the brain, is most likely produced by an extension, or contraction, of the elements themselves, as probably any expansion or contraction of a combination of the elements may be occasioned by stimuli; thus, grief, or anger, will induce tears. May not this phenomenon be caused by the expansion or contraction of the affected elements, meaning the compounded elements of mind, matter, and force, which induces them to discharge the tears as a relief? It would be interesting to test the soundness, or otherwise, of this view by experiment.

That a mental element can have a full, or even a complex, intelligence of any sort, seems to me impossible; all the elements with which we are acquainted, whether chemical or physical, have a single property; and hence mental elements cannot at the same time have complex intelligence and be the elements of intelligence.

The soundness and stability of the Greater Mind theory depends, in great measure, upon the possibility of its elements being able to compound and produce complex intelligence, and it will be necessary to consider this part most carefully, as the idea of the self-compounding of mental elements has been mercilessly condemned by the majority of psychological writers. Thus Professor William James

(of Harvard University) advances, under the heading of "Self-compounding of mental facts is inadmissible," in his "Principles of Psychology," what he calls a "fatal objection to the theory of mental units 'compounding with themselves,' or 'integrating.' It is logically unintelligible," he goes on to assert; "it leaves out the essential feature of all the 'combinations' we actually know. *All the 'combinations' which we actually know are effects wrought by the units said to be 'combined' upon some entity other than themselves.* Without this feature of a medium or vehicle, the notion of combination has no sense." Then the Professor quotes the following passage from Montgomery in *Mind*: "A multitude of contractile units, by joint action, and by being all connected, for instance, with a single tendon, will pull at the same, and will bring about a dynamical effect which is undoubtedly the resultant of their combined individual energies. . . . On the whole, tendons are to muscular fibres, and bones are to tendons, combining recipients of mechanical energies. A medium of composition is indispensable to the summation of energies. To realise the complete dependence of mechanical resultants on a combining substratum, one may fancy for a moment all the individually contracting muscular elements severed from their attachments. They might then still be capable of contracting with the same energy as before, yet no co-operative result would be

accomplished. The medium of dynamical combination would be wanting. The multiple energies, singly exerted on no common recipient, would lose themselves on entirely isolated and disconnected efforts."

"In other words," then continues Professor James, "no possible number of entities (call them as you like, whether forces, material particles, or mental elements) can sum *themselves* together. Each remains, in the sum, what it always was; and the sum itself exists only *for a bystander* who happens to overlook the units and to apprehend the sum as such; or else it exists in the shape of some other *effect* on an entity external to the sum itself. Let it not be objected that H₂ and O combine of themselves into 'water,' and thence-forward exhibit new properties. They do not. The 'water' is just the old atoms in the new position, H—O—H; the 'new properties' are just their combined *effects*, when in this position, upon external media, such as our sense-organs, and the various reagents on which water may exert its properties and be known." "Aggregations," then again quotes the professor, this time from Professor Royce in *Mind*, "are organised wholes only when they behave as such in the presence of other things. A statue is an aggregation of particles of marble; but as such it has no unity. For the spectator it has one; in itself it is an aggregate; just as, to the consciousness of an ant crawling

over it, it may again appear a mere aggregate. No summing up of parts can make an unity of a mass of discrete constituents, unless this unity exist for some other subject, not for the mass itself."

When Professor James put forward the foregoing, he had not seen my theory of the Greater Mental elements, which attributes to each one a single and different portion of a complete intelligence. It may, indeed, be the fact that "no summing up of parts can make an unity of a mass of discrete constituents, unless the unity exist . . . not for the mass itself," but—and here it is that psychologists appear to have made one of their stumbles—every unity, whatever its nature may be, must have parts. And thus we have the apparent paradox, that while it is impossible to make up an unity by combining a number of separate parts, yet an unity may be—and, indeed, invariably is—composed of parts.

No doubt if the Greater Mental elements cannot compound, my theory must fail at its very beginning. But we have distinct evidence that elements do compound, and that it is the nature of certain elements to combine. In light, we find the elements in combination, and forming, not a mere aggregate of units, but a complete and perfect unity.

When all the elements necessary to the production of light are compounded, the resultant light occupies no greater space than did any one of its constituents, though its density and power would be greater.

It is not, however, probable that the Greater

Mental elements, when not actively engaged, remain in the organism in an isolated condition ; they are more likely to be in a passing state of fusion, forming the complete and undivided Ego, each and every portion being ready, when stimulated, to produce certain phenomena. But it must be remembered that the part producing the phenomena has no responsibility, that of course being the attribute of the complete unity, the Greater Ego.

Professor James is right in maintaining that the properties in a compound, are also in the constituents of the compound, though it may be that they are latent. We cannot wash our hands, or make our tea, with $H_2 - O$, unless they are formed into water.

It is clear that the statue, mentioned by Professor Royce, being an aggregation of particles of marble, can, *as such*, have no unity ; but a combination of the elements of mind may have unity ; the combination may have no new properties, for all its properties were no doubt latent in its parts ; and although in the case of the statue, the particles of marble, when combined, must form a mere aggregate, the elementary substances of mind or life when combined, being only part of the original unity, can sum themselves together—in fact, they cannot be separated from the unity.

But I differ from Professor Royce, in that a marble statue can have no unity by itself. Though the parts capable of composing the unity are necessarily of a sort different from the particles of marble from

which the statue is formed, yet the statue is a one and undivided whole, with all its parts perfectly compounded, and forming the unity. Thus there are the head, the trunk, the arms, the legs, and all the minor parts, and we cannot deprive it of any one of its parts without destroying its entirety ; whereas, on the other hand, we might chip out the particles of marble from the interior of the statue, and yet leave it complete.

Those who maintain that self-compounding is impossible, forget that a part may be equal to the whole, at least as regards size ; they seem to imagine that a part must necessarily be smaller than the whole. It is of course evident that if two or more elements compound, the compound must either be of a greater size, of greater bulk, or of greater density, than either of its elements, but it will be also evident that the compound may be of the same size but of greater bulk or density, the same bulk but of greater size or density, or of the same density but of greater size or bulk. Yet curiously enough those who say compounding of mental elements is unintelligible always take the third alternative and leave out of consideration the other two, notwithstanding the well-known fact that one may take an air-tight vessel and fill it as full of gas as it will hold, yet a large quantity of gas of another kind can still be introduced into the vessel, therefore it is plain that two elements compounding need not occupy a greater bulk than either element separately.

But with regard to density as far as our knowledge goes, we cannot make a compound of two elements with the compound of the same density as one of its elements, unless the bulk is increased.

Elementary sounds may also compound so thoroughly as to elude the analysis of a skilful musician, although the scale of elementary sounds is not considerable.

The difficulty of imagining any *modus operandi* whereby different elements may be formed into one more or less harmonious whole, whether it be a soul or the universe, would be insurmountable if the elements, like monads, are all equal to one another in value ; there would then be no conflict in nature, such as there undoubtedly is. And if they could compound there would be nothing gained, since the compound would be precisely the same thing, only in greater quantity. Thus there would be no variety, nothing in any way resembling the human mind. If some of the elements have arbitrary power over the others, we must necessarily come at last to a great controlling power, and consequently to a full stop, because this great controlling power has not fully and scientifically revealed Himself, and unless He does so it is inconceivable that we can discover what He is.

As each of the elements of mind and life has only a single part of an intelligence, and so can have no knowledge or experience of anything beyond its own extremely limited sphere, and therefore can impart

no information, nor form any judgment, many scientists infer that any number of the same elements combined must be in similar condition. But to show that memory and judgment may be possessed by the whole, while there is no sign of them in the parts, let us suppose that a human brain be divided into a number of sections, and that each section retains its former life; no section alone would have memory or judgment. But rejoin the sections, and the brain, being entire again, would of course be in possession of its former memory and judgment.

Another question to be considered is: Can an element suffer? We have postulated the dogma that an element is only one portion of an intelligence, one portion of a desire which it ever seeks to gratify—except of course when satisfied; now it is obvious that if the desire be gratified, the element is at rest, and must feel somewhat of inner conscious pleasure; but if the desire be thwarted by a powerful combination, the element, with its affiliated elements, will feel unrestful and so disorganise the commonwealth. Therefore there is suffering, of a sort, through unsatisfied desire. But the suffering is not confined to the element. The unsatisfied desire of the element would probably not be felt if it did not share the desire with its kindred elements, and thus become conscious to the outer consciousness of the brain, for no outer conscious sensation of pain can be felt unless through the brain, and only then by a combination of elements.

With regard to the distinction between inner and outer consciousness, I mean by inner consciousness, the consciousness of which we are ignorant, because it is impossible for the brain to feel it (although it is evidently felt by the elements when not working through the brain); and by outer consciousness, I mean the consciousness which is felt by the various combinations in the brain.

The principal result to be learned from this chapter is, first, there are in life three divisions, or three kinds of elementary substances, and that the elementary substances forming the first division, namely, mind, are as real and technical as those of matter and physical force; second, that the elementary substances of all three divisions are permeable to one another and that it is their nature to compound.

The question to be considered in the next chapter is how these various elementary substances can form and produce out of themselves that constitutional unity, a high-class animal.

CHAPTER III

THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE ELEMENTARY SUBSTANCES OF LIFE COMPOUNDED IN A HIGH-CLASS ORGANISM

In our last chapter we arrived at the conclusion that in every organism there was a colony of elementary substances more or less numerous, according to the nature and complexity of the organism, or in other words, every organism was composed of these elementary substances and of *nothing else*.

I have already put forth the assumption that the elements of life may be divided into three divisions, namely, the elements of mind, the elements of matter, and the elements of force; but in a living organism all the various elementary substances are so perfectly compounded that it would be impossible, for the sake of studying these elements, to separate the elements of one division from those of another, and yet to preserve the life of the organism.

Hence, as we cannot analyse the elements of each division separately while they compose life, when we speak of the elements of mind we can only gather an idea of their nature by studying the elements of life as seen from the mental point of view, when we wish to arrive at the nature of the elements

of organic matter we can only do so by studying the elements of life from their material and chemical point of view, and when we wish to arrive at the nature of the elements of physical force, still taking the elements as belonging to a living organism, we can only accomplish it when we study their nature through the elements of life.

In the highest class of organisms, as in man, there are elementary substances which, for convenience' sake, we may describe as those of the highest grade, descending gradually to those of the lowest. Some of them, when in combination, are visible, while possibly some are invisible. But the majority of them are certainly visible in some form or other, even such compounds as love, hunger, and so on.

Each organism possesses its own constitution, the peculiarity of which is produced by the number and character of the elementary substances of *mind* which form the intellectual aspect of life rather than those of the other divisions ; and it is the nature of this constitution which we are now about to investigate. I found it no easy matter to discard the current formulæ of accepted psychological teachers. Hence, to account for the evident control that is exercised over the emotions in the Greater Ego, it first seemed to me that the elements formed a sort of council, or parliament, as it were, before which all their own various combinations had to appear, in order to obtain permission to assume the rôle of the

Ego. But further consideration made it evident to me that the elements which form the second consciousness, possess each an organ in the brain, and that therefore this "parliament," by withholding from the combinations permission to use their own organs, would be opposing the theory of the equality of the powers of the elements. Moreover, there were many obstacles in the way of determining the nature of the self-constituted authority of the "parliament." The Greater Mind would not be the simple community of elementary substances which, I felt convinced, was necessary to constitute the government of our organism.

So from that conclusion I proceeded to the opposite extreme, and surmised that all the elements combined, and conflicted among themselves in their various combinations, and that it was only a question of the strong overcoming the weak.

But to this view there is the objection that it separates the elements into sections, and fails to coincide with the obvious fact that each Greater Ego is an unity.

These two theories, as I have described them, I have now discarded in favour of a combination of both, and I think we may postulate the fact that all the elements comprising each Greater Ego form an individual whole; that the different combinations of elements do conflict with each other, must, I imagine, also be postulated; and, in order to make the postulates agree, it must be assumed that when

a combination of the elementary substance of life is formed, if it has the approval of the Greater Ego as an entirety, it then becomes the dominant one, holding possession of the brain. But should this dominant combination be without the general approval of the Greater Ego, the latter is unable to suppress it by force ; the only means it can use to prevent the injury to the organism which this combination is likely to effect, being to stimulate opposing combinations of elements, and by building up a stronger force, stultify the power for evil of the objectionable combinations.

The elements of the Greater Mind, either singly or in combination, cannot work quite independently of the Greater Ego, which is responsible for all thought and action in the organism, through its possession of the faculty by which it can stimulate opposing combinations into consciousness. The parts which actually execute the phenomena carry no responsibility.

It is obvious that a community of the elements of life, many of which are antagonistic to each other, must, since they may have to exist together for a considerable period of time, possess some sort of constitution or government.

In all human communities the question of constitution or government is of paramount importance, since harmonious communities of mankind are impossible without some sort of constitution, embodying laws, and rules, and regulations.

All the various forms of government adopted by men may be divided broadly into two classes—the autocratic and the democratic, these two systems being of course subject to modifications, according to circumstances. But a commonwealth, pure and simple, in which all the members of the community, the youngest and the oldest, the weak and the strong, are equal to each other—that is, where there is no authority—is never met with.

In every human community there must necessarily be different grades of authority, one over another, from the highest in the scale to the lowest, and—as I have already pointed out elsewhere in this work—authority, however limited, cannot exist unless it possesses power to inflict punishment for disobedience; but this rule which applies to the constitution and government of material communities need not apply to the constitution and government of the elements of life.

Our researches into the nature of the elementary substances of life tended to show that, unlike the elements comprising communities of mankind and other animals, they are not entities with a separate existence; that is, instead of a life possessing a number of complete intelligences, it has only one complete intelligence, the which is made up of fractional parts of this intelligence, each fractional part having a peculiar character of its own, which it naturally loses, in so far as regards identity, when compounded with its kindred elements, just as

oxygen and hydrogen lose their peculiar characters when they compound and form water.

The effort in this chapter will be to find out how the elementary substances which constitute a life govern themselves or are governed.

It will be observed that we are now considering the complete organism, or life, and not the mind only.

We are not compelled to regard the governing power of the elements of life as being similar to any of the various forms of government prevailing in human communities, seeing that, if there be any authority among the elements of the Greater Ego, then, as in the other communities, there must be various grades of authority, leading up to one which exercises supreme control; and as there does not seem to be any scientific method of elucidating what such supreme authority (if any) is, we must perforce remain, respecting it, as contentedly as we can in the dark.

Until recently it has been considered that the mind worked under the autocratic system of government, but now the prevailing theory is that its controlling power is a vague sort of dual, or oligarchic, or republican, form of rule, more or less analogous to one or other of those adopted by human communities.

There is no disguising the fact that modern thought has brought the question of the government of the mind into a peculiarly contradictory and unsatis-

factory condition ; the theory which used to prevail among scientists, that the mind of man is one and indivisible, is no longer entertained, and no psychologist or physiologist of the modern school of thought ever now advances the theory of the indivisible mind ; all modern discoveries go to prove that there is something of mentality in every organism, besides the mind of the brain. But modern scientists do not propose anything in place of the discarded notion of the one and indivisible mind of the brain, and consequently that important part of the question is left in a state of chaos.

Thus the one and indivisible mind, as it has always been presented to us, has been shorn of half its former importance, for a second mind, called the unconscious mind, has been discovered, and made to share with it the honours of place. And this newly found unconscious mind, we are told, is not posterior to the mind, but anterior to it, distinctly independent of it, and, as it were, a feeder to it—in fact, we have now a dual mind. But we are not told which of these two minds is the superior one, or if both are equal ; certainly if either of them has superior power to the other, that one must possess authority, which takes us back to mental autocracy.

And while modern science has deprived the mind of the brain, its whilom sovereignty, it has not provided or suggested any other form of mental government, or constitution, in place of the deposed system. There are insurmountable difficulties in the way

of theorising that the communities of life's elements are governed by an autocratic power, because, if so, what, and where, is the autocrat? Science reveals no knowledge of it; and if the government be really autocratic, there can be practically no limit to its power over the community, because any limit to the power of an autocrat would stultify it.

Equally impossible seems a tripartite, or an oligarchical government, or a dual mind; in fact any of these systems of rule would be even more incomprehensible than an autocracy. And government upon the republican principle, as it is represented by human communities, is open to the objection that some members of the community, headed by the president, must possess power over other members, and hence authority comes in.

Likewise government or constitution founded upon the simplest commonwealth principle where all the elements have *equal power* if applied to a mind or a life, is open to the unanswerable objection that we cannot conceive a means whereby a number of diverse elements, *if separate entities*, can compound and produce that which is so evident a unity, namely, an organism.

This was fully explained in the last chapter on the compounding of mental units.

As the principles of all the foregoing descriptions of government have been applied to the mind, and found to be unworkable, it appears to me that it is necessary to conceive an entirely new sort of con-

stitution for it. No doubt it may be urged that a constitution unlike any on earth is not government in the ordinary acceptation of the term, but it may be self-government.

It is true that the self-governing system has already been applied to life's elements by many psychologists, including Lotze and Durand de Gros, but they have all had their labours in this direction checked, and they have all failed to discover the obstacle in the way of their success.

The reasons of their non-success are several. For instance, they invested some monads with powers over others, such as an arch-cell, or pontifical monad—which hypothesis must be fatal, as it would necessarily lead to Authority; or they imagined all monads to be of the same pattern, which is also fatal to the compounding and producing of anything other than a greater number, or a larger bulk, of themselves.

Thus the nature of the elements with which they worked, being all complete and separate entities in themselves, made the task of forming them into a one and undivided whole, such as a Greater Mind, or a soul, an impossibility. They began at the wrong end. Had they taken the soul as an unity, and reduced it, by analysis, into its elements, they might have solved the problem.

Suppose, for example, we take the printed leaf of a book. It is, so far as it goes, a complete whole, and we cannot strike out any part of it without

destroying its completeness. Now, tear it into small pieces. It will not be difficult, by putting the parts together in their original positions, to reconstruct it, so that it may be as easily read as it was before it was torn ; but it would be impossible to construct the pieces in the first instance and form them into an entire leaf so that the letterpress could be read.

Yet such is the sort of task which many of the scientists have set themselves, and endeavoured to perform. Obviously, if a torn or a shattered article is to be reconstructed, all the parts which belonged to it in its entirety must be replaced, or it cannot be reconstructed ; the torn or shattered parts cannot be constructed.

Thus a Greater Mind or a soul may have parts, but each part, separately, is incomplete, and it cannot be regarded otherwise than as a part. Hence, if we are to discover what a soul is, we must take the parts as incomplete fragments, and build up the soul with them, as an osteologist would build up a complete skeleton from loose bones, but he can only use the loose bones of the skeleton he is building ; to use any other bones would make the skeleton incomplete.

This theory argues that every organism is an unity, and that every unity must have parts, the possibility of an active unity without parts being inconceivable.

Therefore, although in one sense an organism is a community or commonwealth of elementary substances, yet, as these substances are permeable, they

may manifestly compound and form a single substance which must be the sum of all its parts.

This nature, which all the parts of an organism possesses of being able to compound and produce a single substance, necessarily does away with authority as pertaining to the parts, as when all the parts are compounded in an organism there can be no authority in any of these parts.

Let us further consider the terms Authority, Equality, and Unity, as applied to the elementary substances of life.

By the term Unity, I mean a single substance of perfectly compounded elements, whether universal, organic, or inorganic.

By Authority, I mean the supposition that any element, or combination of elements, can possess power over any other element or combination of elements to compel its submission.

By Equality, I mean that, although the elements of the unity may have qualitative differences, yet there is no absolute separation, and all the elements are equal, as regards power, to each other, whether singly or in combination.

Seeing that absolute Authority would be incompatible with the unity which this theory maintains, I imagine that further research will show that it cannot exist.

No doubt philosophers generally theorise in favour of authority in some form, but there are exceptions, and the arguments of these latter are

certainly the more logical. And although some of our greatest thinkers—Herbert Spencer among them—maintain that all phenomena are due to variations of force, to most students it must seem unnatural. Yet the theories are so well reasoned out that it appears impossible to detect a flaw in them. But my investigations seem to have disclosed one, in the fact that the philosophers who have rejected the authority argument have omitted from their calculations the existence, as a compound substance, of the soul, or vital essence—by which I mean all intelligence which is apart from force and matter. On the other hand, the philosophers who recognise the soul are unable to dispense with authority, since to the soul they attribute power over matter, and consequently give it authority.

It may truly be said that whatever exists now upon earth exists in the universe, and has existed, though doubtless in other forms, through all time. And if authority exists now in this world, then it exists in the universe. But can authority, or absolute power, exist in this world, or anywhere? Let us premise that authority means a power which makes, or enforces, or endeavours to enforce, laws, and punishes those for whom they are made when they disobey them. Yet no power can compel obedience to any law or command; authority may torture its victim, and yet not conquer him. A man may be made to meet death in its most agonising form, and yet retain the secret which

authority would have wrested from him had it possessed the power to do so. The old adage, "You may lead a horse to the water, but you cannot make him drink," exactly illustrates the limit to which even the most powerful authority must always be confined, namely, the willingness or otherwise of the commanded to obey the commander. Even the power of God is unable to compel a man to do His wish if the man be rebelliously opposed to doing it. And we need go no further than this to prove that absolute authority does not exist.

What limited authority there is can, as already pointed out, only be maintained by the power to inflict punishment for disobedience; for all life exercises its own discretion, and obeys only when it deems fit, for some sufficient reason as fear, duty, affection, self-interest, and so on. But disobedience is a quality that must always be reckoned with, since rebellion against authority is always possible.

These facts tend to show that whatever forces there may be in an organism, no force or forces can have absolute power over any other force or forces; therefore the soul, or vital essence, cannot have the absolute power in the organism necessary to enforce obedience.

Those who contend in favour of the authority theory, should endeavour to explain what power the soul can possess over matter, which, if it be not inert, must have the power of refusal to obey; and if it be inert, then how can the vital essence con-

struct from it such an organ as, for instance, the eye, and make mere inert matter exhibit such phenomena as the emotions? Surely the supposition that inert matter can be made to do these things at the command of the vital essence is opposed to reason.

That man is an unity, composed of *one substance*—that, in fact, he is the soul, used to be accepted as an indisputable fact, until science showed that the physical matter composing the organism can be reduced to the same elements as those which constitute inorganic matter, and that each of the forces of life, as heat, &c., can be examined apart from life. But the rejection by modern scientists of ancient theories does not invariably prove them to be wrong, and it is possible that, however wrong the ancient philosophers' conception of the phenomena may have been in detail, they may have been right in the abstract, and it does not follow that their unity theory should be inconsequently dismissed merely because it was surrounded by obvious errors, since further consideration might make it feasible that mind, matter, and force, can so perfectly compound as to produce the single compound we know as life, just as two forces travelling towards each other at an angle, may, on meeting, compound and produce a single force different from that of either.

Unity with equality of power in the elements and forces constituting an organism, is, so far as we can

judge, an absolute necessity if we hope to realise what life is. Even if we are able to imagine the existence of absolute authority, we shall be obliged to relegate it to the unknown, and consequently stultify ourselves. Moreover, if all the phenomena of nature, as mind, matter, and force, cannot compound and become one substance, then, if driven to their limits, there does not seem to be any middle course between the theories of *absolute authority* and *absolute independence of parts*. Now both of these theories will permanently close the gates against any comprehensive understanding of what life is, because in the first instance any absolute authority we may meet with in this world must eventually lead up to a great supreme controlling power Who is utterly beyond any conception we are able to form, and of Whom we cannot possibly know anything, and in the other instance, anything like absolute independence of parts would lead to such a state of existence which may be described as simply impossible.¹

It would thus appear according to the Greater Mind theory that absolute authority and absolute independence cannot possibly exist either in the universe as a whole (except the whole is regarded from the objective point of view) or in any part of it, and there only remains to us the conception of the universe as an Unity having within it smaller Unities.

¹ See "Compounding of Mental Units," chap. ii.

This may seem like a paradox, but are we not confronted with many seeming paradoxes in the universe? It would be easy to say that because we cannot conceive any terrestrial thing which never had a beginning and which will never have an end, that the cosmos must necessarily have had a beginning, and that when we look at the starry firmament we cannot conceive it possible for it to go on and on to Infinity, and yet paradox as it seems, such is really the case.

Let us rather examine the things amongst which we live, and see whether there are any unities in this world having unities within them, undivided wholes made up of parts. If there are such, we can then conceive it possible for a Greater Ego to be an unity whilst at the same time it may be composed of a number of elements, and that these parts may possess neither authority nor independence.

We only realise an undivided whole through our conception of it as a whole, and whilst viewing it as a whole, although it is composed of parts, it is obvious that we cannot conceive its parts separately.

To explain my meaning, let us take as an illustration Sebastian del Piombo's picture in the National Gallery, representing the raising of Lazarus. Now this picture is made up of parts; there is the figure of Christ, there is the figure of Lazarus, the figures of the Apostles and bearers of Lazarus and others, yet in the conception of every beholder it is an

undivided whole, for block out any portion and the whole ceases to be the whole you have been looking at ; it becomes another whole, and directly you turn from the whole and look intently at a part, the whole fades away and the part you are looking at becomes an undivided whole.

It is impossible to see the picture as a whole whilst examining a part, although you may realise that the part is only a part. You cannot see both distinctly at the same time. If you are looking at and admiring the marvellously painted hand of Lazarus, you cannot see the picture as a whole ; and if you are looking at the whole you cannot see the technique of the hand. Take also as an illustration the building of St. Peter's, Rome. It is made up entirely of parts, but it becomes in the conception of the beholder a distinct and undivided whole—an unity. Cast your eyes upon the altar and the altar becomes an unity ; cast your eyes upon a part of the altar and the part you are looking at becomes an unity.

This is the kind of unity which best represents the Greater Ego, but whereas the picture of the raising of Lazarus and the building of St. Peter's represent object, the Greater Ego may represent both object and subject.

The two instances given make beautiful unities ; but of course there may be incongruous ones also as there are beautiful Greater Egos and discordant Greater Egos.

Thus each Greater Ego is always an unity, for when the parts are working, they, like the parts of the picture, cannot be disunited from the whole, and when examined separately the whole which is always present is either not seen or is seen indistinctly.

The elementary substances of Mind and their various combinations have, like the figures in the picture when examined separately, the appearance of being separate parts, but in reality they cannot be disunited from the unity.

It may be objected that a Greater Ego cannot be an unity because a true unity cannot have within it opposing forces, and if the term, "a true unity," means something homogeneous, with no one part different from any other part, or even with no parts at all, then there can be no such a thing as an unity. Nevertheless whether the unities above mentioned come within the limited meaning of the word is a matter of no consequence, the unities are as I have described them, and if there is no better word to represent the particular kind of unities of my theory, let the word be understood in the light of this explanation.

We see the parts of an unified whole when we turn a terrestrial globe on its axis. We can centre our interest only upon one part of the sphere at a time, although the whole may be grasped at once by the mind, and hence all the parts of the globe may be said to be comprehended at once, as an entirety. And as all the parts of the globe are necessary to

the whole, so all the peculiar elements of a particular life (without any chance elements) are necessary to form the particular Greater Ego.

From one point of view, the Greater Ego is an independent unity, with complete power over itself; while from another standpoint, we see a community of conflicting elements producing the inconsistencies, variableness, and contradictions which are always present in the Greater Ego.

Such, then, is the constitution of the Greater Ego, in which are (apparently paradoxically) combined the principles of an autocracy and a commonwealth. It is both an individual unity, and a pluralistic compound of elements.

The whole of the fundamental part of my theory has now been explained; in the last chapter I gave an explanation of the substances which this theory maintains are the elements of Mind which, although distinct from, yet are always found compounded with, the well-known substances which are the elements of Force and the elements of Matter; and in the present chapter I have given an explanation of a means whereby the whole of the elementary substances forming an organism may constitute an unity in which authority, that great stumbling-block to the formation of a true unity, is absolutely non-existent.

But perhaps the most interesting part of the work is to follow; the chapters immediately succeeding

show a series of experiments which the writer maintains will go far to solve the problems as to the meaning and nature of the various phenomena which are given at the heading of each chapter, and in the later chapters there will be an endeavour to discover whether this theory, as already explained, affords also a reasonable explanation of the mysterious phenomena associated with the universe.

CHAPTER IV

THE EGO AND THE GREATER EGO

I MUST now advance my reason for giving to the organism the term Greater Ego, and show in what respect it differs from what is known as the Ego.

Modern psychological discoveries have destroyed the long entertained theory of an indivisible brain personality; and yet every person in normal mental condition, is conscious of the possession of a distinct individuality.

It is therefore necessary to form some hypothesis which, while admitting the existence of facts apparently antagonistic to the conception of an indivisible personality, will at the same time account for the commonly prevailing sense each person has that he is an unity, that he is always the same person.

By the theory of the Greater Ego, the unifying of well-known phenomena, comprising everything in a human life, is effected by natural process, and made to represent each organism as a distinct and single personality. And if upon examination this view proves to be correct, it will have the desirable effect of closing up what has long been a puzzling hiatus.

I should point out that, although the Greater Ego in this theory is primarily divided into a certain

number of elementary and distinctive qualities, they must not be mistaken for separate entities, seeing that, for reasons concerned with self-compounding, it is necessary to assume that there is but one element of each sort in the universe, and that each of them pervades all space. Therefore the elements in each organism, as well as those of inorganic matter, are only portions of the universal—and original—elements.

And, further, we must infer that it is the compounding of these portions of elements, under certain conditions, which determines each phase of consciousness ; and that, as life rises from its lowest to the higher forms, there is in it a *pro rata* increase of these elements ; that while, as evolution advances, some of these elements will become less pronounced, the powers of others will be greater. That the definite but temporary combinations of elements in the Greater Ego are produced and excited into action by stimuli, which may be either external, or existent in the organism (in which case they will provide the organic appetites, as hunger, thirst, lust, &c. ; and the combination will exist until either its desire be fulfilled, or it has been deposed and replaced by some other combination), and that the combination will be determined by the relation of the organism to its environment. But the essential nature of the combination will necessarily correspond to the nature of the elements which make up the combination, and are contained in the organism, and not in the environment.

As the elements of life are neither fully intelligenced, nor possessed of any complex intelligence, it is for that reason alone that they are capable of *compounding* and forming themselves into a fully intelligenced self-governing commonwealth such as a Greater Ego is. If all the latter's elements were fully intelligenced; if they were entities with a separate existence, their formation, through any synthesis, into what is both an unity and a commonwealth, would not be conceivable.

Hence the Greater Ego may be regarded as a community of describable, but unanalysable, elements (portions of the parent elements), neither directing any inferior elements nor subject to any superior ones, for the reason that no others exist. It is the Alpha and the Omega of everything pertaining to the organism, the physical being its outward aspect, which it has formed, and built up, and directs, and keeps in order, each organism being its own architect, and builder, and overseer.

As previously explained, this theory starts from the position that mind and matter are but different phases of the same noumena, and that at present the only tenable hypothesis adequate to explaining the variety of phenomena existing in this world, necessitates the assumption that there are more than one elementary substance, and that all ideas must be logically regarded as containing an elementary something which imparts to them its peculiar property and characteristics.

Viewed from this standpoint, what we call life may be regarded as a quantitative aggregation and combination of those elements which exhibit a greater amount of the so-called vital characteristics than others. Of these elementary substances, when not affiliated, we probably are not actually conscious, each element being manifest to us only in combination with others, one (or more) of which is always dominant, and produces in the combination its peculiar character.

We are led to infer the presence of this peculiar and dominant element, simply by the characteristics of the group of phenomena named by the word which represents the idea.

The Greater Mind being represented by the processes which go on in the organism, will consequently be the result of the varying activity of the different elements comprising it. The Conscious Mind, under these circumstances, will consist of a series of continually changing phases, which will depend upon environment for their individual activity. Hence different combinations of these elementary substances will be called into activity at different times; the sense of continuity will be produced by the more gradual transition of one combination into another. The more complex the organism, and the higher its development, the greater will be the number of combinations and recombinations, the greater the complexity of the states of consciousness, and the more gradual substitution that will

take place in the passing from one stage of consciousness to another. Hence a greater sense of continuity.

While this theory maintains the unity of the Greater Ego, it argues that without such unity any satisfactory explanation of the mystery of life is impossible. Therefore to allow the brain an intelligence differing fundamentally from that of any other of the vital parts, would be to break up the organism into separate and independent sections, and all notion of unity must then be relinquished; and so if unity be a necessity—as I feel convinced it is—it can only be attained by such an unification of all the parts of the organism compounded into one massive intelligence as is achieved by the Greater Ego.

Many are the names which have been given to parts of the Greater Ego—as mind, consciousness, subconsciousness, states of consciousness, emerged self, submerged self, mental forces, mental faculties, will, intellect, feelings, emotions, brain power, nerve power, and so on. The Greater Ego, embodying, as it does, the entire organism, necessarily includes them all, as well as all the vital processes concerned with the organism.

I will repeat here that the Greater Ego means and includes the whole of the organism regarded from its mental, rather than from its physical aspect; and although no doubt the term will seldom if ever be applied otherwise than to mankind, it

of course does not follow that the constitution of man is different, save in degree, from that of the other higher class animals.

The Greater Ego is the man as he actually is; besides including the Ego, it represents the whole of the elements of life, mental and material, and therefore it is superior to the Ego.

The Greater Ego also represents the man's permanent individual personality—so far, that is to say, as the personality can be considered permanent, for during life the tissues of the body are continually changing by waste and renewal. Yet in the course of a man's life his Greater personality alters but little. The old saw that "the boy is father to the man" is obviously an unchallengeable truth.

Since Nature but rarely indicates any very distinctive line between her various productions, but rather blends each kind gradually, and more or less imperceptibly, into other varieties, so we must recognise the blending of the Mind into the Greater Mind, the Ego into the Greater Ego, and the Personality into the Greater Personality.

The Greater Mind is more distinct from the conscious Mind than the Greater Ego is from the Ego, and the Greater Ego is more distinct from the Ego than the Greater Personality is from the Personality; the Personality approaches very closely to the Greater Personality. For while the intelligence of the vital organs, although parts of Greater Mind, are not

parts of the conscious Mind, there is very little in a man's Greater Personality which is not also in his Personality.

Investigators of this theory often ask how a man can logically be considered as a community of elements, when he feels himself to be master of his own thoughts and actions, and is therefore, in that respect, an autocrat. The answer is, that although a man in his entirety is a community of elements which form the Greater Ego, yet his brain is a series of small autocrats following one another in consecutive succession. The combination of elements which the Greater Ego allows to become momentarily dominant in the brain, is for that space of time a single force, the which, during its brief existence, is an absolute autocrat. It is the Ego, but not the Greater Ego, master of itself, and therefore of its actions.

And so we have the whole community of elements representing the Greater Ego, and the kaleidoscopic combinations of the same elements in the brain, representative of the ever-changing Egos, or autocrats.

The explanation of the continuity of mind—the flow of reason being the result of the combinations of the elements of life continually dissolving and reforming—is that the combination of elements which is dominant in the brain, can, of course, only remain in power while it is doing its work; when its task is completed, or it can proceed no further with it, or if the Greater Ego is dissatisfied

with the combination, another combination will replace it.

Each of these combinations employs, and uses up, during its short life, but an inconsiderable portion of the elements of the Greater Ego. Suppose that a combination of low-class elements has assumed the dominancy of the brain. It will then be a question of either allowing it, for a fleeting enjoyment's sake, to retain its ascendancy, or of suppressing and displacing it in favour of a combination of superior elements. In every case, if the Greater Ego possesses the organs of the higher grade elements, it is within its power to adopt either the easy and seductive, but mischievous, or the right and wholesome, though generally more irksome, alternative. From which it should be gathered that it is easy for a small combination of inferior elements to lead the Greater Ego into disaster, in the absence of sufficient stimuli to arouse and maintain an effective opposition to it by elements of the higher grade.

Hence it will be understood how the possessor of a noble mind may be betrayed into the performance of ignoble actions—how, for instance, an official of justice, in administering punishment to an offender for cruelty, may be guilty of greater cruelty than that committed by the culprit; and how a person may be gentle and kind one instant, and vicious and vindictive the next. And it teaches us the necessity of cultivating and exercising the organs of the higher grade elements.

If the Greater Ego be as other communities, it would hardly, grammatically speaking, be correct for it to refer to itself as "I," or be referred to as "he." The pronouns should be "we," and "it." To make my meaning clear on this point, I will give a descriptive illustration wherein "it" is used instead of "he," and "we" is substituted for "I," and in which I have endeavoured to keep the mind of the brain distinct from the Greater Mind.

We will supposititiously take for our example a mentally and physically healthy working man. The animal (Greater Ego) in its entirety, is a machine of surpassingly marvellous construction, and each of its parts, or organs, represents its own peculiar elements. Thus there are the Greater Mental elements constituting the heart, the stomach, the lungs, the brain, and so on, respectively.

Now we will assume that this animal, or Greater Ego, having—within certain well-defined limits—control of its own physical organs, makes for its daily occupation at six o'clock in the morning, and, with the exception of a thirty minutes' interval for its breakfast, it works steadily on until mid-day, by which time, in consequence of the destruction of its physical forces which has been going on all these hours, it needs replenishing. The stomach of the machine is empty, and a feeling of discomfort in and about its vicinity is the result. The elements constituting it are clamouring for food. But many elements, constituting many structures, are necessary in

order to procure the food, and the excited stomach elements so persistently disturb and rouse all the other elements with their demand for food, that all are compelled to give their whole attention to the stomach. The animal, not having brought its dinner with it, the meal will have to be procured somewhere, and herein come the higher grade elements ; the expenses have to be calculated, a decision arrived at with regard to where the food shall be obtained, the sort to be selected, and so forth ; the stomach itself, of course, being unable to calculate, or reason.

We will go on to imagine that the majority of the elements interested in this matter being affiliated—for individually they can have no intelligent interest—they determine to visit an eating-house in the next street. Now that part of the animal which happens to be in the temporary position of dominancy in the brain, though appearing to be supreme, is only so through the Greater Ego allowing it to assume this position for its own purposes ; the brain is merely an intermediate agent, a “go-between,” as it were. Considered objectively, the animal, through its conscious mind, assumes that its conscious mind is paramount, which no doubt for the moment and for the purpose it may be, but only on sufferance of the Greater Ego. The animal may stand in front of the eating establishment and say to itself, “I will not dine in this place, because here there are no illustrated newspapers. I will go to some other shop where the publications which I want to see are pro-

vided!" But the conscious mind does not say that on its own responsibility, for it is without authority. It is the Greater Ego allowing that part of its elements which comprises the conscious mind to speak for itself, by permission, as it were.

It is therefore not the Ego, or conscious mind, which wields the power over the Greater Ego, but rather it is the Greater Ego which has the power over the Ego, or conscious mind; it is the Greater Ego which determines its own course of action, using the brain, or conscious mind, as a means to this end.

The human machine is put in motion and deployed according to the particular combinations of elements which are permitted for the time being to dominate the brain. The elements in combination are omnipotent so long as they are allowed by the Greater Ego to maintain their dominancy; but the outwardly conscious part of the machine has no knowledge of the elements in the background, which rule it.

To learn anything of these elements, we must have a combination with a peculiar nature assuming dominancy in a superior sort of brain—that is to say, we must have the organs of these elements. If we can but get the right elements and the right organs in the brain, there is no reason why a combination of greater mental elements should not be formed which would explain the mystery of infinity.

It should not be inferred that because the con-

scious mind, or Ego, appears to assume omnipotency in the organism, that it is assuming a position to which it has no claim. It assumes nothing, for the very good reason that *qua* mind, it has no existence. It is the Greater Mind which speaks, as it were, in sections. The conscious mind is but a reproduction of one or more of these sections.

Life is the only compound of elements having initiative intelligences, and to it as represented by man custom has given the nominative singular. Seeing, however, that the case is unique, custom in this instance may well be conceded the advantage.

When a man says, "I am the same self that I was yesterday," although his statement is perfectly true, it is liable to a wrong interpretation.

The actual position is that a small combination of the elements, having obtained dominance in the brain, and so becoming the Ego, is permitted to say the words which, while true with regard to the Greater Ego, are misleading when uttered by the small combination. But it must be clear that the Greater Ego, as a whole, is only responsible when the words are applied to itself, and it is not responsible for their being applied to the small combination representing the conscious mind, for the latter can only represent the full powers of the Greater Ego by its continuous changes.

Thus while the Greater Ego must be regarded as responsible for the sayings and doings of all its various combinations of elements, just as the printer

of a periodical publication is responsible to the law for the character of its contents, although in fact both Greater Ego and printer may be opposed on principle to the words for which they are answerable.

A great deal of the student's difficulty of comprehending what Mind is might be overcome if he would understand the reason why the words uttered by one combination of elements, comprising the conscious mind at one time, need not coincide with the opinion of another combination of elements comprising the conscious mind at another time: that while the Greater Ego is to-day the same as it was yesterday, consciousness, as represented by the Ego, is continually changing. The true, or Greater Ego, is always in the background, he never exhibits himself in all his fulness, for we cannot conceive the whole commonwealth of elements framing a single combination in the brain. The Greater Ego can only be inferred by closely watching all the words, actions, and looks, both conscious and unconscious, of the individual.

Each of the five sensory feelings—seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting, and smelling—possesses organs in the brain, and also organs, structures, and nerves, in the body; or rather, to be accurate, the elements of the senses are there, for the senses are themselves the organs.

The elements of the sensory feelings have a very simple nature in themselves, until they are compounded with other elements; for instance, it is

possible that a person may see without perceiving ; he may hear without realising what he hears ; he may touch, or be touched, without knowing what he has touched or been touched by ; he may taste, without knowing what he has tasted ; and he may smell, without knowing what he has smelled. But usually the elements comprising the senses arouse various feelings and emotions through association, which combine, and thus become different in character from the simple sensory elements.

We cannot be aware of the existence of any describable emotions, or sensations, other than those already indicated among the abstract nouns.

Sensations and emotions are closely connected, the sensation coming before the emotion. The difference between a sensation and an emotion may be demonstrated by lightly touching, say, a stranger's hand with any pointed instrument. A slight prickling sensation will be felt, and if the point of the instrument is pressed, a sensation of pain will be felt, and will probably be accompanied by an emotion of annoyance, and perhaps of anger. To further experimentalise, the surreptitious conveyance of a living reptile, as a frog or a toad, into the unsuspecting hand, would be likely to result in the sensation of touch being succeeded by a series of violent emotions, among which even cruelty might be represented, since, however humanely the owner of the unpleasantly surprised hand may ordinarily treat the perhaps beautiful and inoffensive animal em-

ployed to startle him with, he would now, in his rage and excitement, hardly stay to consider the measure of injury he inflicted upon it; nor would he for the moment regret its sufferings, or even think of them.

The sensations and emotional feelings experienced by a person who is reading, or writing, or speaking, are distinct from the motor actions necessary for the performance of these phenomena; for reading, writing, and speaking, can hardly be described as distinctive feelings. I rather incline to think that, in themselves, they might with some accuracy be called habits—the means by which the ever-continuous stream of emotions and feelings is received from, or given to, the outer world. In reading, the emotions are aroused by the author's words or word pictures, but in writing and speaking they come into existence from within the subject, and are communicated to the outer world by the method which nature has taught them to adopt.

As this theory of life simplifies the different mental phenomena, and reduces all into one family of elements, there is no fundamental difference between a sensation, a thought, an emotion, or a feeling; continuous thought is only a continuity of emotions; general consciousness is only a constant alternating of combinations of the various elements. Thus all forms of consciousness are only the elements working in the brain, and all forms of unconsciousness (inner consciousness) are only the same elements working without a substratum of brain.

Therefore we cannot separate, otherwise than superficially, the different mental phenomena, but must include sensations with thought, and thought with emotions, and feelings with consciousness.

With regard to thought, Professor William James rightly argues that the most simple method of stating the fact would be to say "it thinks." "The first facts for us as psychologists," writes the professor, "is that thinking goes on. I use the word 'thinking' . . . for every form of consciousness indiscriminately. If we could say in English, 'it thinks,' as we say 'it rains,' and 'it blows,' we would be stating the fact most simply, but as we cannot, we must simply say that thought goes on.

"Five characters in thought.

"How does thought go on? We notice immediately five important characters in the process—

"(1.) Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness.

"(2.) Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing.

"(3.) Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous.

"(4.) It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself.

"(5.) It is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others, and welcomes or rejects—chooses from among them, in a word—all the while."

It appears to me that the flow of reason, the continuity of thought, the production of emotions and feelings, are due to association.

Perhaps a good way to convey this idea to the reader will be to resort again to imagery.

Let us picture, then, a cottage, far out in the open country. Its occupier, with a pipe in his mouth, is lounging idly against the garden gate. Anon he notices a moving something in the extreme distance, which, although too far away to be distinguished by its form, his apperception suggests to him is probably a pig, that being the prevailing animal in the district. At once the combination of elements conjured up by, and constituting, the mentally pictorial representation of the pig, continues without cessation to add to its forces, and presently forms, by association, a mental view of an unsavoury pigstye, and a feeling of DISGUST ensues. The procession of the elements flows on, compounding and decomposing as it comes, and bringing presently the idea of a pretty pastoral scene, in which pigs, small and large, are roaming and feeding among stacks of corn. The feeling of AESTHETICISM has now taken possession of the subject. Continuing its progress, the procession of the elements carries him in thought to his kitchen, where the imagination of roast pork and its odour excites his APPETITE for food.

But as the moving object approaches nearer to the man, he discovers that it is not a pig, but a

human person. And now the combination of elements forming apperception, suggests that the oncoming individual may be the postman, which in turn suggests the likelihood of a letter from a son who is somewhere in the colonies; and thus **FAMILY AFFECTION** is momentarily in the ascendant. The stream of elements then, however, suggests the greater probability of the looked-for missive being from a lawyer, and concerning certain property; and so **BUSINESS** obtains temporary sway. But the elements go on to suggest that it is too early in the day for the letter-carrier to be on his rounds, and so the feeling now pervades our subject that the oncomer is a poor tramp, and he thereupon experiences the emotion of **COMPASSION**; and the impulse takes him to provide the object of his pity, when he arrives, with a substantial meal; and hence he comes under the domination of **CHARITY**. A few seconds more, and the watcher perceives that the man is not a tramp, but appears to be a gunner carrying a fowling-piece, and a feeling of **SPORT** takes possession of him. Still nearer, and, judging from the figure, he suspects that it may be his enemy, consequently his brow wrinkles, his lips compress, and he is a victim of the feeling of **HATE**. Finally the supposed bearer of the gun approaches near enough for his features to be distinguishable, whereupon the lounging at the gate recognises in him his bosom friend, and his heart goes out to him in **BROTHERLY LOVE**. Visions of pleasant dis-

cussions and controversies with him upon the subject of mental philosophy occupy his mind, and so, for the instant, SCIENCE prevails.

There is nothing new or speculative in this picture; it is as commonplace and matter-of-fact as can well be conceived. It is simply what we all have experienced in an infinite variety of ways.

Here we have eleven different Feelings, or Emotions. But we have no name for the initial undeveloped promptings, brought into existence through associations, from unconsciousness, and which undoubtedly have a distinct character of their own.

If these eleven Feelings be traced backwards, there will be found, among their many elements, eleven distinct initial promptings or elements which afterwards become the dominant elements.

Scientists apparently are content to vaguely classify these initial promptings as impulses, and instincts. Nor have they made any attempt to differentiate them.

These eleven examples of feelings may be increased indefinitely, and as each of them is possessed by at least one element which is not in any of the others—or at least, which is not dominant therein—there must obviously be a large colony of them.

Allowing them, then, a workable constitution, we have the foundation of a new and reasonable theory, which may possibly solve the great problems of ethics.

My point in this theory will be better explained by the ensuing process :—

The idea of the pig, leading to the mental picture of the pigsty.

The pig, leading on to the suggestion of the homestead.

The pig, leading on to the suggestion of the kitchen.

The postman, leading to the idea of a letter from a relative abroad.

The postman, leading to the expectation of a letter from the lawyer.

The tramp, leading to the idea of his look of misery.

The tramp, leading to the idea of his look of hunger.

The idea of a man with a gun, leading to a mental picture of a shooting.

The idea of the enemy, leading to an emotion of animosity.

The idea of the friend, leading to the sensation of brotherly friendship.

The thought of the friend, leading to the recollection of scientific conversations.

The birth of a Greater Mental element, leading, by compounding with other elements, to the feeling of disgust.

The birth of a Greater Mental element, leading to the feeling of the æsthetic.

The birth of a Greater Mental element, leading to the feeling of appetite.

The birth of a Greater Mental element, leading to the feeling of family affection.

The birth of a Greater Mental element, leading to the feeling of interest in business.

The birth of a Greater Mental element, leading to the feeling of compassion.

The birth of a Greater Mental element, leading to the feeling of charity.

The birth of a Greater Mental element, leading to the feeling of a love (or otherwise) of sport.

The birth of a Greater Mental element, leading to a feeling of hate.

The birth of a Greater Mental element, leading to a feeling of amicable love.

The birth of a Greater Mental element, leading to a feeling of love of science.

Of course these eleven feelings are but a few of what the man at the gate might have experienced

under the circumstances. For instance, the supposition of the postman might have led his thoughts to all the various members of his family, and to all his friends and acquaintances, who might be likely to write to him.

It is noticeable that the nerves and motor muscles are visibly affected with every change in the feelings of the personality. Thus, when a man experiences disgust, his face will plainly indicate it, as it also will the presence of the other emotions, of which no doubt hate is the most violent, as under its influence the motor muscles exhibit the greatest movement, and cause the greatest alteration of the features.

As these changes of expression are not self-sought, or voluntary—are not the result of the mind of the brain, or consciousness—they must necessarily represent the processes of Greater Mind.

From the standpoint of the Greater Mind theory, that all the structures and tissues of the organism are comprised of mind, matter, and force, and that they have built themselves up so as to form, as a whole, the Greater Ego, it will be understood that the nerves, as instruments of pain, would have constructed themselves differently if pain had not been necessary.

But although in order that the elements should know everything that goes on in the organism, it is evident that the means of communication must be of an extremely sensitive nature, no combination of elements has yet risen to consciousness to show us

the necessity of the nerves being so constructed that they possess the power of producing pain. If I ask the present dominant combination in my brain—which of course is equivalent to the dominant combination asking itself—if such suffering is necessary, and if so, why ; it answers, “I do not know ; no one knows, and probably it never will be known. No combination capable of imparting that knowledge has ever been formed. And yet, despite its improbability, it is possible that a combination may some day succeed in obtaining a position in the brain that will enable it to solve the problem.”

This illustrates the difficulty of reserving in mind the fact that all thinking is done by a succession of combinations of elements, as each combination can only think or speak for itself, and hence the combinations of Greater Mind are constantly moving and following one another with more or less rapidity, after the manner of geometrical figures shown by a magic lantern.

The nerves are so intimately connected with the elements of life—being the elements themselves—that every sensation, emotion, thought, &c., is induced by them, through the medium of themselves. Have, then, we may ask, the elements within themselves the elements of original pleasure and pain, or are they compelled to create the nerves of so sensitive a nature that pleasure and pain are a necessary result ?

These questions, with our present limitations of

knowledge, are difficult to answer, but there are two reasons for expecting the affirmative to be for the former one; firstly, because it favours the idea of the ultimate unity of substance, from which stand-point, pleasure and pain cannot be separated from universal noumena to become independent parts of the organism; and secondly, because it is not conceivable that the elements could create pleasure and pain; by analogous reasoning, those sensations must be part of their nature when they are in certain combinations, and they must in themselves be powerless to cause or prevent them.

And here an interesting incident bearing upon this argument occurs. Compare the last paragraph with the one preceding the last three paragraphs, which was written about two hours before the other. The combination of elements responsible for it was unable to supply any information with regard to the necessity or otherwise of pain. But the combination of the elements responsible for the last paragraph has given an idea, which was evidently produced by association (memory) bringing up the monistic theory, together with that of the unalterable nature of elements, and, by inference founding an opinion from them. Plainly then, the desired information is not to be arrived at by *a priori* knowledge; the necessary factor is experience.

Although there may be a possibility of the formation of a combination of elements which shall be capable of solving for us the mysteries of the be-

ginning, the reason, and the end, of all things, yet, as all combinations of elements producing consciousness are only compounded through experience, apparently experience must lead the way. It may be possible that each Greater Ego, as a whole, is *a priori* the master of these mysteries; for it must be remembered that the states of consciousness are composed of but a small proportion of the elements of the organism, and therefore each combination of elements, on realising its second consciousness in the brain, must necessarily be an incomplete combination if the organism as a whole is considered.

It is reasonable to surmise that there are elements in the universe which we are unable to use, by reason of our not having the organs of these elements in the brain; but supposing that mankind, in, perhaps, the distant future, becomes possessed of the necessary organs, it will then, as I have already said, be possible that the now apparently unfathomable mysteries of life and the universe may be understood and explained.

CHAPTER V

CONSCIOUSNESS, SUBCONSCIOUSNESS, AND UNCONSCIOUSNESS

CONTINUING our investigations and carrying with us the previously worked out assumptions that all life is composed of the three groups of elementary substances—Mind, matter, and force. Consciousness, Subconsciousness, and Unconsciousness therefore must be composed entirely of the above elements, and, as they (the states of mind) are evidently representative of the mental aspect of life, the elements of matter and force are generally left out of sight, when the above states are considered ; though there is no evidence that consciousness in any form, or intelligence either, exist independently of matter and force—but as we have already postulated the hypothesis that the above states comprise the elements of each division, we may be allowed to consider them in their mental, and not in their material, aspect.

It will be generally conceded that all which is initiative in man's life is comprised in the heading of this chapter. But if we refer to these three mental states by their alternative names—the conscious mind, the subconscious mind, and the unconscious mind, no doubt many scientists will at

once object to certain forces which are inseparable from the unconscious—as those which carry on the process of digestion, for example—being included in the conditions of mind.

But whether it be called the unconscious mind, or simply the unconscious, all this particular mind or mental state, as well as all states of consciousness, and subconsciousness, will be found included in the comprehensive Mind which I have designated the Greater Mind; and they are all comprised of the same elementary substances.

Thus, when Greater Mind is doing its work through the brain, we have—

Consciousness, or the conscious mind.

When Greater Mind is allowing certain combinations of its elements to use their organs in the brain desultorily, we have—

Subconsciousness, or the subconscious mind.

And when the Greater Mind is performing its functions independently of the brain, we have—

The Unconscious; or, the unconscious mind.

Some of my critics to whom I have submitted certain parts of my theory have been under the impression that I had made a confusion between the Greater Mind and the unconscious mind, but the Greater Mind very widely differs from the unconscious mind, since it is much more comprehensive, for in addition to the unconscious, it includes the subconscious, the conscious, and also every intelligence belonging to the organism, and I

place whatever claim there may be of originality here, upon the fact that, in the term "Greater Mind"—as I use it—the three minds (all inner intelligences included) are Unified, and so, what I profess to have discovered, is, *not a new mind*, but the *elements and constitution* of these three minds unified as they are in the Greater Mind.

Von Hartmann, I must point out, assumes that "the unconscious is a pure and spiritual activity, without a substratum of nerve or brain, which are the bases of consciousness"; while this theory argues that the Greater Mind is a colony of pure and spiritual activities, which, nevertheless, are elementary substances; and that the nerve and brain—the bases of consciousness—are merely organs constructed, maintained, and directed, by the elements of the Greater Mind, similarly to all the other varieties of organs.

It would more truly express my views if I were to say that the brain, the nerves, and all the various organs in the body are themselves the development of the three classes of elements. I do not wish it to be supposed that the elements are outside the brain, nerves, and organs, and direct them as a man might direct the movements of a horse.

From Plato to the present time, scientists generally have been conscious of a spiritual activity, although they have not been unanimous with regard to the form it takes. Thus, Plato's conception of it was the Absolute Idea. Hegel's is the same; von Hartmann's is the Will and Idea; Spinoza's is the

Substance ; Schopenhauer's is the Will ; Fichtor's is the Absolute Ego ; Schelling's is the Absolute Subject Object, and so on.

Such are some of the terms applied to assumed substances, and speculative theories. These substances have never been analytically reduced into technical elements, because the means to do this never probably occurred to their authors, nor has any one ever been able to explain what they are, and how they work.

But, so far from this present theory being speculative, I have advanced in it, many definite hypotheses, which I hold can be proved or falsified by experiment ; and the elements upon which they are founded are always conveniently at hand when required for experimental purposes.

Dr. Schofield, in his work on the "Unconscious Mind," gives a number of interesting extracts from the writings of thinkers on both sides of the Unconscious Mind theory. From those who are antagonistic to it he quotes Bowne ("Unconscious knowing and willing are phrases which defy all interpretation"), Ladd ("To speak of unconscious psychical or mental states as belonging to mind, is to use the words that are quite unintelligible. To talk of unconscious mental states is to talk of the inconceivable, of wooden iron, of the unconscious conscious"), Montgomery ("Every one feels that to speak of unconscious mental states is not only uttering a paradox, but to be almost as

preposterous as if we were to assert non-existent existence"), Sully ("Modern science, physiological as well as psychological, is unable to advance any proof of unconscious elements of processions in the human mind"), Royce ("If by the unconscious mind is meant matter, we remain where we were. But if unconscious mind means aught else; then the term seems equivalent to unconscious consciousness, and all the ingenuity of generations of von Hartmanns shall not induce us to corrupt our speculations with monstrous marriages of contradictory notions, whereof the philosophy of the unconscious 'seems so proud'"), Hutton ("I do not think you can get the result of thinking without thought, of judging without judgment . . . but only physical conditions of thought"), Ireland ("The theory of unconscious cerebration derives no support from physiology"), and Kirchener ("An unconscious consciousness. . . . Are there unconscious acts? . . . the proof of unconscious physical phenomena is difficult, for in order to be experienced they must be known . . . what is adduced as proof fails in certainty").¹ And from those in favour of it: Bowen ("We have produced evidence from known psychologists that the Unconscious Mind is the secret source of apperception"), Rosmini ("The fundamental source of all mental operation"),

¹ I have slightly abridged Dr. Schofield's quotations for the Unconscious Mind theory, but those against it are reproduced verbatim.

James Ward ("The unconscious motive power of all actions"), Ribot ("The immediate cause of all voluntary action." "The elaborate arranger of all dates and facts"), Montgomery ("The basis of all mind action"), Bascom ("The ceaseless offspring of conscious activity"), Maudsley ("The agent that accomplishes all mental work, consciousness being merely the light." "The most important of all mental actions, the essential process on which thinking depends." "The deep basis of all mental functions"), Creighton ("The vast reserve behind the scenes"), Wundt ("The basis on which the conscious always depends." "The uniting agent in all separate acts of consciousness"), Ladd ("The source of happy hits, the rare achievements of inventions, of our most brilliant and impressive acts"), von Hartmann ("The source of genius, instinct, tact, love of the beautiful, invention, ethics"), Barrett ("The seat of inspiration, of conscience, and of divine life"), &c.

It will be seen from these quotations, *pro* and *con*, that the balance of psychological opinion is distinctly in favour of what is clumsily termed the unconscious mind theory. But Dr. Schofield is obviously justified in charging some psychologists with ambiguity. Comparing the contradictory sentences from the writings of the same scientists in different parts of their works (as illustrated in the foregoing quotations from them), it is difficult to gather whether they are questioning the existence of the something called

the unconscious mind, or whether they merely object to the paradox suggested by the term mind, which is confined generally (and no doubt unsatisfactorily) to Consciousness, being prefixed by the word "unconscious." In any case it appears that inappropriate nomenclature is responsible for a great deal of the misunderstanding.

Probably what is really meant by the unconscious mind is an active mind (employing the term "active mind" in a wider sense than psychologists generally use it) having an inner consciousness, of which the conscious mind is unconscious.

When a person becomes the abode of a tape-worm, we may presume that his unwelcome tenant possesses consciousness, and hence it would be misleading to describe it as the unconscious tape-worm, merely because its host is unconscious of its presence within him.

But if we are to make ourselves properly understood, we must employ names as they are commonly applied, however unsatisfactory we may consider the nomenclature. It would not be wise to deny the existence of a thing which we know, or suppose, exists, simply because a name which may mean something else is applied to it. No doubt it would be an advantage to change the name; but if there is any difficulty in the way of doing that, it is better to let the matter remain as it is, and leave the responsibility to the authors of the incongruity.

Another misleading term is "reflex action" when

applied to an intelligent but unconsciously (because independently of the brain) performed action. Remarking upon this, Professor Huxley, in his "Elementary Physiology," says: "The name is not a good one, since it seems to imply that the molecular changes in the afferent nerve, the central column, and the efferent nerve, are all alike, and differ only in direction, whereas there is reason to think that they differ in many ways.

"A Reflex Action," continues the professor, "may take place without our knowing anything about it, and hundreds of such actions are continually going on in our bodies without our being aware of them. But it very frequently happens that we learn that something is going on when a stimulus affects our afferent nerves, by having what we call a feeling, or sensation.

"We class sensations along with *emotions*, and *volitions*, and *thoughts*, under the common head of states of consciousness. But what consciousness is, we know not; and how it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as any other ultimate fact of nature."

Despite this sweeping opinion of Professor Huxley's, however, it will be my endeavour to explain what this consciousness is, and how it comes about.

In this Greater Mind theory, life is represented by the elements which were in the original cell and which afterwards produced the resultant organism.

These elements absorb, or compound with, other elements from the external world—whether they be those of what is called mind, or of what is called matter, or of what is called physical force—in such quantity as may be necessary to build up their organs and structures. They extract from the outside world, and use, by their combined intelligences, their kindred elements of heat, electricity, magnetism; animal, mineral, and vegetable, substances, as they are required, repelling those which are mischievous, or unnecessary, for their purpose. They manufacture—or perhaps it would be more correct to say, they resolve themselves into—the gastric juices for digesting the food which they procure, and prepare. They form themselves into the blood, and into the heart, which circulates it. They construct, and use, all the other apparatus necessary for the maintenance of life; and surely, if the Greater Mental elements be capable of performing such miracles as these—the which after all are merely everyday commonplace matters of fact—it should not be very difficult to believe that they also have power to construct the brain, in order to procure a second, or outward, consciousness.

This theory maintains that any particular combination of Greater Mental elements which has obtained dominance in the brain, has then a new consciousness (*a posteriori*).

All the elements having organs in the body no doubt possess an elementary consciousness of their

own, but the elements dominating the organs have individually no control, or at any rate, only a very limited control, over the motor nerves, *through* their own organs. No initiative and predetermined movements of the motor organs can be made save only by the combination actively using its organs in the brain, or by the consent of the combination. The Greater Mental elements construct the brain for their own use ; it is a part of themselves. No doubt they can, and often do, live and thrive without a brain, as in the case of vegetation ; but the individuals of the vegetable world are without motive power ; they are incapable of migrating from place to place in search of sustenance, or to escape from danger—albeit they not infrequently invent, and practise, devices for their own protection.

Immediately the combination of Greater Mental elements obtains supremacy in the brain, it becomes manifest to itself, as it is also to the Greater Ego—that is to say, it becomes a state of consciousness.

This manifestation appears to be a desirable realisation to the elements, seeing that they evidently regard it as worth contending for.

Man, in his entirety, is represented by the whole of his elements constituting the Greater Ego, but that portion of the elements which are actively using his brain is naturally without complete consciousness of the character and quality of the Greater Ego, although the Greater Ego is conscious of the character and quality of the portion constituting

the combination. It is the successions of the combinations of the elements dominant in the brain (states of consciousness), by which we—in great part, though not altogether—judge our fellow-man. We know him, and criticise him, and commune, and converse with him, through these constantly changing combinations, which represent him as (to us) he appears to be; and his character depends upon the character of the various combinations which assume dominance in his brain.

At the same time—as already indicated—it is impossible to know a man entirely by the combinations which pass through his brain; many of his actions are unconsciously performed, and they, when they come under our observation, reveal to us the quality of the Greater Mind.

Thus a man is really mentally constituted according to the number and grade of the Greater Mental elements which possess organs in his brain. If he has a large number of the organs, all well developed and evenly balanced, he will necessarily have a well-developed and evenly-balanced Greater Mind.

The Greater Mental elements can sometimes use the motor organs without the intervention of the brain as in the simplest so-called reflex actions, which are often “the result of irritating nervous tissue,” but the movement would not be brought about by a state of consciousness, but rather by a state of what is called unconsciousness; the move-

ment having been made; the phenomena caused by the excitation of some of the elements become manifest to the Greater Ego, and produce both a sensation and an emotion: hence a “state of consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue.”

The elements comprising vegetable life may, and in many cases do, live for more, and not infrequently for very considerably more, than a hundred years in their environment, obtaining food and water, propagating their species, and apparently enjoying existence, and all without, so far as we know, possessing any organ of the nature of a brain.

The outer consciousness of the small combination is too often mistaken for the whole mind—the whole organism. The “I” of consciousness is generally credited with more power than it really possesses; it is, in fact, merely a small combination temporarily dominant, by sufferance of the powerful Unity—the Greater Ego—which never appears in its entirety in the brain. The Greater Ego is the real “I”; the actual, permanent personality.

Professor Huxley describes experiments in which certain cold-blooded animals, after decapitation, persistently endeavour to remove, with their limbs, a torturing corrosive liquid from their bodies, where-to it has been applied; which of course shows conclusively that feeling and intelligence can—and do—exist in the absence of the brain, and at once disposes of the supposition that the mind, or at least

intelligence, is solely centred in, and dependent upon, it.

Professor Huxley, therefore, is in harmony with—and indeed proves—my contention, that the greater mind is diffused throughout the body, instead of being isolated in any particular part of it, and that, independently of the brain, certain of the elements are sensitive to stimuli affecting their organs, and can exercise such parts of the body by permission of the Greater Ego as those organs control. But the elements are unable to move any part of the body unless their physical organs are in working order. They are unable, for example, to bridge over a severance of the spinal cord, though, if the spinal cord, the afferent and the efferent nerves, and the muscles, are all uninjured, the greater mental elements can work through them, and use their organs, which, after all, are only part of themselves, and which it is their function to direct.

But the consciousness which is independent of the brain is not a manifestation of consciousness; it is not the complex outer consciousness, but elementary consciousness.

With a fairly complete list of the elementary substances composing all the three groups of which life is composed, and with the knowledge that self-compounding is one of their chief characteristics, and with the knowledge of a means whereby they can and do compound, there would appear to be no reason why every phenomena of life including con-

sciousness, unconsciousness, memory, sleep, dissolution, &c., &c., should not be perfectly understood by man, and the only question left for us to which we can give no answer, is, What is the inward nature of an element? If we could only find out what an element *really is* we probably should know all; but as the elements individually have such a limited amount of sentiency, we shall have to depend upon the chance of obtaining the number required to form a combination capable of possessing this knowledge, and upon the accident whereby this combination is brought into the outer consciousness of the brain; perhaps this knowledge is only known to the Great Unity comprising *all* the elements, if so, Infinity is a sealed problem to the various parts of this Unity.

Among the questions I have put to my theory is the following: Must the organs in an individual be worked from within or may they not be worked by the parent elements from the unknown regions of space?

Suppose, now, we take, for illustrative purposes, an individual with his organs already formed. It cannot make any difference either to his thoughts or his actions, whether his organs are worked from within themselves, or from without; the effect to him as well as to others must be the same in either case, because his outer consciousness as far as it appears to his fellow-men is neither more nor less than what his brain organs are. If any of the organs of his brain

are absent, no power, whether within or without, can create them, and no conscious action can be exhibited unless the elements composing the state of consciousness have their organs in the brain. Of course I do not mean by this that a weak, or deficient, brain organ, in its normal position, may not be to some extent strengthened, or developed; but before that can be done, it is obviously necessary that the organ must be in its place.

If we trace the fully grown organism back to its germ, the argument is greatly in favour of its working force being within, since the organs have to be built up by their elements; but they are only able to build up those of which the potential organs have existed in the ovum. And although it is possible that the elements may be able to communicate with similar elements in other individuals, yet all investigation in this direction goes to show that the colony of elements in each individual, from the ovum to full development, forms a distinctive colony, albeit each colony of course fits into its own particular place, and is perfectly compounded with the universal cosmos.

When the body decays, the elements of Mind presumably become disembodied elements. The common belief is that, when the body dies, the soul—or what in the Greater Mind theory is its equivalent—departs from it *en masse*. But our experience of what transpires during the process of dissolution does not support this view. No doubt

when a person dies suddenly, the soul, or the life, may seem to vacate the body as an entirety; but when death is the result of senile decay, or a lingering sickness, it must appear, to even a casual observer, that the elements of Mind leave the body gradually.

In old age, man loses the use of his organs, although they may still exist. By slow degrees, his senses of sight, smell, taste, hearing, leave him; his intellect, once perhaps great, diminishes, and even his consciousness fades away, until, in extreme old age, nothing of it is left save the dimmest flickering of the former multitudinous Greater Mental elements, which originally built up, and sustained, the once mentally and physically splendid animal, now wasted, shrunken, and helpless.

When the tissues of the body are in danger of damage by wear, sleep becomes necessary, in order that they may be recuperated.

To account for the phenomenon of sleep, we have three hypotheses to choose from, namely:—

(1.) That it is the result of the Greater Mental elements voluntarily taking a rest for their self-recuperation.

(2.) That it comes from the inability of the organs, through exhaustion, to accurately record external associations, and hence their failure to produce the (consequent) mental combinations which are associated with wakefulness; and

(3.) That it is the result of the Greater Mental elements voluntarily according rest to their organs

(the more material part of themselves), in order to rectify the mischief caused by wear and tear.

Of these three suggested explanations, that of the second hypothesis is apparently the most plausible, and no doubt up to a certain point it may be accepted as correct. But it cannot be considered altogether trustworthy, because it fails to cover the whole ground. It will account for normal sleep, and for the sleep of the intoxicated, but not for that of the person who, although unfatigued, and who may even feel an inclination to continue work, but who, having completed what he considers to be a sufficiency of labour for the time being, and having a wholesome regard for his physical welfare, retires to rest, and straightway falls into a healthful slumber. Still less will it account for the inability of an over-worked, and thoroughly tired out, individual to sleep, when he has for it the opportunity of which he is so painfully unable to avail himself.

There are obstacles in the way of accepting the first tentative explanation, conspicuous among them being the fact that, as the groups of elements are of opposite and contradictory character, all contending among themselves, each for a different object, we can hardly assume that at given intervals they raise a flag of truce, discontinue their mutual aggression, and retire from the occupation of the brain, in order that the general welfare of the body, in which some of them have no interest, shall be maintained.

Apparently the third hypothesis is the most feasible and satisfactory of the list, albeit it also at first glance presents certain difficulties.

So far, my investigations have led me to believe that the organs of the brain are formed, developed, and directed by, and out of, their own elements, which are most probably affiliated, but that the organs are not used solely by their own elements—or rather, the various elements and the various organs compound, and produce the dominant combination which would necessarily have possession of the major part of the brain. Now, seeing that the elements have constructed the brain, are in fact themselves the brain, it must naturally be their object to keep it in a condition of health; an excess of work tends to impoverish the tissues, and, consequently, to render the organ unhealthy.

No doubt it is the consciousness of this fact that impels the various combined elements, whose interests are centred in the health of the brain, to combine, that it may be afforded an opportunity for rest and recuperation, by freeing it from those elements (by not combining with them) which would otherwise overtask it.

But although I am satisfied that this hypothesis will fully account for sleep in all its phases, it must not be imagined that I am begging the question by crediting the brain with any peculiarity not possessed by the other organs, since I attribute to them all certain elements which in combination are soli-

citous for their health and well-being. This, indeed, is as it must necessarily be, from the fact that the organs and their elements are one and the same.

The second hypothesis may no doubt account for the sleep which is engendered by weariness, as well as that which results from the excessive use of alcoholic stimulant. But the third hypothesis seems to be equally reliable, and it also at the same time accounts for the sleep which comes, not from weariness, but simply from a desire to sleep, in order that the body may be invigorated, and its health maintained.

This third hypothesis suggests that the combination of the elements which is solicitous for the health of the brain, is the one which desires and demands sleep, and that all it has to do to accomplish its object, is to assume the dominancy, by refusing to ally itself with the elements which induce action. And thus it ensures rest for the brain, because, as I have already indicated, it is not possible for more than a single combination of elements, if a powerful one, to be in possession of it at the same time, and the combination which produces rest, once having obtained dominancy, has nothing further to do, in the fulfilment of its function, than to maintain a condition of masterly inactivity, by preventing the influx into the brain of other combinations ; and they being excluded, sleep necessarily results.

The third hypothesis further indicates how sleep

can be induced by this brain-preserving combination, when otherwise the mind would remain active. Obviously, if it can exclude the other combinations, and thus obtain the ascendancy, sleep will ensue, and, indeed, it may even aid its object, by using the brain itself with gentle work of a monotonous, or rhythmic character, as when a weary but sleepless individual successfully woos slumber by counting, or other such device.

Sleeplessness may be the result of disease affecting the organs of the brain, or it may be caused by the action upon them of otherwise wholesome stimuli. In either case the brain-preserving combination is in conflict with the particular influence, exerting itself to procure rest for its organs, the which it can only fail to do by the disease proving too powerful for it to overcome, or by the wholesome stimulant developing into an unwholesome one.

Sometimes we find it difficult to sleep, and at others we find it difficult to remain awake. In the latter case, the conflict between the elements is often very keen, being generally between those of the higher class, composing the feelings contained in what is called duty, on the one hand, and those of the tired organs on the other. We may find an object lesson of this warfare of the elements of the brain organs in the case of the weary soldier on sentry duty at an isolated post. The combined elements for preventing him succumbing to his weariness are those which represent his oath, his

duty, his patriotism, his *esprit de corps*; his fear of being discovered asleep, of being court-martialled, and disgraced.

Here are a large number of elements which, in combination, should be sufficient to ensure the sentry's wakefulness. Those which promote sleep are of a lower grade, and are contained in the feelings of self-gratification, in alliance with the wearied organs. But these feelings obtain supremacy by reason of the other feelings, which, under other conditions, would rise against and counteract their efforts to induce sleep, being dormant, for want of *stimuli* to excite them to action. If there were anything inspiriting for the sleepy soldier to do, or to see, his remaining in a condition of wakefulness would be comparatively easy; but the effort to keep the nerves alert, and particularly those which control the motor muscles of the eyelids, is, under the stated conditions, extremely difficult and painful, and it is therefore not surprising that the exertions of the often powerful elements, to maintain wakefulness in the subject, should sometimes fail.

During sleep the majority of the elements have but a limited power in the brain, the dominant combination preventing their access to it. In the healthy subject, dreams are generally more or less agreeable; they do not fatigue the brain, and very rarely do they exhibit power over the motor muscles. Hence the healthy individual will rise from his repose thoroughly refreshed and recuperated,

mentally and physically, even after elaborate dreaming.

We all have two personalities, the waking, and the dreaming. What we supposititiously say and do sometimes in our dreams, we would not say or do when we are awake; and yet what we say and do when we are awake, we frequently repeat, often grotesquely, in our dreams.

Dreams appear to me to be various combinations of greater mental elements coursing through the brain, but which the brain-preserving combinations effectually prevent obtaining command over true consciousness, and the motor organs. Nevertheless, the number of ever-changing combinations necessary to make up the living pictures seen in dreams, can be resuscitated, similarly as our experiences in waking life can be revived, by association.

Our dreams appear to be founded upon experiences, since we never dream of anything which we have had no experience of in some form or other. But the incidents of our dreams are not often exact repetitions of real occurrences—that is, exactly as we remember them when we are awake. The harmlessness of dreams seems to corroborate the Greater Mind theory with regard to the watchfulness of the Greater Mental elements over their organs, in order to prevent undue, or unnecessary labour being forced upon them.

But although these elements can, in a general way, prevent their organs being unduly exercised

during sleep, by the elements which are responsible for dreams, they are not always able to ensure them from harm, as nightmare fully testifies.

The fearful phenomena experienced in some phases of nightmare, as well as in raving madness, in delirium tremens, and in ordinary delirium, sufficiently prove the existence of formidable elements in every unified colony; and further, that gentle, lovable, amiable, and humane persons owe their admirable qualities to the fact of their mental elements being evenly balanced. But in the event of disease attacking the organs of the higher grade elements, then the hitherto estimable mind becomes, perhaps, a disastrous chaos of uncontrollable passion.

Reverie is a sort of semi-sleep, and may be attributed to the same cause as sleep; that is, the elements which have constructed the organs of the brain, finding those organs to be suffering from over-work, refuse to combine with other, but too active, elements, with the result that they experience the reposeful condition called reverie.

CHAPTER VI

REASON, WILL, INTELLECT

BEFORE entering into a description and explanation of Reason from the standpoint of the Greater Mind theory, we will consider the meaning of the word in its common acceptance.

In the first place, then, Reasoning may be broadly separated into two divisions, namely :—

- (1.) That wherein different individuals engage together in polemical discussions.
- (2.) That in which ideas are evolved from a single mind, independently of others.

The method adopted in the reasoning out of a subject, according to the first of these divisions, is simply the expression, by the individuals engaged, of the various relevant thoughts as they occur. One individual propounds a theory or advances an opinion, and the others follow with their respective views upon it; the *pros* and *cons* are compared, weighed, and discussed; weak points are detected, and rejected, and the subject is criticised, and argued upon from the various lights in which it presents itself to the different intellects.

Each of the reasoning minds engaged in the discussion is complete in itself, and has its particular

individual intelligence; each may introduce an aspect of the subject discussed which is different from that of any of the others. But the individual who presents his views in the most logical form, and expresses them in the clearest, and plainest language, will most likely be the one to prevail with the majority.

Very distinctive from this phase of reasoning is the second form of it, wherein one single mind independently exercises its individual complete intelligence. This single mind, also critical of its own work, brings into consciousness, say, a particular thought, which may be immediately succeeded by another one, more or less opposed to it, and it then becomes necessary to compare their respective merits, in order to decide which of them shall be adopted.

To the mental processes under both the foregoing conditions, the term "reason," or "reasoning," is applied. But all logical thought may also come under the head of reason.

Thus, in its general sense, reason may be defined as logical thought upon definite subjects where more than one line of argument can be taken, and as opposed to ordinary conversation which requires but little serious thought.

There are of course various idiomatic uses of the term "reason," and its derivatives, such as, for instance, its employment in the phrases, "he had reason to think" (meaning he had *cause* to think), and "with

reasonable care" (meaning with *ordinary* care), but with them we are not now concerned, since we are here simply regarding the word in its sense of describing processions of thoughts, during their evolution and passage through the conscious mind, and the consideration of reason in this form can best be accomplished when we take it as being performed by one mind.

The elementary substances composing reason (the element of life) are the same as those which compose thoughts, and it will be necessary to give some explanation of the interworking of these elementary substances which constitute the fundamental properties of Reason.

On the one hand, we may take the elements of mind and life, and endeavour, by examining them, to discover whether they can be made to divulge the secret of such phenomena as reason, will, and intellect; and on the other hand, we may take the phenomena themselves, and, also by experiment, seek for their explanation by the theory of the elementary substances which we have been considering.

From the standpoint of the Greater Mind theory the explanation of Reason is, that it is the interworking of Judgment and Memory, and that its elements are the same as those which comprise Greater Mind, but since these elements are only single intelligences they are therefore incapable, individually, of participating in any sort of reasoning.

This colony of intelligences contains elements of extremely diverse characteristics. In some of the groups they are closely allied to one another by a natural affinity; in others they are antagonistic among themselves, and in others again, they possess neither affinity nor antagonism.

In this colony of elementary substances we have all the elements of Reason. But experiments upon young animals show that reason must be preceded by experience, which begins to assert itself very early, and continues during life, constantly growing, and being added to by new combinations of the various elements. When a combination has once been formed it is very easily formed again.

Every fresh action learned by a young animal, is the result of a new combination of the elementary substances assuming consciousness in the brain, and is another experience gained; and all such new combinations can—as is explained in my chapter on Memory—be resuscitated by association between the different combinations. Therefore, in the view of this theory, what is called Reason in a single mind, is a succession of combinations of its elements—of course compounded with those of matter and force—ever following one another, formed and learned by experience, and brought into use by association.

Thus it will be seen that, according to the Greater Mind theory, each combination, when it becomes dominant in the brain, may straightway proceed to perpetuate itself through the organs of speech, or by

writing; or it may be so sensible of its own importance as to entertain a conviction that it will be resuscitated upon some future occasion.

Having thus accomplished its present purpose, it ceases to use its organs in the brain, and becomes quiescent; but it is more than likely that it will presently lead up, by association, to another combination, and the process may be repeated again and again, for thus the flow of reason goes on.

If we can regard the Greater Mind as a colony of single-intellicenced elementary substances which, by the aid of experience and association, exhibit a tendency to form themselves into combinations, we may imagine that such combinations are capable of producing myriads of intelligenced feelings—the latter of course being compound, and the former elementary—and then the mechanism of reasoning can easily be understood.

Now comes the question: How do the elementary substances of mind combine to form themselves, as they do, into the millions of thoughts?—in which word I include also feelings, emotions, will, intellect, &c.

It does not seem possible that any combination of the elements could occupy a dominant position in the brain, unless the organs of the elements represented in the combination were previously there; and as the organs are a compound of the elements of Mind, Matter, and Force, the question is reduced to simplicity, because, as I have already explained,

a hundred organs in the brain may be made to produce myriads of combinations, and constitute all the substances necessary for the composition of Reason.

The initiatory stage of the combinations is probably induced by the excitation of one, or more, of the elements by stimuli. The other elements which are most nearly allied to it, and with which it is in a constant state of fusion, are then immediately affected, and jointly they form the combination, which, in the absence of opposition, becomes dominant, and for the moment is the Conscious Ego. But if there be opposition (and the beginning of the gathering together of the elements forming the combination will at once indicate a movement which may necessitate the formation of an opposing combination) then conflict must follow—temptation, and resistance to it, say, or some similar phenomenon.

The result of this self-contesting, however, if the question lie between, say, virtuous and vicious combinations, is arrived at by power only, and wholly depends upon which of the combinations obtains dominance in the brain.

But it must not be imagined that the mastery is due to accident. If the Greater Ego allows, through the weakness of its higher grade elements, the lower grade to be victorious, it produces, and is responsible for, its own punishment. It has fallen, and will always be conscious of its position whenever Memory revives the incident into consciousness.

An explanation is also needed for the phenomenon

of two combinations of elements sometimes working in the brain simultaneously, as when a person writes out two different nursery rhymes, one with each hand, at the same time. Although possibly at first thought it may appear simple and easy to do this, an attempt to perform the feat will generally prove it to be the reverse. But the difficulty of writing impromptu answers to two abstruse questions simultaneously, one with each hand, would be so far greater, that it has never yet been overcome.

But all this is precisely what, according to the Greater Mind theory, might have been anticipated. There must be occasions when the dissolving and the evolving combinations are both out of focus, as it were—that is to say, when their states of power in the brain are abnormally low. If, therefore, we imagine that the two combinations of elements necessary for writing two nursery rhymes at once, are intentionally kept at a low stage of development, it is easily conceivable that the feat of writing two simple and easy sets of words may be performed as described, whilst it would be impossible to deal with a couple of abstruse subjects in the same way.

A question which will probably have to be answered is : Can reasoning of any sort be exercised without the aid of the brain ; or does all reasoning have to be done solely in the brain ? Although there are intelligences which are independent of the brain, as is shown in the repairing of diseased tissues, yet the higher grade elements would be un-

able to exist in the organism without their delicately formed organs in the brain, albeit I see no scientific or other reason why the substance known as life should be more intelligent in one part of the body than it is in another.

The combinations of elements which form themselves into thoughts, on dissolving leave no trace in the organism, except the emotion is strong enough to effect, more or less permanently, the physical part of themselves, for unless the thought perpetuates itself in words or actions, directly the combination merges into other combinations, it is lost; yet not irretrievably, because the same combination may be re-formed, and so resuscitated.

The different combinations of the elementary substances of mind are constantly changing—like the sea, they are an ever-moving mass, sometimes flowing with unruffled smoothness, and at others, stormily tumultuous. As the flow of reason continues, some of the elements are unneeded, and retire from the combination, while others, more or less necessary, are drawn into it.

The higher class reasoning of a well-balanced mind is, I submit, carried on by the higher grade elements. By the term "higher grade," I do not mean to imply that these elements possess power over those of the lower grade. I use it simply to distinguish them, responsible as they are for such feelings as charity, &c., from the combinations of the lower grade elements, which produce feelings like greed, and so

on. Often it happens that of the two combinations the latter is the more powerful; but in a well-balanced mind the higher grade elements generally succeed in keeping the lower grade ones in order, though not by the exercise of any superior authority.

That, however, they do not invariably keep them in order, is abundantly testified by the criminal classes and the mentally deranged. In them the organs of the higher grade elements are weak, and the lower grade ones are strong. The cause of this ill-balanced condition may be either hereditary, or post-natal acquired, disease; or it may be that the organs of the higher grade elements have been overcome, and repressed, by the encouragement and exercise given to the lower grade ones. Yet even individuals who are customarily gentle-mannered and humane, may—and do—at times give way to, and revel in, savage blood-debauches—as, for example, in periods of revolution and anarchy. In such case the lower grade elements have been allowed to assume dominancy, while the higher grade elements have been temporarily suppressed.

It may be asked why the higher grade elements are generally so successful in keeping the lower grade ones in order. It is because, as a rule, each Greater Ego discovers, from experience, that succumbing to the influence of the lower grade elements brings its own punishment, which falls, not upon them alone, but upon all the elements alike. Thus, when the lower grade elements, having obtained the

ascendancy in the Greater Ego, induce it to perpetrate, say, a theft, if the crime be detected and punished, all the elements of the Greater Ego will suffer equally from the imprisonment, or whatever other penalty may be meted out for it. It is of course not necessary that such extreme measures as imprisonment should be resorted to in order to subject the Greater Ego to a feeling of more or less acute degradation. Thus, if a well-ordered child commit some trifling misdeed, a very slight reproof—a word, an ejaculation, even a look—will suffice to impart to the small transgressor so lively a sense of discomfort that he will carefully avoid repeating the fault in the future. And if the temptation to do so re-occurs, so sensitive are the elements of the Greater Ego, that the higher grade elements in combination, vividly remembering the former experience, will exercise vigilance to prevent a repetition of it, that is to say, they will marshal a greater number of elements to their side, and so, by superiority of numbers, and more stable combinations, prevent the lower grade elements obtaining a dominancy. Such resistance of the higher grade elements, which we call Reason, is actually represented by the recruiting of the necessary elements of that grade, until they are numerically strong enough to hold, in the brain, the supremacy against, and to rout, those of the lower grade.

As an illustration of what is meant by Reason, we will supposititiously assume the case of an artizan

who has been working short time, and consequently at the end of the week has earned less than his usual wage. We will say that he has been accustomed, on his way home on Saturday afternoons, to drop into a convenient hostelry, and disburse an appreciable part of his week's earnings in the festive companionship of his shopmates; but upon this particular Saturday he reasons with himself, to the effect that, in the state of his diminished finances, all his available capital will be urgently needed to keep the domestic pot a-boiling, and that therefore he will, for once, sacrifice inclination to duty, by avoiding the customary conviviality.

The way to his *lares et penates* takes him past his shopmates' meeting-place, and, when he arrives at it, he feels tempted to enter, and so he changes his mind, with the reservation that he will have just one glass, and no more. But as he is about to put his foot upon the tavern threshold, Reason again interposes, with the objection that one glass will of a certainty lead to others, and, Reason prevailing, he resumes his journey and goes home to his family.

Now let us examine the working of the greater mental elements of this exemplary artizan, from the time he receives his wages until he reaches his habitation.

At the sight of his attenuated earnings, the elements, which in combining, lead to Parental Duty, and the elements which induce the Greater Ego to act cautiously, and with circumspection, vanquish

those which hold out temptation to selfish personal pleasure, and so, under their guidance, he decides to go directly home, instead of making a stay at his usual Saturday afternoon haunt. But the conquered combinations of lower grade elements are still waiting their opportunity, and so, when the workman comes in sight of the haunt, they return to the charge.

Here now are combinations of elements which delight in alcoholic stimuli, and festive companionship. Possibly our subject sings fairly well, and then these elements will be joined by others which delight in the admiration of his fellows. Maybe his wife is a slattern, and his children are ill-behaved, and his home is disordered. Then the elements which delight in domestic cleanliness, and comfort, join the other elements, until they form the majority—or rather, they become temporarily the strongest, and form a series of combinations. These combinations dominant and subdominant are now the Ego, which approaches the tempting threshold with the intention of indulging in the stipulated "just one" glass, in congenial companionship. But the opposing combinations of forces, being not yet vanquished, appeal energetically and fervently to the Greater Ego, as a whole, to reconsider its determination. They show that the commonwealth is in danger. They remind the Ego of the diminished wage; of the difficulty of adhering to the resolution not to exceed the one glass. They picture the babies at home, hungry, perhaps whimpering for food. They

urge that the Ego, by succumbing to the temptation it has set itself, would be acting a selfish and cowardly part, which would invite the reprobation and disgust of persons whose good-will and esteem he values. This series of combinations have now become so powerful that they draw over them many of the elements composing the present Ego, which, by joining them, form a new Ego. And now this new Ego halts, in the nick of time, upon the very threshold of temptation, and turning from it, continues along the pathway of Paternal Duty to its domicile.

WILL

It has been written that : “The most prominent and prevailing characteristics of the ordinary actions of working life, is that they are performed in obedience to the will, and as a rule the will not only suggests the action, but presides over its fulfilment.”

By which we see that absolute power is accorded to the will, and while that is so, no satisfactory explanations of the mysteries of mind or life are possible.

My theory of life has the advantage of being able to dispense with the unmanageable difficulty of a supreme will, and of explaining how it is possible for the Greater Mind—or rather the Greater Ego—to perform every act by its unassisted self; and further, how it suggests, and how it accomplishes, without the aid of a will. How, in fact, the Greater Ego is its own Will.

When we hear it said of a body of men that they

are Working with a Will, the meaning intended to be conveyed is simply that they are executing their task with energy and intelligence; which is precisely what occurs when a combination of the elementary substances of mind is carrying out the object for which they combined.

The use of the word "Will," I take it, ought to signify the sustained force and consistency of the elementary substances of mind and life. But it is generally employed to indicate not merely an apparently uncontrolled initiative power, but a great controlling one—one of the primary genera of the mind. Yet there is no justification for supposing that there is any such power as this implies, the elementary substances of the Greater Ego being quite sufficient in themselves; and, therefore, to imagine the existence of so omnipotent and useless a power is to pile further and unnecessary difficulties in the way of an already sufficiently difficult subject.

What is described as the Will, is dependent upon and, indeed, is equivalent to, the determination of the dominant combination. Each element is a desire without what we call intelligence; each combination is a compound of a number of these desires, producing an Intelligence. This Intelligence may go on to success, in which event the combination resigns its outer consciousness, its place in the brain being then taken by another; or the combination may fail to keep itself intact (this is where there is hesitancy of purpose and the Will is called weak), in which case

it wavers and disappears from consciousness. But probably some of its elements will lead up to, and form part of, the succeeding combinations.

An exhaustive collection of the names of Feelings and Emotions would be found to comprise the *whole* of the conscious mind, since everything that is mental has its name classed as an abstract noun signifying a feeling. Will and Thought are necessarily included in the emotions.

Will has been defined as "the power of the mind which enables one to choose between two courses of action." But although every feeling and emotion possesses its own descriptive term in a single word, there is no single word which describes Will, and yet does not at the same time express a Feeling. Will and Mental Power are alternative terms. The Power of the Mind is the result of an Emotion merely; for we properly say, "the power of revenge," and "the power of affection." Thus among all the multitude of words which are expressive of the emotions, there is not one that describes only the Will.

Do we Feel the will as we feel the emotions? The emotions are able to perform all the active work of the conscious mind; and as there is no active power in the conscious mind save what may be consistently classed among the emotions, we must infer that Will is a supposititious power, by which it is imagined that the control of the emotions may be accounted for. From the Greater Mind standpoint, however, any such control is unnecessary, for the reason that

the emotions through their elements are entirely self-governing.

Introspective examination shows us that all the elements of mind are active. If we are tempted to commit an offence or an indiscretion it is from the active elements that the temptation comes ; and when, on the other hand, the temptation to commit an offence is resisted, the resistance also comes from the active elements.

We can neither feel nor describe any elements of life which are superior to the active elements ; for the virtues, such as prudence, honour, &c. (which are separate combinations of the elementary substances of mind in a state of dominance, or subdominance, in the brain), are of the same kind as those of the vices —as anger, envy, dishonesty, and so on. Therefore the elements are active enough in themselves and need no Will ; and to attempt to describe any power which we can neither see nor feel, and of the existence of which we have no evidence, is to blindly enter the realms of speculation.

INTELLECT

As with Will, so with Intellect. There is no single word which expresses Intellect other than may be found in the catalogue of the Feelings and Emotions. A love of mathematics is as actually an emotion as is a love of *rouge-et-noir*. Love of cricket, of power, of science, of country, of dolls, all are kith and kin, albeit some are combinations

of the higher, and some of the lower, grade elements. Intellect, I submit, is not proved to be a separate division of mind.

Close investigation discloses that the so-called primary divisions of mind, viz., Will, and Intellect, are imaginary, no doubt drawn with the intention of explaining Reason. But so far are they from attaining that object, that their only effect is to create confusion.

I have been invited to show how my commonwealth (a multiplicity in unity) can be superior to Sir William Hamilton's division of mind into three primary genera, namely, the phenomena of Knowledge (or Cognition), the phenomena of Feeling (or Pleasure and Pain), and the phenomena of Conation (or Will, or Desire)—or, as Bain more tersely puts it, "Feeling; Will, or Volition; and Thought, or Intellect."

If these three categories comprise the whole world of subject, as their originators and supporters assert they do, then it must necessarily follow that every Feeling, every Will, or Desire, and every Thought, must be either a single unextended substance, or a combination of such substances—in other words, it must be an entity or a compound.

If we are to understand that these categories are results of something, then we have to ask what is the something they are the results of? For we shall still have the *something* to deal with.

If we are to suppose them to be combinations of unextended substances, then we must ask what those

substances are which form the compound, and why are they left out of the subject world? But if, as was first suggested, each category is a single unextended substance or Entity, then we may inquire. What are the differentia between the three entities, Feeling, Desire, and Thought? Has any one any power over another, and if so, which is the controlling power? And wherein do its powers lie? how does it enforce them? and how does it punish if disobeyed? There is surely no chance whatever of unveiling the mystery of life if we make each category independent of the others.

The Greater Mind theory has the advantage of Sir William Hamilton's categories, in that it works upwards, from the lowest rung of the biological ladder, with common Feelings—with things which are not less matter of fact than those of the categories, namely, the common qualities of an ordinary individual, as jealousy, envy, &c.

With such theories as Sir William Hamilton's and others', then, that of the Greater Mind is at variance. For while the former separate the mind into permanent divisions of Feeling, Will, and Thought—the Conscious Mind, the Subconscious Mind, and the Unconscious Mind—from the Greater Mind standpoint, these divisions, except the Unconscious Mind, are only temporary and secondary.

The exception of the Unconscious Mind is made because it represents the Greater Mental elements permanently at work in the various organs.

The other divisions, according to the Greater Mind theory, are merely the various phases of the different combinations of the elementary substances of mind and life.

A thought, whilst being evolved, is a combination of the elementary substances of mind, compounded with those of matter and force, yet only of elements which are closely akin, and connected with the leading essence of the thought. Therefore, if this theory be the correct one, the mind of the brain cannot be responsible for the thought, for the thought is a portion of a certain number of the elementary substances themselves. The only control of the thought is from within itself, by the various elementary substances composing it, although it can be suppressed by the Greater Ego, as previously explained. If the thought expands, and brings into itself other elements, they will amalgamate with those originally comprising it, and exert their influence. A thought is only in existence while the combination composing it remains intact. When the thought is spoken, or written, it is no longer the Feeling of thought, but merely the result of thinking, and therefore it has no substance.

If we are agreed that the ruling power of the organism is the temporary dominant combination of elementary substances which are near akin, or affiliated, and also if it is able to dispense with any not required, and can absorb others required during its chameleon-like changes, reasoning is an

easily understood phenomenon; reason in a single individual being represented by the sequence of the ever-changing combinations.

Man arrogantly assumes that there is a great dividing line between himself and the other animals. He claims to have reason and a soul, which he denies to the other animals. No doubt it may be said that something in favour of this common belief lies in the fact that man is vastly superior to the other animals. But even this, truism as it is, is misleading to most people, since it weighs mankind against all the other animals, monopolising reason to the one, and allowing only instinct to the other.

That nature, however, draws no such dividing line, may be seen in the innumerable lower animals which possess more intelligence than many men. Some of the lower animals are endowed with intelligence equal to that of the average man, while the difference between an intelligent elephant and an intelligent man is inconsiderable in comparison to that between an intelligent elephant and the lower forms of life. Of course it cannot be denied that man has many qualifications which other animals do not possess, but it is also beyond denial that the elephant has many qualifications which are not possessed by the jelly-fish. As the jelly-fish is to the elephant, so is the elephant to the man. If we can account for the superiority of the intelligence of the elephant over that of the jelly-fish, inference will account for the superiority of the

intelligence of the man over that of the elephant, without denying the elephant possession of a soul.

The structures of all animals and vegetables are only such as are present—though latent—in the ovum: there can be no structures in any living organism other than those which are built up by the elementary substances of the ovum.

There must therefore be a greater number of elementary substances in the ovum of the elephant than there are in the ovum of the jelly-fish; and a greater number of elementary substances in the ovum of mankind than there are in that of the elephant.

Another question occurs. How does a fresh combination of elements—representing materials for a thought—oust a thought in possession of the brain, from its position?

I have already postulated the theory that each element has its organ in the brain, and if a given number of brain organs are necessary to ensure the formation of a thought, it follows that the elementary substances of life composing those organs, must be included in the compound.

That being so, then the elements composing the organs have only to sever their connection with the dominant combination in the brain, and allow a fresh combination to succeed to the dominancy. Hence each combination must possess a distinctive character, more or less differing from that of any other combination.

This explanation goes to show that intellect is

represented by the state of the development of the organs of the higher class elements, and that its varying phases are due to the formation of combinations of those elements following each other. Intellect, therefore, is not primary, but secondary; and represents the ability of the Greater Ego possessing these combinations, to form judgments.

The intellect of a man is represented by the number and power of his brain organs; for the elements of mind can only achieve actual and visible results by working through those organs. An even balance of power in the brain organs is indicative of a clear intellect; for it must be remembered that the organs of the brain and their elements are one and the same. If these organs are in a well- and evenly-developed condition, the Greater Ego which they represent is a person to be trusted and respected; but if, on the other hand, the brain organs are imperfectly developed, or are unevenly balanced, then the intellect of the Greater Ego is not of a high order, and in ratio to their ill development and unevenness, the intellect will diminish, until it is altogether absent, and the Greater Ego is an imbecile.

Reason represents the varying combinations of the elements of Greater Mind using their brain organs. These elements must necessarily be those of the highest grade.

Will represents the energy of the combinations, and Intellect represents their quality, number, and character.

CHAPTER VII

MEMORY

MEMORY, the most interesting, and at the same time the most mysterious, part of the mind, is perhaps man's most valued quality, for he could hardly exist without it.

Memory may be said to represent almost the whole of mind; for when an individual loses his memory, he practically has no mind left: his brain is useless to him. A man wholly without memory would be in worse case than the jelly-fish; for the jelly-fish knows how to find its food, which the man without memory would be unable to do.

The Greater Mind theory propounds the hypothesis that Memory, Consciousness, Reason, Habit, and all the differentiated attributes of mind, are but phases and parts of Greater Mind and the Greater Ego; consequently, the elementary substances which constitute the Greater Mind and the Greater Ego, must be the same as those which comprise Memory, as well as all the other phases of mind, when these phenomena are considered not as manifestations but as the substances which give forth the manifestations.

Elsewhere in this work I have described these elementary substances, and I will now explain how

they work and co-ordinate in the formation of the phenomena called Memory.

I remember being taught, in my very early youth, that the brain is a depository, or storage-place, in which all thoughts, impressions, and sensations, when done with for the time, are put away, to be kept, until again needed.

To me this seemed the most wonderful, not to say improbable, of all the marvellous mysteries of mind ; and I strove to imagine how the myriads upon myriads of concepts which come into our minds, could be accommodated with storage-room in so limited a space as the human brain. Subsequently I asked myself whether, when the thoughts are stored away, they are dead or living. And if they are dead, whether it is anything short of a miracle to resuscitate them, at a moment's notice, years and years after their demise. And if they are living, then equally miraculous is it for them to be hidden away, and preserved, and brought to light again, and revivified, after similar lapses of time, possibly without the remotest indication of their existence during the interval.

Another question with me was : Are these dormant concepts and thoughts single entities, or compound substances ? To regard them as single entities seemed against reason ; while to suppose that compound substances of such ephemeral character could remain intact for decades, or scores, of years, seemed very like supposing the impossible.

To these puzzles I was unable to find any solution. But all the same, my disbelief in the storage theory never weakened.

In course of time, however, a chance incident came to my aid. Conversing one evening on the subject with Dr. H. and Professor M., the former suddenly turned on me with "What is memory?" and without waiting for an immediate answer, he followed his question with the asseveration that he could at will summon up the remembrance of any former experience.

Before he had ended his remark, I interposed with "While you are speaking to me now, you cannot recollect what occurred ten minutes ago."

Watching his countenance while I said this, I saw that my words appeared to have upon him the effect of a hypnotic suggestion; that he was evidently endeavouring to do two things at once, namely, while he was replying to me with "N-no, but if I desire to do so I can" (speaking the sentence in an absent-minded sort of way), he was obviously searching in his mind for something, and it seemed to me at the moment that he was subconsciously looking for a former combination. His mind appeared to be in a state of transition; and then I saw that the combination of the elementary mental substances having present possession of his brain was dissolving, while the combination of elements which had dominancy in his brain ten minutes previously was being re-evolved. All this was indicated to my

mind plainly enough, and the feeling immediately expressed itself in words when I replied to him, "Memory is the resuscitation of the combination of elements dominant in the brain when the incident to be remembered occurred ; in other words, it is the re-formation, and consequently the return to consciousness, of combinations of the elements which have previously been formed, and have already exercised, their brief dominancy in the brain, where their groupings have been only partly disintegrated." And to this impromptu explanation of the phenomena of Memory I still adhere.

These more or less definite combinations, in a more or less disintegrated form, are always liable to be resuscitated, either through visualism or sequence, when their composing elements happen to be included among those forming the combination which is in temporary possession of the brain.

To illustrate my conception of memory, we will imagine a pianoforte having, say, a hundred strings, each one representing a different note. We will suppose that every string is a living activity, the sole object of which is to play its own note. If several of the strings emit their notes simultaneously, it is evident that the result will be either harmony or discord. We will suppose that the strings are producing an improvised melody. When they have finished it, and are silent again, the tune is gone ; there is no record of it left, and it cannot be repeated unless the strings are again affected in an exactly similar way.

Memory acts just as those pianoforte strings do. According to the Greater Mind theory, the unuttered, or unwritten, thought, when past, is lost for ever, unless the combination of elements which originated it will reproduce itself.

It should be noted that the foregoing illustration is intended to apply to Memory only, and therefore must not be regarded as in any way figurative of the Greater Mind, or the Greater Ego. Otherwise the strings would have to be ethereal ones, neither visible nor audible, save through some instrument, or medium, analogous to the brain, and from which issue melodies which may be regarded as analogous to the consciousness of the brain.

To continue the metaphor with regard to Greater Mind, such ethereal strings should also be permeable, and capable of compounding, and of producing an unity, as well as any number of smaller combinations.

This analogy of the mind to a piano, I find, was anticipated by Herbert Spencer, in the passage, "Ideas are like successive chords brought out from a piano. And it would be as proper to say that these passing chords thereafter exist in the piano, as it is proper to say that passing ideas thereafter exist in the brain."

On the other hand, I anticipated the objections which Maudsley raises against Herbert Spencer's simile—

"But," demands Maudsley, in his "Physiology of

Mind," replying to Herbert Spencer, "what about the performer in the case of the piano and the brain respectively? Where, in the illustration, is the equivalent of the harmonic conception in the performer's mind? And there is this difference between the passing chords in the piano and in the brain and that is the essence of the matter, that in the former case the chords do pass, and leave no trace in the structure of the piano, while in the latter they do not, without leaving the most important after-effects in the structure of the brain.

"Whence does arise in due time a considerable difference between a cultivated piano and a cultivated brain. Those who speak of latent ideas do, therefore, endeavour to denote thereby an important something which Mr. Spencer always leaves out of sight."

Of course the Greater Mind theory agrees with Herbert Spencer in maintaining that, as already explained, passing ideas do not afterwards exist in the brain any more than a melody, when played, thereafter exists in the piano. The brain and the piano can only reproduce the respective effects by again undergoing the process which resulted in the original production.

Dr. Schofield writes: "There are then two hypotheses as to memory. Do the ideas persist as unconscious psychological phenomena—*i.e.*, sensations fallen below the threshold of consciousness? Or do they not exist at all as psychical phenomena,

but are retained because of the persistence of certain changes, traces, or dispositions of the nerve centres?"

It is evident that the Greater Mind theory rejects both these hypotheses, because it maintains that ideas do not persist, either as psychical or physical phenomena.

Memory has two peculiarities : either it is visual, or it pursues its course in sequences, apparently without effort ; Consciousness has no power or control over memory, although it can in various ways assist it by leading a train of thought, by means of association, up to the reformation of past concepts and bringing them again into consciousness.

My investigations lead me to the conclusion that the act of remembering is not—as seems to be generally supposed, and as the word itself implies—a single act of mind. Nor do I believe remembering to be a single act at all ; but rather that it is a term applied to a somewhat complicated process which goes on in the Greater Ego, even as a man may suggest to others that he has undergone great trials and hardships by simply using the words "I escaped!"

Everything we see with our eyes creates a pictorial impression, in the shape of a concept formed by the compounding of a number of the elementary substances of mind and life, which we have reason to believe are counterparts of the elements forming the

object perceived. When anything is seen for the first time, a combination of mental elementary substances is formed, which produces the pictorial representation of the scene. But the representation of it is never absolutely accurate, since its different spectators will generally form of it slightly differing concepts.

If the same scene be looked upon again by the same eyes, however long afterwards, it must cause a combination similar to that which it produced on the first occasion ; and as the elements forming the subsequent concept must be somewhat similar to those which formed the first one, we have two pictorial representations of the scene, one within the other, the later one containing all, or nearly all, the elements of the first one ; and we naturally want to know why the two representations of the scene do not coalesce—why we remember, when we see anything more than once, that we have seen it before ?

Well, there are many reasons why the concepts do not coalesce. It is possible, and probable, that we do not look upon a scene a second time from precisely the same point of view as we did when we saw it first ; conditions of light, colour, form, and so on, may be different ; the remembrance of the initial sight of it may have faded into indistinctness from inaction, and lapse of time, the elements comprising it having in the meanwhile formed other combinations. But probably the main reason why the two concepts do not coalesce, is because another com-

bination of elements, that which is responsible for registering the passing of time, puts the first concept back. Sometimes recollection of the scene may come immediately to our consciousness, with perhaps a well-defined remembrance of various circumstances connected with it, while at others it may come slowly, imperfectly, and indistinctly.

Memory is never to be implicitly relied upon; there is always the possibility of its misleading, because we are never certain of being able to resuscitate a concept with exactly the same elements, and with each element in exactly the same condition as it was upon previous occasions. Memory is not dependent upon *a priori* knowledge, but upon the multitudinous phenomena which are constantly occurring around us. It is, therefore, wholly the result of experience. As I have already said, Memory is the resuscitation of past concepts, which must have been previously conceived by particular combinations of the elements of Greater Mind.

I have also explained the formation of concepts by the elements of Greater Mind, and it is not difficult to imagine that a concept being once formed, may be subsequently re-formed. For example, if a man who has never before seen a dragon-fly, has one settle upon him, his mental elements will require some little time to form a concept of the animal; but the concept—in which are included fear, wonder, and admiration—having been formed, it seems not difficult to imagine that, when asso-

ciation leads the ever-moving procession of combinations of elements in the brain, up to anything more or less remotely resembling a dragon-fly, or even a place, or scene, anything like the one in which it had first appeared to him, the elements forming the concept should follow by a sequence, and re-form themselves.

If the same man some time afterwards sees another dragon-fly, a fresh concept is formed, which must naturally include many, if not all, the elements in the first concept, and then, consequently, there are two concepts in his brain at the same time. But the second concept in some respects, and from various causes, differs from the first one, and so neither can be mistaken for the other, while the relative time, place, and position of the first concept are gauged and fixed by the elements forming the necessary combinations, as in those qualified for judging comparison, perception of time, &c.

So, when a person says, "I remember seeing this thing before," the interpretation of it is that the combination forming the second concept has within it the first one, which therefore must necessarily have been resuscitated; and various combinations of the elements of the Greater Mind are busy comparing the two, of which they are of course conscious.

To me this appeared to explain the phenomena of memory well enough; but a friendly critic was less easily satisfied. Said he: "Your explanation of

memory, I am afraid, is not quite sufficient; what I want, as critic, is a clear explanation of why the elements, which are invariable, have a collective consciousness under certain conditions of past experience. It is quite impossible to assume any consciousness of previous combinations in the elements individually. *The question is, therefore, why a given combination which has been represented in the past, by related combinations, should be conscious of them any more than a chord played on a violin is, being composed of elements that are themselves without memory.* Your theory explains present combinations; it has to explain how those present combinations are related to the combinations of the past, and how, before the combination found expression, it came into the mind, and how each part of that combination is related to the whole, and one combination to the other."

I cannot complain that my critic has not put his crucial question clearly and concisely, and a completely satisfactory answer to it would appear to be almost impossible. Indeed, the objection raised would be fatal if my theory with regard to the elements is, as my critical friend apparently imagines it to be, that the combinations pass through the brain, after the manner of the moving targets in a shooting gallery; but it entertains no such idea. The Greater Ego, dominant and subdominant, may have a knowledge, not only of the present, but also of past concepts, and even, in a certain way, of

future ones, which are pictorially or otherwise before the Greater Ego, all in the same momentary space of time.

This may be exemplified by the act of a musician in playing from a score at sight. The notes he has played are the Past, the note he is playing is the Present, and the note he is about to play (in so far as regards actions which are going to be performed) is the Future. And yet he has a distinct knowledge of all those parts at the same time ; for while the act of playing a note constitutes the Present, he has at the same time a distinct knowledge of the bar he has just finished ; and every musician who plays at sight will admit that, during his performance, he looks, not at the notes he is actually playing, but at those in advance, and therefore he knows what he is going to play.

The combinations of elements which hold the musician's mind are naturally those which are connected solely with music, as time, and tune ; and although something external may have imparted a stimulus to them, yet they are not called into action, or made to fulfil their purpose, by any influence outside themselves ; they come together because they are interested, as it were, and having come together, they continue to perform their task until they fade away into other combinations, or until, from some cause or other, certain stimuli excite fresh combinations to supplant them.

In the illustration of the musician and his notes,

we have at least three subdominant combinations, realising respectively the past, the present, and the future, and yet all interwoven with each other, and so compounding, that they become one dominant combination. And thus the unknown future becomes the known future, the known future becomes the present, and the present becomes the past.

The unseen part of the score represents the unknown future; but as each note comes in view, its concept is formed, by the aid of past experience, and becomes a minor combination forming part of the larger combinations. It will then be seen that, as all the notes are individually well known to the musician, each one resuscitates itself at sight.

And now here are three other interesting questions which touch upon the phenomenon of memory, namely:—

(1.) Is there a Present?

Despite the poetic thinker who averred that "there is no present," there appear to me to be indisputable facts to prove that there is a present; otherwise how do we account for, say, continuous pain?

(2.) Is there a past?

We have much more direct evidence that there is a present than we have that there is a past. We cannot have direct material evidence of a past, as all material must be present material. There is, however, always circumstantial evidence of a past; a skeleton suggests that it was once part of a living

creature, and there is always circumstantial evidence that we were alive yesterday.

(3.) Is there a future?

The future generally is beyond the knowledge of man, although there is an immediate future which is perceived by the present. But that there is a future is as indisputable as the fact that there is a past—that is, of course, if our reasoning faculties are not delusive.

But the divisions between past, present, and future, are not clearly defined. The musician in the illustration sees all three at the same time.

Which indicates that the combinations of the various elements are not separated from each other, and do not appear in the brain like the moving targets in the shooting gallery.

When the instrumentalist has played the composition through, although its performance may have occupied him half-an-hour or more, he has the whole of it in his mind in a single instant of time. He can criticise it as a whole, and he can select the numbers in the score which he considers commendable, or the reverse.

A person intending to put a question to another, has the whole question in a complete form in his mind, before he has time to utter a syllable. Thus the combinations of the brain can perceive in a moment the events which may have taken weeks, or months, or years, to transpire, as a drowning man is said to have a complete review of his life pass through his mind at once.

The hypothesis seems to be fairly well established that all thoughts and actions (not mere manifestations of these) are combinations of greater mental elementary substances, allied with the elementary substances of Matter and Force ; that these combinations are parts of the Greater Ego ; and that the Greater Ego never fully reveals itself by thought or action, but is only seen objectively, and, in the abstract, through its parts. It may be likened to an army, by reason of the fact that, while the head is always necessarily acquainted with the action of its parts, the parts know nothing of the actions of their head. And it further resembles an army in that its parts, through impetuosity, may occasionally become unmanageable, and endanger the whole.

Thus the position of the Greater Ego is to know everything immediately connected with the organism —that which has transpired, is transpiring, and (providing it be within the range of vision) will transpire.

To understand the relationship of the various combinations to each other, we have only to consider that the Greater Ego has full knowledge of all that its parts have done and are doing ; that these parts are an ever-varying mass of elements, some of which attract their kindred elements, whilst others repel them. That they sometimes work in unison, but at other times contest in rivalry for dominion. And further, having now discovered that the past,

the present, and (at times) the future, can be seen at once by a general combination of all the combinations, the self-resuscitation of past combinations assisted by—and at the same time assisting—present combinations, becomes comprehensible.

To arrive at the simplest effort of memory, I have considered this question, namely :—

When an infant wakens from a slumber, and sees his mother, why does he recognise (or, in other words, remember) her ?

It has been shown that in wakefulness all the elementary substances of mind and life are in an active condition, and all sorts of combinations—the result of stimuli—are instantly formed, one within another. The eye being an organ of the Greater Mind, possesses the faculty to pictorially represent the objective world, and so convey the stimuli to the before-mentioned elementary substances.

It seems that the Greater Ego then immediately becomes aware of this pictorial representation, and that its elements are excited, or otherwise, according to the way in which it affects them: thus a pretty child, or a handsome woman, will excite admiration; a vulgar, or drunken, person will excite disgust, a distressed person will excite compassion, and so on ; the elements which have affinity are attracted more closely to one another, and readily form combinations, which, in their turn, repel other combinations which are antagonistic to them.

The question concerning the awakened infant

necessitates the hypothesis that, before he fell asleep he formed a concept of his mother, to which pictorial representation of her he had attached all sorts of combinations of the elements. The combination of the elements of Affection, which had been reciprocated by the original, had affixed itself upon the representation ; that of Hunger had looked to it for food ; while those of comfort, wonder, pleasurable excitement, and all the other various combinations which are called up in an infant's mind, are centred in the original of this pictorial representation. Before the child went to sleep he was tired, and sated with comforts and advantages ; but rest and sleep having fulfilled their purpose, his appreciation of the several gratifications returns to him. Awakened, he sees again the same pictorial representation, all the pleasurable combinations and subcombinations straightway fix upon the pictorial representation of his maternal parent. Whereas if a stranger had been in her place, the combination of the elements of fear and distrust would probably have taken possession of him.

The process of the recognition most likely occurs in this way :—

The fresh concept of the mother by the awakened child is clear and well defined, while the concept formed before sleep is indistinct ; but the Greater Ego is, as I have already submitted, able to judge with more or less accuracy of the passing of time, it will naturally place the two concepts distinctly

apart, and this it is which constitutes the process of recognition, or memory.

To explain the method by which the memory is produced, we will consider the action of an infant at and from its birth, and note the first signs of intelligent articulation, which, of course, are indicative of memory.

Very soon after its birth, the infant will begin to exercise its lungs. Evidently it is an *a priori* instinct which causes it to cry, since it cannot be the result of experience; and it shows that there are certain combinations of the elementary substances of mind—having as their organ the larynx—which delight in creating a noise. This predisposition to make articulate sounds is common to most animals, and generally remains with them during life.

The next step is to the first intelligent utterance of the infant, which is naturally the result of experience. If the sound of the letter *a*, and no other, were continually produced in the hearing of the infant, he would quickly learn by imitation to repeat it; but he would utter no other articulate sound during his life; which confirms the hypothesis that the Greater Mental elements responsible for articulation have pleasure in their vocation, even though it be confined to a repetition of the simple sound of the first letter of the alphabet. Thus we have the earliest symptom of memory in the infant, in his parrot-like repetition of the only articulate sound he has ever heard.

The Greater Mind of this particular infant fulfils its *a priori* function of building up its tissues ; but with regard to experience of the world, it is a blank, the sound of the letter *a* being the sum total of its consciousness.

To continue the hypothetical experiment, we will suppose that, instead of being confined to the letter *a*, the infant were allowed to hear a continued repetition of the simple sounds of the whole twenty-six letters of the alphabet, but nothing else. He would repeat the entire alphabet, and only that, to the end of his life ; and in doing it he would be performing one of the most difficult feats of memory with a brain possessing little or no intelligence.

This indicates that only a very few of the elements of the higher grade are being exercised in the child (the rest of them being wasted by disuse), and that the Greater Ego, representing the child, knowing nothing but the alphabet, simply for its own pleasure allows a portion of its elements to repeat *ad infinitum* the only articulate sounds he has ever heard.

Each letter sound is formed by a combination of affiliated elements, which performs its brief duty in the brain, and then retires. But the combination is never entirely dissolved, because, as it is the nature of the elements to remain in combination, absolute dissolution is impossible ; but they are all dormant until stimulated, when they become active, following the combinations they have been accustomed to, and using the organs of the brain to assume the

outer consciousness habitual to them, and to the Greater Ego.

All combinations in the brain are conscious, and are co-ordinated with other combinations, the whole —*i.e.* the Greater Ego—being cognisant, in a single instant of time, of everything that it is possible for consciousness to know; and, as I have already shown, they can at once view past, present, and part of the future; consequently they recognise that the weaker combination is an anterior one; and if the word “Remember” be substituted for “Recognise,” we get a tolerably clear conception of what Memory is.

In any explanation of this faculty of Memory, we must always take into consideration the necessity of supposing that Greater Mind, through its various combinations, can distinguish the passing of present sensations into past ones, and estimate, with more or less exactitude, the distance, in time, between any one sensation and another.

We should consider, too, what time really is, or what is implied by the term, since we cannot conceive that there is a distinctive element of time. It has been suggested, as a definition of Time, that it is “the relation of successions of stimuli to each other.”

The perception of moving phenomena must necessarily, I imagine, be one of the attributes of the Universal Ego, for it would appear strange if the Universal Ego could not feel and perceive His various planets revolving around their respective

suns, in regular course. He must be conscious of these phenomena going on within Him.

The Greater Ego can also perceive moving phenomena, and can form an estimate of the time required for a body to move from one place to another. By seeing a horse trotting, we are able to get some idea of the number of miles per hour it is moving at, the calculation being made from within the spectator, and being accurate, or otherwise, in ratio to his experience, and ability to form an opinion upon the matter.

We must thus arrive at the conclusion that the passing of time, and the distance in time between one sensation and another, are distinguished by certain combinations of elements within the Greater Ego.

If we remain motionless in darkness and silence, we are nevertheless conscious of the passing of time, and can even form a tolerably accurate idea of the number of times we breathe per minute.

I have been asked by one who has not quite grasped my theory whether I have considered what an immense quantity of concepts this Greater Mind theory must involve, and hence the myriads of mental units of the same order, and also the number of registered impressions which Memory, under these conditions, will have to account for in a lifetime of, say, threescore and ten years.

No doubt we are confronted with this apparent complexity, and as we have not yet determined how

many Greater Mental elements there are in a higher class organism, we must point analogically to the equally formidable opportunity for complexity arising out of the stupendous number of combinations of, for instance, the elements of speech, which are comparatively very few, while the combinations of words, syllables, and verbal sounds, in the languages and dialects of the world, must be reckoned by millions.

A common kaleidoscope will afford a familiar instance of infinite combinations formed from a few elements, represented by half-a-dozen or so bits of coloured glass.

Any element which does not compound with others, is, for all practical purposes, non-existent. The elements are never thoroughly known to us singly; two of them would have some sort of a complex intelligence; three would have more than two, in increasing ratio, and so on; and when a number of elements combine, the character of the combination depends upon which of the elements are the more excited.

To ask "What is memory?" and "Why do we remember?" is almost equivalent to asking "What is mind?" and "Why do we think?"

But asking how the elements of a present combination, forming present experience, can reproduce the consciousness of past combinations, is putting the question, "Why do we remember?" in a more concrete shape, which makes it more easily answerable.

It would not be correct to assert that a combination of elements having dominion in the brain, will remain dominant until displaced by other combinations, for every combination when its work is accomplished naturally retires from the active use of the brain organs. The elements of Greater Mind are in a constant state of fusion, and are continually forming themselves into groups of combinations both large and small, and of combinations within combinations. It may be that sometimes two, or three, or more, combinations are occupying the brain at the same time; but when any abstruse or difficult question is employing the brain, the combination forming it is the only one in possession, though there may be subdominant ones, because no two combinations of any importance can occupy the brain at the same instant.

As an illustration of how subdominant combinations may remain with an individual for an indefinitely lengthened period, without being in evidence until wanted, we will take a man with an umbrella. He is in the habit, say, of carrying it about with him, always, whatever the weather. Long familiarity with the implement has filled his brain with numerous concepts concerning it. There is one concept about its appearance, another about its materials; others respectively about where to place it when not being held; possible risks of losing it, and so on; and all these concepts remain with him, latently, throughout the day, coming forward

for use when association leads up to them—as when he is leaving his home in the morning, or his office in the afternoon, or when rain is threatening. Thus the concepts are all past experiences, always ready to re-form, and come into prominence, when called upon by the Greater Ego.

If rain is descending, these minor combinations will suggest that the umbrella should be opened, and used, as otherwise its owner will get wet, and then be in danger of catching cold. Thus the present combinations will bring back those that are past; memory being the resuscitation of past experiences.

If we enter a room which we have seen several years previously, the Greater Ego will at once proceed to differentiate the two concepts formed as already explained. It will say, "The fainter of these concepts was formed long ago;" or, in ordinary language, "We remember having seen this room before." Then previous, and related, concepts will appear to the Greater Ego, being brought up by association, as a change in the positions of the furniture and the pictures, or anything of that sort.

The combinations, noticing the alterations, are gratified at discovering the accuracy of their previous concepts, and say to themselves, "What an observant person I am, and what an excellent memory I have!"

The Greater Mental elements are therefore like an effervescent mass, forming all sorts of combina-

tions, always ready, when wanted, to come forward, and enjoy their brief period of brain consciousness.

A great deal of what is called memory belongs to the flow of thought. The casual sight of a man may immediately transport one's thoughts to the other side of the world, where some time previously one remembers having seen his brother; or the appearance of the man may remind one of having met him a summer or two before at the sea-side, and the thought of the sea-side may revive reminiscences of some other person; and so the flow of thought will go on, *ad infinitum*.

All thought and consciousness are dependent upon memory, which, as I have said before, is the result of past experiences, for new experiences are rare; and consciousness, as a rule, may be described as a re-shuffling of past experiences. Hence it follows that Memory is simply a transposing and re-transposing of the elementary substances forming past experiences.

The combination of the Greater Mental elements dominant for the moment, with its subdominant combinations, are the moving powers for the resuscitation of past thoughts, by partly dissolving themselves, and rejecting from their compound such elements as are not required, and taking into it those which are. The result is that the new dominant combination will thus contain the old combination which was dominant when the incident or aspect occurred or was seen. This combination,

when it has served its purpose, will again partly dissolve, but it may be resuscitated again and again, not necessarily in the same form, according to the direction taken by the stream of thought.

The reproduction of a thought (according to this theory) is very simple. Here association comes to the help of the elementary forces, for by this means every combination of Greater Mental elements brings back another one. If I were asked to make a drawing of a horse, my mind's eye would first see a field, or a roadway, upon which the animal to be drawn would immediately appear. And if I were asked to make a sketch of a tiger, my mental vision would travel at once to Indian jungles, or to the Zoological Gardens. And it is thus, by association, that the Greater Mind can, at will, revive any of its old and past combinations.

Of so sensitive a nature are the mental elements, that any stimuli, internal or external, will at once excite them—not abnormally if the physical organs be in healthful condition; but when they are otherwise, the result may be one of two opposite states, namely, the elements may be super-excited, as in delirium, or too meagrely so, as in lethargy. The combining of the elements is due to their excitation. But as the external stimuli are always changing, so the internal stimuli are necessarily always changing too. And thus external association calls up, by gradual changes, internal association of the combinations of the Greater Mental elements.

Dr. Edridge Green tells us that "the optic thalami and the corpora striata are seats of sensory and motor memory respectively." But the Greater Mind theory places the seat of memory with *all* the Greater Mental elements—the which use not only the optic thalami and the corpora striata, but all parts of the brain, as they may be called upon.

When a child begins to use its tongue for the production of articulate speech, generally the first word he utters is "mamma," because he hears it oftener repeated than any other, and being once learned, he never forgets it. Having committed the word to memory, and being able to articulate it, whenever the child sees, or needs, his mother, association prompts him to say "mamma." At this stage of life the compound of Greater Mental elements entering a new existence is gratified at discovering that it is able to utter a distinct word.

The elementary substances required for the remembrance of the word "mamma" are of the simplest nature, being those which have interest in the perception of its various sounds and the organs of which are the ears. Then follow the elements which have interest and pleasure (only to be experienced when they are compounded), in the faculty of Imitation; next come the elements which have interest and pleasure in the production of Articulate Sounds, their organ being the larynx.

This sort of Memory finds an apt illustration in the individual who, by frequently hearing long Latin

prayers said, becomes in time able to repeat them by rote, notwithstanding that he does not know the meaning of the words he is uttering.

If the technical elementary substances of mind be conceded (as are those of matter and force), and if it be also conceded that the elements of the three divisions can perfectly compound into a single substance, then the great mysteries of Mind and Life—including Memory, Reason, and all physical phenomena—may be explained.

CHAPTER VIII

HABITS AND REFLEX ACTS

WHAT are described as Reflex Actions in animals may represent (1) acts of common natural serviceableness, as walking, talking, flying, &c. ; (2) actions which apparently serve no useful purpose, but which are not harmful, as involuntary facial contortions, or biting the finger-nails ; and (3) mischievous actions, as habitual (and almost unconscious) use of bad language, violence, intemperance, and so on.

These three varieties of actions are the consequences of habit, and relate to consciousness sufficiently to empower it to check, or to inhibit, them. According to the Greater Mind theory they may be defined as the effect produced by particular combinations of the elementary substances of life having, as it were, a general licence from the Greater Ego to use the brain organs for their respective purposes.

As the actions referred to in the initial class of this series are not only harmless in themselves but serviceable and even necessary, the Greater Ego exercises very slight vigilance over them, and hence, being unopposed by other combinations, they fulfil their several offices with almost unrestricted freedom.

Actions classed under the second heading, and

which signify some degree of weakness in the individual, but are not mischievous, may somewhat similarly be accounted for, by the combinations of the elements of life, comprising the nerves—and therefore not possessing the higher faculty of wisdom—working without restraint from the more intelligent combinations. But the Greater Ego has, and not infrequently exercises, power to hinder such habits, by stimulating the higher grade elements into a more sustained supervision over them.

But the habits, or actions, of the third class, so far from being necessary, or useful, or merely useless, are always more or less harmful, and often positively dangerous.

Now these mischievous habits, or actions—regarding them as compound mental and physical substances under the conditions as already explained—resemble those of the initial class, in that they are combinations of the elements having general licence to use the brain organs, and, consequently, the motor organs; but in each case combinations of the higher class elements, if strong enough to assume dominancy in the brain, would have power to check and suppress the habits; but if these higher class elements and their organs are too weak to form a sufficiently strong combination, the mischievous combinations are allowed by the Greater Ego to pursue their own course unrestrained.

Although I have, for convenience, divided habits into three classes, for general purposes they may be

grouped together, as actions performed by certain combinations of the elements of life which can be inhibited by the Greater Ego, but which, for the reasons already advanced, are allowed to happen.

This, I submit, puts the matter plainly and concisely. There have, of course, been other explanations of it in various biological works ; but, referring to them, Professor James writes : "All this is vague to the last degree, and amounts to little more than saying that a new path may be formed by the sort of *chances* that in nervous material are likely to occur. But vague as it is, it is really the last word of our wisdom in the matter."

Sudden and involuntary reflex actions are, however, less often the result of habit than they are of powerful stimuli, affecting certain combinations of the elements which react before the Greater Ego (as a whole) has time to intervene and prevent them. Thus the Greater Ego is taken unexpectedly, and therefore, unprepared, and the elements which are most affected act instantaneously, without affording the Greater Ego an opportunity of judging between the different courses which would otherwise be open to it.

Although habits which are the results of experience are commonly called Instincts, they must not be confused with *a priori* instincts. While the former may be described as acquired knowledge, the latter is the capacity of acquiring the knowledge. It may, however, be said, that as the elements of

life can build up an organism, they must have *a priori* knowledge; and no doubt this is true so far as the building up of the organism is concerned; but with regard to the material they must use, that all rests with experience.

As the physical is only the outward and visible indication of the Greater Mind, so the evolution of the physical is only the evolution of the elements of life; and if a number of the elements of each of the three divisions—Mind, Matter, and Force—have power to combine with each other, then, given suitable environment, an organism will be evolved, the nature of which will be according to the nature and number of its elements.

But at the same time, as each element possesses its portion of a complete intelligence, it must necessarily have *a priori* knowledge, so far as its atom of intelligence will go.

Professor Lloyd Morgan's experiments with newly hatched chickens led him to the conclusion that *a priori* instinct is far from possessing the importance which is commonly attributed to it, and he says, "that instinctive automatic actions merely afford data to consciousness, from which subsequent actions may be guided to finer issues, or in other ways modified. The locomotion and balancing of young birds are instinctive, and owing to the inherited co-ordination within the nervous system; the initial acts of locomotion—*e.g.* walking, swimming, and flying—afford data to consciousness, in

the light of which the actions are improved and perfected.

"That the so-called instinctive acts of animals, even to the finding and using of their food, are due to experience, and not to *a priori* instinct, is proved by experiment."

Professor Lloyd Morgan discovered that a chicken hatched in an incubator, and therefore without the advantage of maternal instruction in matters which are generally regarded as instinctive, would suffer, and even perish, from hunger and thirst, with food and water within its reach, if their use were not in some way indicated to it. But when the professor pecked at the grains of corn with his pencil-case, the bird imitated the action with its bill, which disclosed to it the use of the food, and it began to feed; and when its beak was touched with water, the purpose of the liquid directly became apparent to it, and it began to drink. Thus it seems that at the birth of an animal the elements of life collectively have had no *a priori* knowledge of the world, and that every combination they form themselves into means an experience gained, and lays the foundation of what presently becomes habit.

Every word uttered to an infant, and every letter of the alphabet learned by it, leads it into the habit of talking; and every time its feet are put to the ground, the foundation of its future habit of walking is being laid. Many lessons are better inculcated by habit than by reason—for example, language,

the multiplication table, pianoforte playing. Thus, while many matters are learned by habit (practice) without much use of reason, many matters which are learned by reason develop into habit.

The elements of life in the young organism appear to find pleasure in combining with each other, and so gathering new experiences; the pleasure, of course, is only when the elements are compounded, as singly they are incapable of feeling it.

All conscious actions, whether due to habit, or otherwise, can only be performed by combinations of the elements which have organs in the brain, for they must originally have been performed by the elements through the brain organs. All habits can be inhibited, though with more or less difficulty, by the Greater Ego stimulating special combinations of elements for the purpose.

Psychologists are often at a loss to know how it is that at times, a person is able to perform an action to which he has been accustomed, while his mind is wholly engaged in another direction; the explanation is this. When an action, whether self-taught or otherwise, has been thoroughly acquired in early life, and has been so continually allowed by the dominant combinations of the brain to be performed without their interference that it is enacted almost automatically, they, because of its being harmless, and probably also useful, offer no opposition to it.

In this sense the Greater Ego may be compared

to a chief clerk in a merchant's office, who, so long as his juniors perform their routine work satisfactorily, plods along with his own superior duties, without interfering with them ; he may be ignorant of the details of his subordinates' labours, but he necessarily has a general knowledge of the whole.

Walking is a habit, and becomes an unconscious one. But the Greater Ego has to be constantly on the alert to avoid obstacles, which shows that it can inhibit the perambulatory habit when there is danger in the path.

So far, then, our investigations point to the hypothesis that habits are unopposed conscious actions—that is to say, actions which the dominant combinations allow to be performed by temporarily subservient combinations ; but always under the surveillance of the Greater Ego.

Hence it will be seen that this theory of life does not recognise the difference which is generally drawn between reason and the so-called instinct which is engendered by habit ; the variation being (according to this theory) that in reason certain of the elements are in action, and have to be watched, and perhaps opposed and suppressed, for the good of the commonwealth, while "instinct" meets with no opposition, since, from habit and experience, the actions are so natural and usual, that the instigating elements are permitted to repeat them without hindrance.

Thus, while reason is a certain combination of

elements which after successfully contesting with rival combinations, becomes the dominant one in the brain, in instinct, the combinations are allowed to become subdominant, without contest or selection; or, to put it in another way, if there arises a more or less useful combination of elements (composing the instinct) which has many times previously been examined, it is allowed to become subdominant without re-examination, and therefore without opposition from the other elements comprising the brain, which they are permitted to use for their own purpose without the interference of reason. But should there be any deviation from the ordinary course of the instinct—say, by the introduction of some unusual action—the other elements would immediately interpose, and contest, and the result would be reason.

What is generally called the instinctive faculty in dogs, will illustrate this hypothesis that instinct is the result of experience and habit—that is to say, acts of reason so often repeated, that they have become more or less automatic. A dog, we are told, knows his master by instinct. Such knowledge must evidently be acquired through the brain, for knowing is an act of consciousness, and is, therefore, a brain function. A dog, say, has learned to know, by experience, which has become a habit, some particular man as his master. All the animal's elements, in their various combinations, are agreed upon that point, and so there is no opposition. But suppose

the man blackens his face, and in other ways alters his general appearance, then the dog's behaviour is altogether different, for there comes opposition into his mind. At first he regards his master with doubt and suspicion, and it requires some amount of reason (a conflict of mental elements) to overcome his distrust. But if the man's disguise is continued, the dog learns to recognise and welcome him in his changed appearance at first sight, because the transformation has been reasoned out, and the repetition in the dog's brain becomes a habit.

From this it will be gathered that habit is intimately associated with memory. It may indeed be described as memory in its subconscious condition, applying more particularly to physical action than to brain consciousness. Like memory, habit comes forward unbidden, and the Greater Ego has no power to inhibit it from suddenly appearing and taking possession of the brain, but it is within the power of the Greater Ego to stifle it by other combinations if it is likely to become mischievous, otherwise it may allow it to pursue its course as a stream of thought. Both memory and habit must be regarded as the most useful possessions of the higher class animals, of course including man.

One of the arguments adduced against the evolution theory, is that the accidental variations and acquired habits common in all forms of life, are not transmitted to the offspring, or that, if they are, the transmission is limited, and soon dies out. No

doubt this is so, and if it were otherwise, the fauna of the world would become changed so rapidly, that stability would be lost, and the gradual evolution, upon which scientists are now agreed, would have been impossible. Yet it is apparent that some accidental variations are preserved by the various organisms, whilst the slowness of their evolution may be due to the fewness of the permanently adopted variations, and the multitude of the rejected ones.

Who could suggest a variation which would improve, and make more beautiful what we regard as a perfect animal? And what an immensity of variations there might be which would disfigure it.

Should there, by accident, occur in the structure of an organism, any variation which detracts from its usefulness, or its physical beauty, or its adaptability to environment, the Greater Ego, representing the whole of the elements of the organism, will naturally endeavour, not only to overcome the difference, but also to prevent its transmission. On the other hand, should the variation prove advantageous to the organism, the Greater Ego will endeavour to retain, and transmit it.

The transmission of actual disease, which the Greater Ego would prevent if it could, may be accounted for by the elements being themselves diseased—*e.g.* foreign and unwelcome elements have become compounded with them—and although the healthy elements strenuously resist the intrusion of the unhealthy, or infected, ones, they cannot help

transmitting them, and the struggle is repeated continuously in the descendants until the objectionable elements are eliminated.

The hypothesis with regard to accidental variations is, therefore, that the tendency of the organism is to discard all elements which are detrimental, or useless, and to preserve and transmit those which are useful.

But while accidental variations—such as malformations and physical injuries, which of course are exclusively allied with unconsciousness—cannot be inhibited from disfiguring the organism by any act of consciousness, acquired habits may be inhibited.

If, as this Greater Mind theory maintains, all possible states of consciousness and subconsciousness are comprised of the various elementary substances of life and become outwardly conscious, through their organs in the brain, it follows that our knowledge of *a priori* instincts is limited to the sensations that such instincts exist, and that they are the source whence all consciousness springs. *A priori* instincts, therefore, need not be considered here, because (as various combinations of the elements of mind and life, working independently of their organs in the brain) they have been fully considered in the chapter on the examination of the greater mental elements.

All habits are performed by motor muscles, through the medium of the brain, but without any conflict between the elements comprising the

muscles and the brain organs. Hence, by reason of the orderly and harmonious way in which the habits are performed, the organism may not be fully conscious of them.

Habit, therefore, is not *a priori* instinct, and cannot be transmitted from parent to progeny, although the *a priori* intelligences which induce the habit may be.

Suppose, for example, we take two dogs of widely different degrees of intelligence, and endeavour to teach them tricks. The more intelligent of the animals quickly learns his lessons, and the other one is difficult to teach. But the former does not transmit his acquired habits to his descendants, although he may transmit to them the intelligence which enables him to learn, so that they may be as capable of acquiring similar habits as he is; while the other dog may be able to transmit to his offspring only his lack of intelligence.

The ensuing letter, which appeared originally in the *St. James's Gazette*, is not without some degree of interest in its bearing upon this subject :—

“ SIR,—Dr. Lindsay Johnson offers to supply Dr. Morton and myself with evidence of the transmission to the child of character acquired by the parent. We shall be delighted to have his evidence, but I hope it will be of better quality than the specimen he publishes. He has discovered that if rodents be kept in small, dark boxes their sight is thereby

injured, as is also the sight of their offspring when the latter are reared ‘under similar conditions.’ One would have expected this result. Dr. Johnson calls it a ‘rigid experiment,’ and imagines he has proved the transmission of an acquirement. I suppose, if he amputated a dog’s tail, and thereafter, in due course, the tails of that animal’s offspring, he would regard this as another ‘rigid’ experiment and signal proof of transmission. He is mistaken. To prove that offspring may be injured in the same way as the parent is one thing, and not a very important thing. To prove that offspring *inherit* parental injuries is quite another thing. When he has proved that terriers are commonly *born* without tails, or that the offspring of injured rodents *inherit* the parental defect, he will have done something to establish his point. It is often a good thing to make experiments, but always a much better thing to have clear ideas. Dr. Johnson advises us to make experiments. Hundreds of trained observers, the leading men of science in the world, have already made thousands of them, and no one has as yet demonstrated the transmission of even a single acquirement. Every supposed instance of such transmission has broken down on investigation.—I am, &c.,

“G. ARCHDALL REID, M.B., F.R.S.Ed.”

While Dr. Reid here advances an undoubtedly good argument, it cannot be denied that such

accidental variations as disease conveyed by contagion, may be inherited—that is to say, the taint of morbific blood in certain forms of contagious diseases is transmitted to the offspring, although, as already remarked, the vitiation is not permanent, and the organism is constantly endeavouring to throw it off.

But although the transmission of acquired habits, or injuries, is not likely to occur, there is no doubting the fact that new intelligences are developed in races of organisms in the course of ages. But they are *a priori* intelligences, and—as Professor Lloyd Morgan explains—cannot be manifested as outer consciousness in an organism, unless they are produced by experience.

Acquired habits are not a cause of fundamental change in the organism. They really mean no more than that certain of the Greater Mental elements have combined, and learned some particular actions. But their intelligences (combinations of Greater Mental elements) after combination are the same as they were before, and it is only these *a priori* intelligences which can be transmitted, and not their combinations.

Although, from the standpoint of this theory, Weissmann and his followers are much nearer the truth in their conclusions upon this subject than their opponents are, their method of analysis makes it necessary for them to assign to each of the various organs and cells an independence, which the Greater Mind theory refuses to them. The unity of the

organism is apparently so obvious, that it seems impossible to regard germ plasm as being of so stable and independent a nature as Weissmann, in his earlier works, claims for it. He draws a too hard and fast line of division, instead of allowing for the overlapping which is so general throughout nature.

The Greater Mind theory, then, advances the hypothesis that acquired habits induced by experience, and consequently appertaining to consciousness, cannot be inherited, though the ability to perform them may be; and that although accidental variations, belonging exclusively to the unconscious part of the organism, and which are of no service to the organism, may be transmitted, they cannot become permanent. But accidental variations, belonging exclusively to the unconscious part of life, if serviceable to the organism, may be inherited, and may even become permanent.

The extreme rarity of these useful variations, which generally occur through a change in the environment, would by itself be sufficient to prevent any too rapid alterations in the forms of organisms. But there are many conditions in which changes are of common occurrence, as, for example, that (from dark to white) of the animals indigenous to the polar regions, on the approach of winter; and the frequent adoption of surrounding colours by reptiles and insects, to aid them in eluding their enemies.

Herbert Spencer's theory of the evolution of intelligence, which I take to be combinations of

a priori instinct, or Greater Mental elements, is ingenious, and except that, for a full explanation, its author appears to take too much for granted, no fault can be found with it. It seems obvious that a creature with but a rudimentary eye, cannot possess intelligence equal to that of the superior animal which is subsequently developed ; but the specialisation must necessarily be simultaneously co-ordinated, and it is difficult to imagine that any variation could occur without being accompanied by co-ordinated variations in the whole organism. Herbert Spencer's theory that the initial development will be seen in the eye, is no doubt correct, but to what cause is the development due ? There is, with regard to ultimate purpose, such obvious intention in the evolution of nature, that it is only to be accounted for by the theory of an additional intelligence, compelling the eye to develop new characteristics, and at the same time imparting new intelligence to the entire organism.

The phenomena which arise in the course of the evolution of the ontogeny can only, it appears to me, be accounted for on the supposition that additional elements or mind (life) have found their way into the organism, and formed new organs. Such elements can only be those which are affiliated, as all elements which cannot work co-ordinately with those already belonging to the organism, would necessarily fail to accomplish anything.

CHAPTER IX

HYPNOTISM; AND DUPLEX AND MULTIPLE PERSONALITIES

Not having personally had any experience of hypnotism, I approach the subject with less confidence than I have felt when dealing with the themes of the foregoing chapters, and consequently this division of my work will not be directed towards a synthesis, or analysis, of hypnotism, but rather to a tentative comparison of the published accounts of the experiments performed by certain scientists upon neurotic subjects, with this theory of the elementary substances of life, and an endeavour to discover whether the latter will explain the mysterious phenomena which the distinguished investigators describe.

I may say, in passing, that the so-called hypnotism and thought-reading of the exhibition rooms, closely associated as they are with charlatanism, do not occupy my attention.

It may be interesting to observe the relations between the Greater Mind theory and the theory of Evolution on the one hand, and on the other, the relations between the Greater Mind theory and that of Hypnotism.

The Greater Mind theory and that of Evolution are in accord upon every point ; each is allied with, and supplemented and supported by, the other, and they combine, and together form a sound theory of the evolution of the mental and the physical.

But while the theory of evolution has been lucidly and satisfactorily explained by master minds, it is otherwise with hypnotism, which is still in its infancy ; and although we have veracious accounts of marvellous experiences with it, we have little or no explanation of the nature, reason, or cause of the phenomenon.

Nevertheless, mysterious as hypnotism is, I look to it with confidence to establish the soundness of this theory of Life, and with equal confidence I rely upon this theory to disclose the secrets of hypnotism. Indeed, I even look forward to seeing them both, in the not far distant future, working harmoniously together in effecting momentous discoveries.

Broadly, it seems to me that this Greater Mind theory should account for hypnotism in all its phases, and also for suggestion without hypnotism, as the natural alliance of the elementary substances of mind of the hypnotiser, or the suggestor, as the case may be, with those of the subject ; and the consequent power of the former to use the latter's organs.

Without attempting to venture upon a didactic explanation of the causes of the various and remarkable effects of hypnotism, post-hypnotic

suggestion, and post-hypnotic, or negative, hallucination, I submit that probably one of the three following postulatory solutions of the mystery may eventually determine to be correct, namely :—

(1.) The voluntary resignation by the subject of his organs to the hypnotiser's Greater Mental elements.

(2.) The Greater Mental elements in both hypnotiser and hypnotised compound and coalesce by mutual agreement.

(3.) That (plus the last suggestion) the Greater Mental elements of the hypnotiser, having coalesced with those of the subject and caused them to form a certain combination, this combination is afterwards resuscitated by association, and causes the subject to obey the suggestion, even when the elements of the hypnotiser are not present.

The first of these postulatory explanations appears to me sufficient to account for the simpler forms of hypnotism, of which the following instances, described by M. Liégeois, may be cited as examples :—

“A daughter fired point-blank at her mother's breast with a pistol, which she believed to be loaded.

“A young man dissolved in water a powder which he was told was arsenic, and gave it to his aunt to drink. When questioned as to his act, he showed the most complete ignorance of what he had done.”

In this category also come the well-known ex-

periments of influencing subjects to go through the actions of washing the hands without soap and water; and to hold their arms extended for periods which would be impossible had they not been hypnotised.

But for the phenomena of post-hypnotic suggestion, or negative hallucination, of which the following illustrations—also described by M. Liégeois—are examples, the first two explanations are not sufficient.

M. Liébeault tells a subject—one Camille S.—that she is unable to either see or hear M. Liégeois. She is then awakened, but is absolutely unconscious of the latter's presence, even when he pricks her with a pin, although she displays a lively sense of pain when any other person does so; and when he addresses her in her own name she shows no consciousness of his proximity. Still more remarkable are the incidents which follow: "I now," continues M. Liégeois, describing the experiment, "proceed impersonally, speaking not in my own name, but as though there was an inner voice addressing her from her own consciousness. Then somnambulic automatism appears as complete in this novel and unknown form as in any of the shapes with which we are familiar."

"I say to her, aloud, 'Camille is thirsty; she will go to the kitchen for a glass of water, which she will bring in and put upon this table.' She seems to have heard nothing, but at the end of a

few minutes she does what has been indicated, and with that lively and impetuous manner so often noticed in somnambules. She is then asked why she has brought in the glass of water which she has placed upon the table: ‘What do you mean? I have not stirred. There is no glass!’ I then say, ‘Camille sees the glass, but it is not water, as they would have her believe. It is a glass of very good wine; she will drink it, and it will do her good.’ She executes at once the order given her, and has immediately forgotten all about it.”

M. Liégeois goes on to relate a conversation between Camille and the other persons present, in which she repeats mechanically, as her own, every answer with which he prompts her. Finally, by a suggestion in his own name, he awakens her, or rather—for she is already awake, except with regard to him—he establishes the negative hallucination, and she is completely oblivious of everything that has passed.

In explanation of which curious phenomena M. Liégeois says: “This shows that during a negative hallucination the subject sees that which he seems not to see, and hears that which he seems not to hear. There are in him two personalities, the unconscious Ego, which sees and hears, and a conscious Ego, which neither sees nor hears, but to which suggestions can be made, passing, if I may so express myself, through the channel of the first Ego. This duplication of personality is no more surprising than

that which has been established by Dr. Azam in the case of Felida X."

No doubt from the standpoint of prevailing theories, this is the best solution of the problem that could be advanced. But it must be rejected, or rather subjected to further explanations, by the Greater Mind theory, which argues that a man has but one personality; that the conscious, or second Ego, has not a real personality, being merely a part of the first, or greater Ego, which is the only real personality.

The Greater Mind theory would advance the hypothesis that the hypnotic's first and only real Ego is rapport with the hypnotiser's elements, and that the latter uses the former's brain organs to work with, they having command over the motor muscles.

To attempt an explanation by this theory of the last-mentioned experiment with Camille. It is probable that the subject was not entirely awakened; that she was still under the control of M. Liébeault; that M. Liébeault possessed exceptionally strong imaginative power, and that, by a great effort, he compelled himself to feel that M. Liégeois was not present. Then, by impersonal suggestion and inhibition, he would be able to will the subject to act as he felt.

The subject's eyesight was inert, or dormant, until it became manifest to the combination of elements having possession of the necessary organs in the

brain ; and as her greater mental elements were not working, or were only working in rapport with those of the hypnotiser, she saw with his elements, but used her own organs.

Dr. Forel relates an experience of post-hypnotic suggestion : " I told Miss Z., while hypnotised," he writes, " that she would, on awakening, find two violets in the bosom of her dress, both natural and pretty, and that she was to give me the prettier, at the same time I put one real violet in her dress. When she awoke she saw two violets, one was brighter and prettier, she said, and she gave me the corner of her pocket-handkerchief, keeping the real violet to herself. I now asked her if both violets were real, or if one of them was not one of those fugitive presents which on previous occasions she had received at my hands. She replied that the brighter violet was not real, because it looked so flattened on the handkerchief. I now renewed the experiment, suggesting three real violets, equally dark, sweet-smelling, not flattened out, but tangible, with stalk and leaves, but I gave her only one flower. This time Miss Z. was completely deceived, and quite unable to tell me whether one, two, or all three violets were real or suggested. She thought that all were real this time, while at the very moment she was holding in one hand a flower, in the other nothing but air. It is clear, therefore, that when a suggestion is made to all the senses at once, it is complete."

This post-hypnotic hallucination may no doubt

be accounted for by both the first and the second explanations. But post-hypnotic suggestions which are executed some more or less considerable time after they are made, and when the hypnotiser has his thoughts entirely elsewhere, can only be accounted for by the third explanation.

Dr. Forel says : "In suggestion one uses the brain of the subject as a machine. In the case of the insane the machine is out of gear, and will not work."

Which is precisely the view taken by the Greater Mind theory, for it regards the brain as being similar in principle to a phonograph. As a phonograph will mechanically reproduce words which have been spoken into it, so will the hypnotised subject's brain mechanically execute the hypnotiser's thoughts or suggestions. The greater mental elements of both hypnotiser and hypnotised being in rapport, the former employs his own brain to think with, and the hypnotic's brain for putting his thoughts into action.

A hypnotiser cannot constrain a hypnotic to do anything which he—the latter—cannot do by himself, with his own unaided elements and organs, which explains the difficulty, and often the impossibility, of hypnotising the insane, for—as Dr. Forel puts it—"the machine is out of gear, and will not work."

Direct hypnotism (of which the cases of the young woman who fired a revolver at her mother, and the young man who administered supposititious arsenic

to his aunt, are examples) can be explained by the postulation that the elements of the subject are in rapport with those of the hypnotiser.

Post-hypnotism, however, appears to require the additional explanation that the greater mental elements of the hypnotiser having formed certain combinations of the elements in the subject, these combinations may afterwards be resuscitated (as suggested in the third explanation).

But it is common knowledge that some persons acquire great influence over others without the aid of hypnotism. The law recognises this; as when a married woman who has committed an unlawful act can show that it was done at the instigation of her husband, and in the very ordinary plea of undue influence in contested will actions, all of which is equivalent to what the scientist would term suggestion.

Professor Huxley, in "Elementary Physiology," relates an instance of suggestion without hypnotism. "There is a story," he writes, "which is credible enough, though it may not be true, of a practical joker, who, seeing a discharged veteran carrying home his dinner, suddenly called out 'Attention!' whereupon the man instantly brought his hands down, and lost his mutton and potatoes in the gutter. The drill had been thorough, and its effects had become imbedded in the man's nervous structure." In other words, it was a reflex action.

But the Greater Mind theory would go further than Professor Huxley, and point out that the effects

of the drill upon the old soldier's greater mind had produced in him a habit, which is a previously reasoned out experience; so that when "attention" was called, the greater mental elements which are responsible for the movement of the motor organs, acted before the other elements representing reason had time to oppose.¹

Dr. Walter Leaf, referring to the observations of Dessoir and Moll, writes: "These experiments, and many others like them, all point convincingly to the conclusion that rapport is not a physical, but a psychical phenomenon; that it is not produced by any action of an effluence from the operator, magnetic or otherwise, but by the action of the subject's own mind, obedient to suggestion, whether received externally, or spontaneously generated. It is natural to conclude that rapport is no more than a concentration of attention on the operator, an exaggerated case of the state of mind which in its different degrees we know in ordinary life as reverie, abstraction, absence of mind, &c."

The Greater Mind theory can endorse the first part of Dr. Leaf's foregoing paragraph; but not his conclusion that "rapport is no more than a concentration on the operator." The influence for good, or for evil, which one person may exercise over another, and the involuntary submission of the influenced individual, are far too real to be explained as the mere concentration of attention.

¹ See preceding chapter, "Habits and Reflex Acts".

DUPLEX AND MULTIPLEX PERSONALITIES

Psychological students generally must be bewildered by the disorganised condition into which the science of psychology has been reduced through modern discoveries. The long unchallenged belief in the one and indivisible mind, the one soul, the one personality, the one Ego, has all apparently been upset and destroyed by experiments in hypnotism, and the revelation that a human individual may apparently possess more than one initiative centre, and consequently may have two, or three, or more, personalities.

Dr. Dessoir writes, "While there are abundant examples of double consciousness in the waking life, in dreams, and in the abnormal state of every one of us, we feel on the other hand that very few observers enter the lists in defence of the multiplicity of the Ego. A mere triplicity, indeed, would not suffice were we to discover in some object with a third condition like Madame B.'s that there were still intelligent acts which accomplished themselves below the level of the third consciousness and *ad infinitum*, we should arrive at a kind of onion structure of the soul. But since the facts are there, and refuse to be explained away by the facile hypothesis of suggestion, we shall need the most patient psychological analysis to lead us to our goal. In the present position of our knowledge, I think that the wisest course is to suspend our

judgment, and to be satisfied with the provisional hypothesis that in certain cases a further division of the secondary self has been established.

"That a consciousness deeper than the hypnotic can be artificially created is shown by the well-known negative hallucination of hypnotised subjects. But for the formation of a new personality we need a new mnemonic chain, and this seems seldom to be found in existence."

Thus, like all other psychologists, Dr. Dessoir admits the inevitable interpretation that a person may apparently have more than one mind, and, therefore, more than one personality.

By the Greater Mind theory, the explanation of this multiple personality is quite simple; the Greater Mind being composed of a large number of elements, may, while doing its unconscious work, employ them all at the same time. But it is evident that it uses only part of them—or rather, only part of its elements are engaged—when doing its conscious work, *i.e.* when it is working through the brain; and an error has been made in supposing that this part of the elements, having the temporary use of the brain, is the real Ego, although no doubt that would be the case if the Ego could be regarded as an ever-changing personality. *

And further, in my chapter on Memory, it will be remembered I show that although I recognise a mnemonic chain, it is a chain of quite different construction from what it is generally supposed to be.

According to this theory of the Greater Mind, a thought which has passed away is not dead, but is merely partly disintegrated with all its parts still living, and it can be resuscitated by those parts becoming reunited, and again forming the dominant combination of the brain.

Now it should be plain that if, from inhibition, hypnotism, alcoholism, &c., the combination ready to be resuscitated is prevented from using the part of the brain it requires, the effect must be loss of memory in that particular part; and if the inhibition be extended to other parts, there will be further loss of memory. At the same time a considerable portion of the brain may be in a healthy condition, otherwise the individual would be imbecile, or unconscious.

Hence it will be comprehended that, if the healthy portion of the brain is sufficient to enable the individual to live, speak, and act rationally, he must have a fresh personality, quite oblivious of his previous self.

Until investigation showed duplex and multiplex personalities, otherwise in relation to other cases, called primary and secondary consciousness, supraliminal and subliminal self, emerged and submerged personality, &c., the unity of human consciousness remained an unshaken, and almost unchallenged, dogma. But although the Greater Mind theory is altogether opposed to the old view, it maintains the hypothesis of the unity of human unconsciousness

as exemplified in a Greater Ego, since consciousness is but the varying combinations of the elements comprising the Greater Mind becoming outwardly manifest through the medium of the brain.

If this be so, it naturally leads to the belief that there is an unchangeable Greater Ego, and an ever-changing number of lesser Egos, which represent the various states of consciousness of the brain.

When inhibition of the part of the brain which is in general use takes place, and past combinations are unable to resuscitate themselves, total loss of memory ensues, and the duplex personality is obviously possible. Inhibition of part of the brain produces incomplete personality, as in alcoholism, &c.

If it can be proved that the stages of increasing alcoholic intoxication, or of any other form of anaesthesia, produce, or permit, a higher state of mental capacity, my theory is negatived.

At first thought, it might seem that the possession by an individual of a series of constantly changing egos would imply interference with the personality, but such a result does not necessarily follow. A peal of bells will serve to illustrate how this may be. The peal has a distinct character of its own ; and a person who has had a lifelong acquaintance with it, would recognise its tones anywhere, and be able to distinguish it at once from any other peal of the same number of bells. And yet that peal—a single personality—(Greater Ego) can produce an infinite number of changes (lesser Egos).

But the unsoundness of the hitherto recognised single personality theory being now established, some scientists have gone to the other extreme, and assume that a man may have several distinct and independent personalities, instead of regarding them as only phasical parts of his greater and complete personality.

It seems remarkable that when science attributed to man a single (and false) personality, man judged his fellow-man by what approached very nearly to his true personality. He did not estimate him by his words or speech only, nor by his appearance and expression only, nor by his conscious and unconscious actions only ; but by all those characteristics together ; and together they are the qualities which, besides forming a complete personality, constitute the greater personality. It is the personality which civilised man endeavours, more or less ineffectually, to hide from his fellows.

Therefore I advance the hypothesis that a man, albeit possessing a number of lesser personalities, portions of personalities, or brain personalities, has but one Greater Personality, which includes all the others ; as one great nation may be formed from any number of confederated states, each being more or less independent of the others.

CHAPTER X

THE UNIVERSAL EXTENSION AND PERMEABILITY OF THE UNIVERSAL ELEMENTS

THE words “Noumenon” and “Noumena” will be often used in this work, and I use the words to represent the substances of which that unity the universe is composed, such as Mind, Matter, Motion, and many others there may possibly be of which we are ignorant.

By Original Noumenon I mean the Universe as we may suppose it originally was, before being divided into groups, or before such groups assumed their present forms.

My metaphysical investigations have induced me to believe that original Noumenon—however rarefied it may be—was and is a ponderable substance, and comprising as it does the elements of the three divisions it comes under the definition of both mind and matter—although that there can be such a substance as inert matter fundamentally different from mind, and force fundamentally different from matter, is inconceivable.

But if I use the words “mind” and “matter” to signify a noumenon which I believe to have the common characteristics of mind and matter, it would be of little importance to me which of the two terms

I employ, since both, according to my theory, are used to express the different aspects of the same thing. On the other hand, if the reader has been accustomed to regard mind and matter as fundamentally different, he would probably be confused by my use of the terms in such a way as to imply not an absolute, but merely a relative, difference in character.

To avoid this difficulty there are three courses open to me—to call everything in the Universe “Mind,” and to eliminate the word “matter”; to call everything Matter and eliminate the word “mind,” or to apply the word “matter” to that class of phenomena which we have believed to be material, and to keep Mind for the higher classes of phenomena which we associate with conscious and subconscious forms of life and with all initiative substance. Mind, as such, in this work is used to signify a conception in which the more essentially vital ideas are predominant; matter, those in which the vital appears absent.

The prevailing opinion among psychologists is that we have a series of phenomena which can be grouped under the heads of Mind, Matter, and Physical Force. This classification is good in so far as it rests upon simple observation; but we may go further, and inquire whether this difference of phenomena is actually represented by three different classes of noumena. The extreme materialist prefers to regard Mind as merely the result of some interaction between matter and physical force, and the monist tends to reduce all these three classes of

phenomena back to modifications, or different aspects of, one noumenon.

Taking Mind as the first of these divisions, we see that it reaches its highest known conscious form in man ; and that from him it gradually lessens, by imperceptible degrees, down to the lowliest organised forms of life, in which it is impossible to say how far consciousness exists at all. We also find that, for some reason, the phenomena which we group under the heading of Matter is in some way associated with it, and that the more complex forms of matter are always found associated with the more complex mental conditions, while the simple forms of matter are often apparently without any mental attributes whatever.

Herein we see that matter and mind appear to be so closely related that the evolution of one seems to run more or less synchronously with the other ; in fact, were the difference between the two classes of phenomena less obvious than they are, it might be imagined, from their association, that they were merely modifications of one and the same something which leads, by alterations in its mass, to the varying phenomena which we have observed.

But when we examine matter, we find the same difficulty of realising what, in its general properties, it means to us. Thus, one of the qualities common to all forms of matter that we know, is the sense of resistance—more or less marked—which it affords us. To what is this sense of resistance due ?

A block of wood may suggest a sense of resistance relatively greater than that of a piece of caoutchouc, but less than that of a bar of iron. But if the caoutchouc loses most of its elasticity, it may feel scarcely less resistant to the touch than does the block of wood if it be softened by exposure to steam. Thus, under different conditions, our sense of solidity alters; to the individual of nervous temperament and organisation, whose hands are not hardened by manual toil, the sense of resistance is very much greater than it is to a labouring man, whose hands are horny, and whose organisation is stronger and coarser. A variation of a few degrees in temperature will effect in the solid, waxlike mixture of hydrocarbons called paraffin, a remarkable difference in this sense of resistance. Solidity thus appears to be a certain definite relation existing between two or more variable classes of phenomena, and apart from this relationship it has no existence.

Shape and quality of surface are other aspects of matter as it presents itself to our minds; we have the sense of roundness, of squareness, of roughness, and smoothness, which, as in the case of solidity, appears to be the result of the interaction of a certain series of relations of one class of phenomena with another. Thus to the fingers a substance may seem smooth, which to the tongue appears rough, and a surface which to the unaided eye seems perfectly smooth and flat, may be shown by a microscope to be a mass of rugged inequalities.

If we examine the properties of those groups of phenomena which, being associated with the active aspects of life (forces), convey to us the impression of unconscious power, we have the same difficulty in sharply differentiating the various aspects under which such power is manifested. Light, heat, electricity, magnetism, are all intimately confederated. They may appear to be distinctive, but we cannot fix their border lines ; and apart from matter they are inconceivable.

If matter seems indefinable in just those properties in which, supposing it to have real existence, it should be most definite ; if physical force resolves by imperceptible degrees from an active into a passive form ; if one class of forces passes imperceptibly into other forms ; and when we know that—as in certain maladies—even the highest types of mind may undergo gradual or sudden dissolution, as marked as is the evolution by which the highest point of specialisation was reached ; and further, when we see that consciousness passes more or less suddenly into unconsciousness, as in sleep and death, we are forced to the conclusion that mind, and matter, and motion, which by insensible gradations blend into each other, are but different aspects of the same phenomena, which, in their turn, are modifications of some other similar form, or forms, of noumenon.

While, therefore, so far agreeing with the arguments of the Monist, I must reject the inference he

deduces from them. Admitting that there is a great deal to be said in favour of an unification of these three classes of phenomena under one heading, I cannot accept the assumption that a quantitative modification of one substance in space, is capable of producing the infinite variety of phenomena which any theory dealing with the universe must be considered accountable for.

On what hypothesis are we to explain these distinctive aspects of phenomena, which seem to merge insensibly into others of equally distinctive characteristics. From one point of view there appears to be an essential unity underlying them all, while another standpoint discloses other aspects no less characteristically distinctive. How are these apparent contradictions of an undifferentiated unity on the one hand, and an equally characteristic specialisation on the other, to be reconciled?

It seems to me that we can find an explanation if we take for granted that the unity is due to certain common characteristics of the universal noumenon ; that in this noumenon, which has certain attributes of unity, there are other characteristic differences, all the characteristics being elementary.

If we assume that all phenomena may be classed under one head (and in this case such generalisation must obviously be connected with the only direct series of data of which we are conscious, namely, Mind), we shall have to follow Berkeley in his view that a form of force, analogous to that

which we class as conscious, is universal in its distribution.

If the fundamental properties of matter are simply a series of relations between an external objective group, and an internal subjective group, of phenomena, it would seem that the idea of matter being distinct from force must be abandoned; hence we would be left with a wide series of phenomena which would have to be explained on the interaction of forces.

But if we examine the characteristics by which we distinguish one state of consciousness from another, we find that the dormant feeling is awakened by the perception of relations like that which is aroused when we become conscious of so-called properties of matter, and as we found that these alleged properties disappear when we attempt to analyse them, so, in any special condition of consciousness, apparently elementary, we realise the almost equally obvious elusiveness of those characteristics as we essay to differentiate and isolate them. Thus, to analyse the sense of fear, the apprehension or premonition of danger to the organism is distinctive and elementary; and just as the property of solidity seems to lose its concreteness, and to consist only of relations, when closely examined, so do fear and all other mental peculiarities or characteristics, as nobleness, courage, love, lose their distinctiveness when we attempt to analyse them; thus we experience a definite sensation of fear when a destructive power threatens our

personality, and proportionately as that power is weakened, or becomes less likely to endanger us, so does the sense of fear pass away, and give place to some other emotion.

This failure to discover anything isolatable in mentality, seems almost to point to the conclusion that the only reality lies in a comparison of relationships. Yet this is absurd, since relationships, to exist, must obviously be relations of something, we must assume, in spite of the difficulty of analysing these apparently elementary conceptions, that they really stand for some distinctive attribute of underlying noumena. Hence the noumena must, in a certain sense, exhibit both the properties of sentiency and materialism; they must possess the power of producing the wide diversity of phenomena that we see around us, the fixity of combination under some conditions, and the variableness and changefulness that we see under others.

How are we to form such a conception of noumena, that they may meet these conditions of material life?

It is difficult to imagine such diversity arising from a single uniform substance. It seems more probable that it could be explained by the hypothesis of the atoms of the various chemical elements comprising it. But then comes the objection that the spaces between such atoms must be occupied by something—a something which is capable of being generally diffused. Hence any

atomic theory must depend upon the assumption that the elementary matters are more or less diffusible, and are also concentrative into local units. To obtain the diversity, and at the same time the universality, of matter, it is necessary to assume that there are more sorts than one of hypothetically diffused substances, or ethers; and as they would be universally diffused, this must imply that they are in some way penetrable to each other; and it is the relation of these hypothetical ethers or universal elements in their most attenuated forms and their combinations, which forms the basis for my theory of the universe.

We have seen in the foregoing analysis that no conception of phenomena is permanent, and that the study of these phenomena leads to the conclusion that there are various elementary ideas embodied in every conception. We have further seen that the physical scientist realises the necessity of postulating an invisible and all-pervading jelly-like substance of inconceivable tenuity, and that the immense rarefaction of this elementary substance tends to alter its apparent properties for this reason. In the same way many mental physiologists and pathologists have been led to the conclusion that there is an equally all-pervading substance, or something which forms the basis of consciousness, by its different aggregations throughout the whole universe, and there are Monists who would take these conceptions back one step further, and tell

us that there is one elementary and all-pervading substance, which comprises the properties of the universally mental and the equally universal material aspects of nature.

If we assume, as apparently we must, that there are many elementary conceptions of matter, and that matter, as we know it, so far from being elementary, appears to be made up of combinations, which are not merely quantitative differentiations of the same substance, but are at least in part also qualitative; if we find that we are unable to dissociate mind from matter, and consciousness from unconsciousness, and when we examine the various phenomena disclosed by a study of the fringes of our conscious life, as it fades gradually into the unconscious; and the equally gradual lessening of conscious life as we descend from the higher to the lower animal organisms; and as in plants there is evidently some power of reacting according to environment, it is impossible to definitely assert that the so-called material aspects of life are as entirely devoid of consciousness as they superficially appear to be, while from the fact, that with the increasing complexity of chemical organisation, there seems to be also associated qualities which bring the so-called inorganic nearer and nearer to the so-called organic, it certainly looks as if we are bound to assume that all matter has some degree of consciousness fundamentally associated with its elementary properties. The ponderability

of the most attenuated forms of matter seem to be evident, but the difficulty of estimating it is progressively greater as it becomes less aggregated. Matter aggregated in certain ways appears to bring consciousness into an easily estimable form, which becomes more difficult to appreciate as it becomes more attenuated.

Reviewing these few principles, we find it necessary to postulate universal extension to whatever is elementary in matter and consciousness, as we know them, and that it is also necessary, if we abide strictly by fact, to assume that there is more than one elementary substance, that these elements are universal in their distribution, and that they must in some way permeate each other more or less indefinitely, there will then appear to be a considerable number of elements endowed with vital and material properties in varying small degrees, which, by attenuation or aggregation, will result in quantitative differences, and by combination into composite aggregate groups, to form qualitative ones. The whole universe will thus appear to consist of widely-diffused and mutually permeable elements, which tend, by reason of their mutual attractions and repulsions, to form large massed groupings of great permanence, forming as a whole an immense universal personality, or Ego—a diffused, massive consciousness.

As these aggregations are more minutely and specifically considered, minor variations become of increasing importance ; hence a more definite, yet less stable,

form of consciousness becomes manifest, as smaller and smaller aggregations of elementary combinations come into action—so long as these elementary combinations are sufficiently numerous to be comparable; when they pass this stage they will tend to merge into particular unconsciousness.

Viewed from this aspect, each combination, or group, of phenomena, related to another combination or group, will have a consciousness, if the aggregation be sufficient to give them definiteness. But consciousness will vary, not only with the aggregation, or diffuseness, of the elements, but also with their stability; the more stable the aggregation, the more one leading idea will predominate, and as one idea cannot invite comparison, there must be absence of consciousness. Hence the more permanent groups will display properties similar to those which are usually called inorganic, while diffusibility will give indefiniteness. Each organism will comprise a greater Ego, which being allied to the higher grade of inorganic relations, will tend to be less actively conscious; and the series of complementary groups (more or less permanent) will be the main condition present in plants.

In animals each organism will be made up of two parts, the Greater Ego and the Ego. The Ego or lesser part being the result of the interaction of the unstable, and more diffuse parts, of the Greater Ego, with external groups. As a consequence, the Ego represents a variable and smaller part of the organism,

while a more permanent part, representing the whole Ego, or Greater Ego, will remain, as a series of subconscious groupings, so long as the organised aggregations (or personality) continues.

As man is a compound of universally diffused elements, it has been necessary to discover, as far as is possible, the characteristics of these elements, and their governing laws, which must be of a sufficiently general nature to be applicable to all the phenomena, and at the same time be sufficiently differentiated to apply to the various classes of living organisms.

In the lower organisms, by reason of the fact that each part of the organism is more or less independent of the others, it will in this theory follow as a consequence, that the sense of personality is much less marked than it is in the higher organisms, where each part is co-ordinated to, and dependent upon, the others, and interrelated by specialisation to the entire individual—the greater the specialisation the greater the sense of personality.

On this basis, the continuity of the brain personality must be a delusion, and those cases in which the personality is broken up to form many personalities, are explainable as being the result of causes which tend to decentralise any part of the organism; and the sense of personality is explained by the substitution of one phase of consciousness for another, by a process so peculiarly delicate and gradual, that the individualistic feeling is never lost, nor in any way interfered with.

Although universal extension and diffusibility of the elements is mentioned in this work many times, yet I think it will bear repetition, as it is an important and integral part of this theory; for it would appear to be impossible for the universe to form an unity without universal extension of each of its elements.

The Monists have been steadily working for this unity, but the chemists, on the other hand, have been working in a contrary direction (though an element of doubt has now taken hold of them). They have so divided and subdivided the parts of the unity, until they have arrived at impermeable and independent atoms. If they would consider matter as being in the same category as Mind, and force, and infer that each element is spatial, they would, I think, form a more correct view of the universe.

Although an element can be apparently separated into disconnected parts, as in iron, which is found in all manner of forms all over the globe, yet permanent as iron appears to be, it is ubiquitous and is constantly changing. Now it is inorganic; anon it becomes associated with the organic, and forms part of an organism. Now again it is inorganic. Now it permeates the air and again it is dissolved in water, whilst in its most solid state, if it ever so slightly touches some kinds of vegetable or animal matter, it will not only change the colour of the substance but will transfer to this matter part of

itself, as is exemplified by the particular taste it imparts.

Iron, it will be seen, is a most active element, and its activity and ubiquity I should impute to its elementary sentiency rather than to any movement, voluntary or involuntary, on the part of its atoms, causing them to separate.

The reader will find the Atomic theory more fully considered in Chapter XIII.

CHAPTER XI

THE UNIVERSAL EGO

FOLLOWING the logical evolution of this theory from the elements of life to the constitution of the Greater Ego, and thence to the more speculative theory of the composition of Universal Noumenon, I have come to the hypothesis that the entire universe comprises one immeasurable Ego. Apart, however, from the method by which I arrive at this conclusion, I do not claim novelty for it, the ancient philosophers having conceived and taught the same dogma.

That there may be no confusion in the reader's mind with respect to terminology, let it be understood that whether I use the terms "God," the "Universal Ego," "Universal Being," the "Universal Cosmos," or the "Universe," I mean that, and only that, which we all know as the Universe as a whole; but by calling the universe the Universal Ego, I give to it a supreme and omniscient consciousness, made up, as in man, of a number of differentiated elements, or intelligences; and with our present knowledge of the mysterious properties of Matter, it is difficult to see how this consciousness, and intelligence, can be denied to the universe.

The Universal Ego would have no outer, or

brain, consciousness. All His consciousness would be similar to man's inner consciousness, or what is called the unconscious mind.

The Universal Ego would have no need of a brain consciousness, as He cannot, like man, work as an Individual, because there is nothing outside Him. His parts only can work, and they of course must work co-ordinately with the Ego as a whole.

We have here to encounter an obvious difficulty, which must lead to inconsistency, for when we are writing about God—the Universal Ego or the Universal Being—we must give, according to custom, a capital letter to the personal pronoun, and then in another part of the work, when writing of the Cosmos, or Universe; all meaning precisely the same thing—custom compels us to use the neuter gender and omit the capital. In this matter I have thought it as well to conform to the usual custom, and apologise to my readers for the inconsistency.

We are now in the realms of the unknowable, and what can we possibly do but to take our knowledge of nature as we find her, and reason by analogy from nature up to God? Speculation to be of any use cannot go further, though there is no decidedly marked line which divides the knowable from the "unknowable," because the number of compounds which may be formed by the numerous elements or intelligences in our organisms, seems to be unlimited, and each compound as it rises to consciousness in the brain may give to the world valuable knowledge

which has not hitherto seen the light, just as a musician, Wagner, for instance, will produce from the well-known musical scale, harmonies and melodies which astonish the world by their originality, and this notwithstanding the millions of combinations which have been produced previously from the same scale. Elements must always be the same elements, therefore in this sense the oft-quoted proverb, "There is nothing new under the sun," is true, but the elements composing the Universal Ego are so numerous that the combinations which may be formed out of these elements are beyond conception, and we may readily believe, cannot be used up if the universe goes on "for ever and for aye."

Since the dogma that a number of *separate* and *independent* substances can so perfectly compound as to become one uniform substance, is shown to be untenable, it will be necessary to infer that if two or more elements can compound so perfectly as to produce a single substance, that each of the elements must be deprived of its independence. We must also infer that the elements involved would have to equal in size the compound into which it became merged—that is to say, the elements must permeate, and fill into, one another, that the compound of them all would not occupy a greater space than was filled by each one separately.

It will also be necessary to infer that the character of each of the elements must be distinct from that of any of the others; and if we take the whole of

the elements of the Universal Ego, that the perfect unity of the combination, when effected, is the sum of all its constituent elements. And further, that the unity must come first; that it cannot be formed by the compounding of a number of separated and independent elements, but that the individual parts of the unity, although possessing a certain liberty, can never be separated from it; hence the nature of the Universal Ego must apparently be prescribed within certain limits.

This Universal Ego must comprise the entire universe, and not be BUILT UP of elements, although He must contain within Himself a great number of them. *If* there could, by any possibility, be anything outside the Universal Ego, to it the Universal Ego would appear as an omnipotent Entity. But with regard to the behaviour of the elements within the Universal Ego, it is clear that, although He may be able, by explainable means, to control them, yet as each individual element has an initiative of its own, the Universal Ego is unable to prevent phenomena occurring within Himself which may not be to His satisfaction or in harmony with His nature as a whole, just as unbidden and unwelcome thoughts of doubtful purity will occasionally rise to consciousness in even the most pure-minded individuals.

It seems evident to our senses that the Universal Ego is going through an eternal process of change, so His original condition must have been different from what He is now, yet not from what He may

become again. It may be that His elements were so equally distributed that there was nothing of what we call matter in existence—that is to say, some certain portions of the elements subsequently combined, in given necessary volumes, and so produced the apparently non-initiative substances which we call matter ; and that other certain portions have combined, and produced what we know as the physical forces ; and that still other portions have combined, and produced what is known to us as mind.

It must be obvious that if certain portions of the various elements combine into a dense volume, there must be some part of the Universal Ego wherein the elements have become more rarefied, or less dense, in inverse ratio, which would naturally have the effect of making the Universal Ego unequal in His parts. And this indeed appears to be actually the case. Yet despite this inequality—productive of matter in its various degrees of ponderability, leading probably to such phenomena as misery, pain, crime, and all the other ills of life, as well as all its blessings—pleasure, love, affection, and so on—there is withal a general system of order ; the parts producing the inequalities must always remain as parts ; no part, or parts, can overwhelm, or overpower, the rest. The Whole must always comprise the whole of His parts.

The noumenon comprising the Universal Ego was composed most probably of a substance which, for want of a better term, may be called ponderable

Mind, or what would mean the same thing, Matter so rarefied as to be almost imponderable. It will be remembered that from the standpoint of the Greater Mind theory, imponderability does not, and never did exist (unless for convenience rarefied ethers may be called imponderable). And as there never could have been any separate fundamental substance other than the universal noumenon, and as what was originally must be now; consequently what we call matter is but solidified portions of the original noumenon, caused by the compounding of certain of the elements, which have the nature of producing uninitiative substances.

The more I consider the distinction which is drawn between mind and matter—and which argues that the elementary character of each substance is totally and fundamentally different from that of the others—the more convinced I am that it is untenable. It is never possible to confine the meanings of these two terms—mind and matter—for the reason that their tendency is to merge insensibly into others. The distinction is utilitarian, not fundamental.

The Universal Ego may be regarded from different aspects, and according to the standpoint from which He is viewed, sometimes mind, and sometimes matter, appears to predominate. But we have no knowledge of mind existing without matter, or of matter which may not be reduced to the same consistency as mind. And any separation which would make a fundamentally qualitative difference

must—as is now generally becoming recognised¹—be unreal, though of course, as already explained, every element, whether of mind or matter, has an individual character of its own.

No doubt all this is purely speculative, as also is the supposition that as man is, so is God; in other words, so is the Universal Ego. But it is not more speculative than the physiologist's dogma that the seat of memory is located in a particular part of the brain, or that the unconscious mind is concealed in some cranial recess; or when biologists endeavour to explain, from a chemical analysis of germ-plasm, its behaviour, from a mental point of view. For I take it to be a foregone conclusion that the secret of what mind is will never be revealed by any chemical analysis, or microscopical examination, of any physiological substance; and therefore all theories of mind, or life, in the initiative aspect, when based on these experiments, must necessarily be speculative, although the scientist may succeed in making them appear to be the result of experiment.

The innate feeling which man has that he is somehow made in the image of God, appears to me to be reasonable enough, and, in fact, a logical and scientific deduction, particularly if we do not limit the presumed likeness to man, but extend it to all life. For as life occupies so large a part of the universal cosmos (arguing from the knowledge we

¹ *Vide* numerous papers which have appeared in *The Monist*, and other metaphysical publications.

possess), it is not unreasonable to suppose that Life must be the essential part of the Universal Ego.

In explaining the Greater Ego, independent of the Universal Ego, through the Greater Mind theory, I submit that my hypotheses have very little about them which are speculative; and there I would leave it, but that some of the proof of the non-speculative part lies in its behaviour when compared with the speculative part of metaphysics—how it compares with other theories, and how far it is consistent and reasonable.

From one standpoint this theory in some respects resembles that of Herbert Spencer, who argues that universal noumenon was originally a single physical force, and that it is the working, in various ways, of that physical force which has produced all universal phenomena. But in place of that physical force the Greater Mind theory puts the Universal Ego—the Great Unified Commonwealth, having both a single and a composite nature; and it further advances the hypothesis that this Unified Commonwealth of single-intelligenced elements, produces all the phenomena which materialism attributes solely to the physical.

The late Alfred Barratt, in his "Physical Metem-psoric," wrote: "The question of the relation of mind and matter has always, since Descartes, been the great crux of Metaphysic, and many solutions have been offered, mostly verbal only, and in no case, as I submit, completely satisfying both the requirements of strict theory as to the nature

and conditions of knowledge on the one hand, and the demands of irresistible belief on the other hand. The Idealists, starting from thought, never succeed in reaching reality ; the Materialists, starting from the object isolated from the subject, can never evolve the latter ; while those who, acknowledging that neither mind nor matter can be produced from the other, have attempted to co-ordinate them as parallel attributes, have not attained more than a verbal explanation, which, when we try to put any real meaning into it, vanishes wholly."

The obvious fourth alternative to the solution of the problem, is the one favoured by the Greater Mind theory, and it therefore agrees with Monism, in so far as it regards mind and matter being in unison, and not parallel attributes. In other words, it argues that all matter is merely original noumenon which has become materialised through the compounding of certain of its elements, and that when an organism dies, it means simply a dissolution of the elements of the noumenon. The higher class elements are compelled to separate, and leave, by reason of a vital organ becoming unworkable, through accident, disease, or decay ; but the elements which remain are still materialised noumenon, and dissolution proceeds.

In all animals there is continually going on a process of gradual dissolution of the lower elements, constituting the epidermis, the hair, the nails, &c.; but as an organism cannot exist without the lower

elements, it is constantly replenishing itself with them through the medium of food.

Nearly every visible thing on earth has, sometime or other, probably many times, been organic, and therefore associated with mind. Our houses, our furniture, our clothes, our books, are made from what has been organic life. All that we eat and drink has been organic life; and consequently everything has been associated with and controlled by Mind.

The three divisions comprising the Universal Ego have yet to be exhaustively analysed in order to discover their various elements; the chemists and the physicists are working in their respective ways slowly, it is true, but surely, towards that end; and I trust that this Greater Mind theory will open up a road towards success for mental scientists. After all, the psychologist is in no worse case than the physicist. For instance, the dominant element in the compound of fear can be *seen* in the individual who is afraid; the compound elements of love, jealousy, hate, and the other passions, are equally plainly distinguishable in the eyes of persons under their influence. What more can be seen or known of some of the physical forces?

Although it is well as a test of the truth of this theory, to look upon the universe as God, or the universal Ego, yet little can be written about Him as *The Individual*, from a scientific point of view, and when we are looking upon His parts we cannot

help looking upon them as being independent of God, as if God were outside them and all of us ; it is as if the lungs of a man (could they do so) were to attempt to write a biography of the whole organism, they could probably say very little about it as a whole, but they could say a great deal about themselves and the various organs with which they are co-ordinated.


The endeavours which have been made to explain the evolutions of the mental and the physical out of universal Being or universal Ego through the medium of charts are not successful, as the reproductions of the accompanying example will show. Any attempt to begin by separating mind from matter, as in the chart, must fail, as mind and matter are found combined in all life, and are indissolubly compounded while any life exists in the compound. Hence if lines are drawn to illustrate a separation of mind from matter, other lines should be drawn to show that they come together again.

There seems to be no possibility of preparing a chart of the Greater Mind theory, for the reason that the progress is continuous and everlasting ; everything is endless ; all is used, and reused, over and over again, in the natural process of evolution. The Great Universal Ego cannot alter as an Unity, though within Himself changes are continually going on through the activity of His various elements.

PORPHYRY'S TREE

Showing degrees of geniality. A table of higher and lower classes arranged in order.

The separated groups may be constituted on one or many properties.



CHAPTER XII

UNIVERSAL RELATIONS

(INITIATIVE AND NON-INITIATIVE GROUPS)

WHEN it first dawned upon me that I had, through following a particular train of thought, accidentally discovered the nature, and composition, of the actual elementary substances of which Mind is composed, I endeavoured—seeing that these elements, when compounded, are well-known abstract qualities—to keep them as much apart from speculative metaphysics as possible, but, as “all roads lead to Rome,” so I found that any attempt to enter the field of mental science almost necessarily leads to inquiry into the composition of universal noumenon ; and as this question is one of the chief points of interest to most metaphysicians, and as the revelation of anything previously unknown, with regard to Mind and Life, naturally opens up a new aspect of the ultimate composition of the universe, I have—as will presently be seen—succumbed to the inevitable.

The primary divisions into which modern noumenon may be reduced, are limited by science to three, namely—Mind, Matter, and Force. But from them,

four variations may be obtained. Hence, with the three original divisions, and their variations, we get seven different forms, each of which may possibly represent the composition of universal noumenon, thus :—

Mind.	Mind and Matter.
Matter.	Matter and Force.
Force.	Mind and Force.
Mind, Matter, and Force.	

At first thought, it might seem that original noumenon, or the universe before it assumed its present condition, must have consisted either of one of the three before-mentioned divisions alone, or in one of the four combinations; but reflections will show that: If Mind, Matter, and Force exist now, they must—in other forms—have existed in original noumenon, and therefore, original noumenon must have been composed, not of the separate substances of mind, matter, and force, as we know them, but of a compound substance from which they have been subsequently evolved.

This view is not out of accord with Herbert Spencer's theory of the persistence of force, and that the quality of force is interchangeable—provided, we may suppose, that Spencer's Force is represented by the universal elements as they are according to the Greater Mind theory, since the formation of present universal noumenon out of original noumenon would not alter the quality of original noumenon; and whether we call original noumenon

Force, or a community of initiative elements, there would always be in it various degrees of density that might produce motion. This theory differs from Herbert Spencer's with regard to the first cause of motion. He tells us that it is the work of a fixed quantity of force in antagonistic forms, while this theory advances the explanation that it is caused by the initiative elements combining in various degrees of density, and in various numbers.

This theory, however, is not at variance with Spencer's view of affinity and repulsion; the affinity for one another which some of the elements have, and the mutual antagonism of others, is described in Chapter II.

But whether these substances be primary, or secondary, or tertiary, the existence of the three divisions of universal noumenon—Mind, Matter, and Force—is evident enough; and yet, when an attempt is made to define these substances, either separately or together, all becomes confusion. There is no doubt about the existence of matter; it is too evident to our senses for that; and equally evident to us is the existence of physical force, and of mind. But mind only becomes evident to us in and through matter. Of the existence of mind by itself—that is, without its appearing to us through the medium of matter—we have no evidence. And yet that same (organic) matter which so unmistakably exhibits mind, is, when reduced into its elements, found to comprise exactly the same constituents as that which

is commonly regarded as uninitiative, and which appears to be independent of mind.

And, to add to the confusion, there is in all life a vital essence—as in an animal's blood corpuscles—which is not admitted to be mind, and which analysis cannot show to be independent of matter.

Thus we have matter in one form without life or intelligence, and the same matter in another form with both life and intelligence; and yet no analysis can show these two forms of matter to be in any way elementarily different from each other; nor can chemical analysis discover in either, any recognised substances like mind, or a vital essence.

No doubt we may attempt to account for these phenomena, by the hypothesis that mind possesses absolute authority over matter. For matter, which is apparently without intelligence in itself, can only be made to exhibit it through the instigation of mind. But with this hypothesis comes the difficulty which arises from the wide difference there is between organic and inorganic matter. We might accept the authority theory in the case of the physical forces, but we cannot imagine it possible that all the wonderful intelligences exhibited by organic matter, are merely the ordering of the inorganic (if inert) by an invisible and superior authority.

We shall, however, no doubt have advanced a stage towards the solution of this problem, when we begin to realise that the elements of matter and force are not always the absolutely inert substances they

have generally been considered, and that the elements of the three divisions probably feel a certain satisfaction in compounding and forming themselves into a living organism.

The infinite complexity which we everywhere find in nature must always excite our wonder, particularly when we see the fine details of the work through a microscope. Still closer examination of nature's marvels will reveal to the student what extremely simple, and sometimes curious, means she employs to fulfil her purpose. In this respect, it may be noted, man himself, who is of course a part of nature, is always endeavouring to imitate her.

Both nature and experience teach us that the best and most direct way to produce results, is the simplest. Simplicity is the aim of all the arts and of all the sciences.

If it be desired to discover how some particularly complex result has been obtained, examination will generally show the means to be so simple, that but for the proof to the contrary, it would be thought impossible for such simplicity to be productive of such complexity.

With regard to the composition of universal noumenon, broadly and in one sense, there are apparently only two alternatives possible. The entire universe must either be a single and undivided whole, or it must comprise two or more independent parts. The Monist theory, that it is a single and undivided whole, appears to be the more logical, since, as

Montgomery and others have argued, if there are two or more independent parts, they cannot effectually compound.

If the universe comprise two or more independent parts, there arises the insurmountable difficulty of explaining how they can accomplish the phenomena of nature (which has evidently such unity of purpose) unless they are self-compounding, and work together as one substance, which seems impossible.

Here the monist has the advantage that, in his endeavour to discover the composition of the universe, he has adopted the simplest course, by advancing the theory that there is only one original substance; that universal noumenon is not made up of a number of independent substances, such as mind, matter, motion, or other constituencies, but that mind, matter, motion, &c., are only phasial, and secondary.

If the monist could go further, and explain how this single substance can produce the vast complexity there is in this world, his theory would apparently be impregnable. But that is where he fails.

While we have, on the one hand, the monist unsuccessful in his search for a connecting link between the simplicity of original noumenon and the present complexity of the universe, on the other we have the materialist failing to attain that simplicity which seems so absolutely necessary to account for the oneness we find prevailing in all things.

This Greater Mind theory avoids both these pit-

falls by adopting a plan of pluralism in unism—a sort of pluralistic monism, as it were, combining the singleness and simplicity of the monistic theory with the pluralism of other theories. In other words, it shows how it is possible for the elements which produce complexity to compound and form an unity. This unity may be illustrated by observing a circle, which, although it has many parts, is at the same time an undivided whole. For it is only when all its parts are *in situ* that it is one and complete, and then it is, as it were, self-compounded.

The materialistic method of analysing a circle, following that of the chemists—when, for instance, it is described with a lead pencil upon paper—is to reduce it into an indefinite number of minute particles (or imaginary atoms) of plumbago, which must of course be interchangeable, and cannot be perfectly compounded ; for we may interchange them without interfering with the form of the circle ; and if we give the circle a half turn, the particles which before had been its northern half, become its southern half, and *vice versa*. But according to this Greater Mind theory, the parts of the circle are not interchangeable, for however it may be turned, its parts—that is to say, its eastern, western, northern, and southern segments—must always occupy the same position.

What this means is, that according to the materialistic method of analysis, self-compounding of parts is not possible ; while from the Greater Mind theory standpoint, it is not only possible, but quite

understandable. For example, the sixty parts into which the circular face of a time-piece is divided, are all perfectly compounded into the circle; and, moreover, a circle may exist without matter, as in the degrees of latitude.

The hypothesis that matter is composed of certain elements of original noumenon, transformed by combination into the concrete masses we see in this and the other worlds, is not difficult to believe, since scientists generally agree that the earth was originally a volume of gas—which possibly, in extreme rarefaction, may have been invisible, without odour or flavour, and neither tangible nor audible.

If, then, this world could have originally come from such single—though not necessarily undifferentiated—substance, it is probable that it can return to it.

Hence this almost imponderable substance must naturally be undistinguishable by weight from the substance we call mind.

And thus, the elements of original noumenon, when self-compounded, may not only have produced the various qualities of mind, as the sentiments and feelings, but also concrete substances, as the metals.

Upon this assumption, the universe is a composite whole, possessing many related parts. In its plan it is both single and continuous, but pluralistic in the sense that there are many qualitatively different force elements, which, although they may be studied apart, yet in reality have no separate unrelated

existence—just as a finger, which, although forming an important part of the organism as a whole, would have no use or meaning as a sentient part if separated from it.

This theory of Mind and Life postulates the hypothesis that these elements are all of one family; that none of them can properly be called sentient, since each respectively possesses only a fractional part of only one of the known senses—that of feeling. And even of this it cannot be conscious.

The probable explanation of the phenomena therefore is, that all the elements of noumenon, whether mind, matter, or force, have this extremely elementary form of consciousness; and hence all the elements are actually living.

In a high-class organism we find a number of high-class elements, which, in the course of a long period of natural selection, have become allied, and form the substance which is called Mind, allied with elements of a lower class, which form the substance called Matter, again allied with other elements forming the substance called Force, together forming an undivided whole, or unity.

In a low-class organism we find the allied elements to be of a proportionately lower type, yet still forming an undivided whole.

In a dead organism, which is in process of dissolution, we find a progressively lower series of types of elements; and in all inorganic matter we find these elements always of the same family, but quali-

tatively different, each probably with its fractional part of sentiency, but with the elements so allied that there is no apparent initiative in the whole.

Nothing imaginable by man can be more marvellous than nature's mysteries which are revealed to us. Hence the hypothesis that mind and matter, when compounded, originally formed a substance of the consistency of mind, need not be regarded as too remarkable for consideration.

Assuming, then, the correctness of the hypothesis that all matter was once in a state of vapour, it follows, of course, that all things around us—our houses, our furniture, our fellow-creatures, are simply masses of condensed gas. Obviously that cannot be regarded as more feasible than the hypothesis that matter is nothing more than ponderable mind, or—what comes to the same thing—that mind is only a form of matter.

The ultimate division of the universe into matter and non-matter, although apparently a truism, can logically only be accepted when matter and non-matter are clearly defined, and shown to comprise definite qualities, or when the various elements of matter, and of non-matter, are analysed and differentiated. To accept such indefinite terms as "matter" and "non-matter" as final products of analysis is illogical and valueless—illogical, because if a substance cannot be defined, it cannot be analysed, and hence no final conclusions with regard to its being elementary can be arrived at; and it is valueless

because such an indefinite assumption can be of no practical consequence, while at the same time, if it be employed as a basis for other hypotheses, it is more than likely to lead to erroneous conclusions—because of the indefinite form in which the statement is made.

Mind, Matter, and Force, being merely the differentiation of one substance, the whole of their elements, when compounded, would form, there is reason to believe, the Universal Ego, or great commonwealth of nature, and this unity they must always and for ever continue to comprise, for universal noumenon must always remain fundamentally the same, however its elements may be separated, for a heap of chalk and flint as dug out of the quarry would still be a heap of chalk and flint, though the chalk may be so placed as to compose one half of the heap, and the flint the other half.

But Mind, Matter, and Force constituting the tissues and organs of a Greater Ego are not always and for ever associated with life, for when death comes there is a dissolution between the elements of the three divisions. In death the elements cease to be the Greater Ego, for when Mind, Matter, and Force, constituting life, are separated, life ceases to exist, just as water ceases to exist, as water, when it is decomposed into its original elements.

In considering the relation of the physical to the mental, or mind to matter, when they compose an organism, we find that all which is mental, or mind,

must come under the definition of organic mind, and that everything which is matter, when organic, must be organic matter; therefore the terms "organic mind," or "organic matter," must apply to an identical composite substance.

As already pointed out, it is impossible to actually separate mind from matter when they compose an organism, for the reason that, when they are so separated, the organism, as an organism, ceases to exist; organic mind becomes inorganic mind, and organic matter becomes inorganic matter. The same difficulty would be experienced in comparing oxygen with hydrogen when both those gases are absorbed, and lost, in the composition of water.

This theory accords to the elements of mind a higher position in the organism than it does to those of force and matter. Intelligence is represented by these elements rather than by those which are visible, and although these elements do not possess authority, yet in intelligence there is power, because it will bring to the organism benefits which unintelligence would fail to produce. But although we naturally realise that the elements which comprise intelligence are of higher grade than those which comprise the emotions, in which intelligence is not observable, yet the lower grade elements are in every way as indispensable as are those of the higher grade.

The evolution of the protoplasmic cell into the complete organism can, perhaps, be better explained by the union of the mental and the physical, than

by the materialist hypothesis of the uninitiative physical alone, as this theory, beginning with the embryo Greater Ego, assumes for it absolute initiative powers, only qualified by the number of elements that were in the apparently (but not actually) undifferentiated protoplasm.

Protoplasmic life possesses, even in its earliest stages, a self-activity which is peculiar to initiative vitality. We see in plants a tendency to take advantage of their immediate surroundings, developing in the direction of their food supply. Many plants also exhibit movements, the object of which is the adjustment of the organism to light, and other favourable conditions, some even having the power to attract and capture insects, for nutriment.

Thus plant life exhibits an initiative faculty which does not appear in the non-living world. Animals, of course, in greater degree, manifest a similar disposition to make the best of their surroundings.

There seems to me very little difficulty in understanding, in a general way, the means by which the elements of life (and consequently the Greater Ego) work in the construction and building of the organism; first, the young organisms are nourished and protected by their guardians, whose Greater Egos are concerned for the welfare of their dependants; their interest in them being accounted for by the common sympathy which exists between the elements of organisms of the same kindred and affinity.

When the young organism is capable of foraging for, and otherwise looking after, itself, the Mental is the principal factor, and it selects for it the proper constituents from the various available animal, vegetable, and mineral products, according to the rules adopted by the Greater Ego.

The mental thus has the principal share in the building up of the physical form, using all its combined powers in the choosing of its materials. And considering the number and diversity of the elements in a Greater Ego, it is remarkable that a beautiful organism is the common result, and that there are so few failures.

I have hitherto refrained from using the word "spiritual" with regard to the elements of Mind, for the reason that it is not in favour with scientists, who employ in its stead the phrase "substance without extension." But "spiritual" appears to me to express something more than that; "spiritual substance" conveys the idea that it has neither beginning nor end; that it is everywhere, and not always embodied.

Yet it should be understood that if I use the word in relation to the elements of Mind, it is not in the sense of the spiritualism of either the spiritualist or the theologian. All the elements of the three divisions may be described as spiritual, since they are individually possessors of that very limited degree of sentiency already indicated, and are imperishable. But though the elements of Mind when not allied

with Matter and Force may compound and be possessed with intelligence, yet if each element is a spirit, then, alone, it cannot see, hear, speak, nor think, as it has none of the complex intelligence necessary for the performance of those acts.

This theory, then, submits that the elements of the three divisions have always existed ; and that, in various combinations, they have become condensed and solidified, and formed themselves into inorganic and organic bodies. And it further advances the hypothesis that, upon the dissolution of an organism, its elements return to their respective divisions, from which, if the universe is looked upon as a whole, they have never been separated.

Observation teaches us that the elements of Mind favour, and seek alliance, as is their nature, with those of matter and force, that, in fact, it affords them pleasure to become incarnated, and that, apart from the suffering to which flesh is always more or less subjected, they enjoy their incarnation, and are reluctant to quit it—as evidenced by their persistently deploying all their powers in unison to keep their temporary tenement alive.

From the standpoint of this Greater Mind theory, the advent and evolution of physical life becomes easily conceivable. Accepting the geologist's hypothesis of the formation and development of the earth, from its gaseous to its cooling down stage, there would come a period in which it would be in a condition to support some low-class life, possessing

only the lower class elements. For apparently there is no difficulty in the way of imagining that certain of the lower grade elements of Mind—including those necessary for the propagation of their species—should become allied with the elements of matter and force, and produce some form of life, which, for myriads of ages, would go on increasing; but as the world became more fit for the support of superior life, the higher class elements would join with those of the lower grade, and slowly construct, and perfect, their organs, and so produce higher, and still higher, forms of organism.

But it is evident that the lower grade forces must come first, since such of them as produce hunger, sexual desire, and so on, are necessary for every phase of life, high or low. Evolution (of which Darwin has proved himself so masterful an exponent) doing the rest, and explaining the continuity.

This theory of life, when coupled with that of evolution, clears away many biological difficulties which have hitherto been considered unexplainable. For instance, the motive which caused the evolution of the reptile into the bird. Biologists have traced the bird back to the reptile with convincing accuracy; but in tracing the evolution of the reptile forwards, into the bird, they have been less successful. They have not explained why in the first instance the reptile developed wings (which in their embryo condition must have been useless appendages) in order that their remote descendants might realise

the no doubt exhilarating sensation of flying through the air, and at the same time attain the additional means of safety which it affords them. But accord to the reptile the greater mental elements producing the desire for aerial flight, and the greater mental elements necessary for giving to the animal means for further self-preservation, and the problem appears solved, for these elements compounding will resolve themselves into the necessary organs.

And herein we may discern a reason for the persistent formations in animals of (at present) apparently useless physical phenomena, for which physiologists are unable to discover a meaning.

It may be asked why, if the universal elements created life in the earliest stages of the world, they cannot do it now. The answer is that—according to this theory—they can do it now, and possibly are doing it, every day. Nature is no niggard with regard to the supply of life. But the world has become too crowded for new life to have now as easy an opportunity for development as it had in the beginning; and moreover, in the early stages of the world, life would have fewer enemies, and they no doubt chiefly meteorological—at any rate, there could not then have been the danger to life, from itself, that there is now.

Elements of the same kindred appear common to all forms of life. Plants probably possess no brain or ego, but only the elements of life. In them the greater mental elements apparently per-

form their work with zest, from the germination of the seed, the sprouting and unfolding of the leaves, the budding and opening of the blossoms, to, finally, the maturing and shedding of the seeds ; and obtaining the while their necessary nutriment without effort from the ground, and with but a few elements, and they of the simplest. Yet plants always appear to enjoy life when their surroundings are congenial ; they perform their important part in the ordering of the universe without pain—or at any rate without the outwardly conscious pain which the possession of a brain entails.

The elements of the higher class are impotent unless they are allied with those of a lower grade, and the elements of matter are impotent unless they are allied with the higher elements of initiative mind. In organic life, the one vitalises the other. The higher class elements in the protoplasm are intimately associated with those of the lower class, and so long as the protoplasm appears to be living, we know that all the classes of the elements are there ; and it is not until the protoplasm is dead that dissolution takes place. But it must not be imagined that the lower class elements of protoplasm have the power to die. Death is due to the higher class elements not being able to preserve the embryo organs of the protoplasm in a sufficiently healthy condition to perform their work.

The concrete elements of matter are few and simple, and yet quite as mysterious as those of

mind, and so, apparently, are those of force ; and as it appears that all the known elements of matter and force may be found in high-class organisms, it has occurred to me that a person's perception of anything external necessitates that person's possession of the elements of the objects he perceives.

If we look upon a yellow disc, it is probable that we would not perceive its yellowness if we had not the yellow element of light incorporated with our other elements. But, it may be asked, What is to be said about the disc's roundness ? We cannot well conceive our possession of an element of roundness. Possibly it may be that the combination of elements which enables us to judge of form is capable of perceiving all kinds, that of roundness as well as straightness.

It may be objected that, if everything perceived must have its counterpart in the organism, a block of wood, when seen, must have its counterpart there ; but the sequence would not be logical, as we are now only considering elements, and the concrete elements of a block of wood (carbon, and the rest) have actually their counterparts in the observer's system, while the abstract properties of the material—its size, weight, form, &c.—have their counterparts in his organism.

All phenomena connected with matter have been described as the effect of the distribution of matter. But the effect which matter in its various forms has upon the mind of the observer is very remarkable ; the peculiar effects of awe, or wonder, are produced

in us by such natural phenomena as great storms, the sight of mountains, of volcanoes in eruption, of oceans, &c. ; and by such works of human enterprise, ingenuity, and labour, as a colossal steam-engine, a huge ship, the Forth Bridge, the pyramids of Egypt, an old cathedral, the statues of ancient Greece, the ruins of ancient Rome, and so on.

Another remarkable effect of the distribution of matter by man's agency, is displayed in the ability of an artist to produce in other minds many of the feelings suggested by a natural scene, by imitating it with a few pigments upon a fragment of canvas. Take, for example, Frederick Walker's painting of "The Harbour of Refuge," now in the Tate collection. The matter—animal, vegetable, and mineral—contained in the canvas, stretcher, and colours, is small; yet the abstract properties of the picture impress the spectators who crowd around it, with the sense of peaceful decay which was intended by the artist—who, indeed, was himself affected in the same way while he was painting it.

The inference that if one of the composite parts of a group possesses any peculiarity, each of its other parts must necessarily present the same characteristic, may seem natural, but it is not to be relied upon, for examination not infrequently reveals the fact that some of the other parts have opposite characteristics, though they may overlap.

But despite the overlapping which everywhere prevails in nature, it must be evident that if there

are substances and non-substances—the material and the immaterial—there can be no overlapping here, there must be a distinct line drawn between the two ; for it is not possible to imagine anything which is at the same time both matter and not matter ; and although a substance may combine both the material and the immaterial, yet that which is material about it cannot also be immaterial, although the term which has been given to the substance may include both.

The consideration of the properties of matter, and the endeavour to distinguish between substances and non-substances, has occupied my attention perhaps more than any other subject. For we must not conclude that because one of the properties of matter is material, that all are ; or because one of them is immaterial, that all must be.

Organic matter, whatever its kind, can only be described by terms which indicate its properties—hot, cold, soft, hard, rough, smooth, round, square, black, white, resonant conductor, or non-conductor, of heat or electricity, and so on.

Evidence shows us that all matter has these supposed non-material aspects, and that it is impossible to dissociate matter from these aspects, qualities, or properties, whatever they may be called, any more than the wisdom of a philosopher can be dissociated from his words. The wisdom and the words are so intimately combined that we cannot describe nor even conceive the former without the latter ; although we may see the words without perceiving the wisdom

they contain ; and similarly, we cannot separate matter from its non-material properties although we may perceive the one and not the other ; we may transpose, and garble, the philosopher's words, so that, instead of conveying wisdom, they become nonsense, and similarly, matter, mind, force, and their properties may be so mingled, that they display no initiative intelligence ; but when viewed in proper order, the intelligence will be apparent where, perhaps, there seemed none before, as the wisdom will be apparent in the words when they are read in their proper order.

Beyond the fact that matter as it is presented to our senses is called matter and composed of elements, all its qualities and properties, which it is possible to describe by words, will be found to be non-material ones. An ordinary table, for example, is not merely a presentation of matter, elementary and otherwise, but it appeals to our senses solely in its non-material aspect, since besides being a greater or lesser quantity of carbon, and other elements, which we are unable to realise, it suggests its own purpose—to put things upon, or to work upon, and so on.

A pebble, too, may possess the non-material attribute of beauty ; and a tree, or a river (in which we fail to realise the oxygen and hydrogen) will display numerous non-material aspects to our minds.

And so it will be found that with all material objects, all their qualities and properties, as they present themselves to the mind of the observer, are

non-material, with the peculiar exceptions presently to be explained.

All organisms are judged by man according to their non-material, and not their material, qualities. If we crush an organism into a shapeless mass of matter, what little interest in it that is left to us is non-material—form, colour, size, weight, &c.

When we see a mountain, we are impressed by its vastness, its grandeur, its beauty. We do not think of it as so many cartloads, or cubic yards, of matter, or as so much carbon, and so much heat, and so much electricity. And even if we did, it would necessarily be in the abstract and be non-material.

If we receive a blow from some material object, we describe it as heavy (violent) or light, hard or soft; always by abstract terms, and so all material must be described by non-material terms.

Matter cannot be made manifest to our senses except by abstract words which imply that Mind is associated with it. Thus Mind and matter are inseparable.

If we were simply to divide the universe into Mind and matter, there will probably be no common agreement over the meaning of the word "Mind," and if Mind and matter are again classified, the one as being initiative imponderability, and the other as uninitiative ponderability, then we leave out of consideration all the passive non-initiative abstract properties—the only qualities in matter which come to consciousness through our different senses.

It is obvious that few of these properties can apply to matter when it is in a state of invisible vapour. They only apply to matter, in what may be called its manufactured state, and then they are not objectively permanent and accurately made out properties. They only represent those properties which can be perceived by the mind of the observer, and each observer may perceive these properties differently.

Thus beauty may be described as a property of matter, but it is only perceived in its various degrees by the organs of Life, of which Mind is the principal factor, and as previously suggested, the organs of the elements which are necessary to perceive beauty, must be present in the organism. This also applies to all other properties of matter. Objectively the properties of matter are formed either by natural selection, and therefore are perhaps accidental, or by being allied with Mind, and therefore formed by design, during its evolution from original noumenon to its present condition.

Subjectively, the realisation of the properties of matter produce emotion and represent compounds in which the mental predominates. Thus "vastness" objectively is merely a certain amount of matter many times multiplied. Subjectively the term "vastness" brings into consciousness a well-known feeling of a similar character to Awe.

Now the question is: What are the properties, or qualities, of Matter? Are they in themselves substances, or are they non-substances?

Fortunately we have a clue to the answer, since the properties of matter are capable of being simply classified as Physical Forces and non-Physical Forces; and when we are able to classify a group of phenomena, the way seems to be cleared of some of its most formidable obstacles. We have already come to the conclusion that the physical forces are substances, and if this be so, it should be found that matter and its allied physical forces can be separated from each other; and this is actually the case, for heat, colour (light), resonance (sound), electricity, &c., can be withdrawn from the matter with which they are associated, and yet leave it intact. But certain other properties, as hardness, smoothness, roughness, &c., cannot be taken from it without its being radically altered. Hence I have drawn the following conclusions, namely :—

That those properties of inorganic matter which come under the head of physical force, are substances, all others are merely the names employed to describe its various characteristics or qualities. Thus, although the physical forces of light, heat, sound, and electricity, may appear in one sense as the immaterial properties of the matter with which they are incorporated, the same as the properties of hardness, smoothness, &c., they are themselves substances: thus, wool, being a non-conductor of heat, possesses the apparently immaterial property of an equable temperature, yet it also possesses the real substance of heat. Red bricks may possess the

apparently immaterial property of colour; but they also possess the real substance of the red-ray light.

Although universal noumena naturally fall into the groups, or divisions, of Mind, matter, and force, yet the hypothesis I have arrived at is, that these divisions are neither permanent nor distinctly separated, for, according to this theory, each element of each division is a substance. Thus the hypothesis presents itself that Mind, matter, and physical force, although they may sometimes appear to form separate divisions, are material substances, and are all compounded into one unified whole, constituting one pluralistic substance.

Carried to its logical conclusion, this means simply that there can be no such thing¹ as non-matter, or the immaterial; that what is supposed to be non-matter is merely this description of matter, and has no separate existence; and I have no doubt that further investigation will prove this hypothesis to be correct. When it was an accepted dictum that this world was divided into matter and non-matter, it was not imagined that a paving stone, or a locomotive engine, could be transformed into so rarefied a vapour as to be almost imperceptible to the senses. And to argue that when solid matter is rarefied, it ceases to be matter, and becomes non-matter because it is rarefied, is obviously contrary to common sense, as well as to natural science.

¹ Of course "nothing" cannot be a "thing," but the language does not provide a word that properly expresses the idea.

To attempt to discover the immaterial in nature is to fail absolutely. A vacuum will perhaps present itself as the nearest approach to non-matter, but a perfect vacuum has not yet been found. A spoken word when leaving the lips, and as long as it is audible, is, if my investigations have not misled me, a substance composed of the elementary substances of sound ; and when a word is written, it is composed of carbon, or other elements ; and while it is being thought, it is composed of the elements of life, already described ; and when it is being received, and perceived by another organism, it stimulates in it kindred elements, and becomes a compound of the same elementary substances.

I am not endeavouring to prove non-existence of matter. We know very well that, so far as we are concerned, it does exist. But as we cannot see, or feel, or otherwise realise it, except through its supposed non-material properties, it is a forcible argument in favour of the theory that it is materialised noumenon, and therefore that its elements have the same fundamental characteristics as those of mind, namely, a certain degree of sentiency.

It is not conceivable that mind (or matter) can create, or bring into existence, anything which has not previously existed in part, or as a whole ; consequently such qualities as beauty, roundness, smoothness, and so on, must always have had, and must always continue to have, existence in the universal Ego independently of the properties of matter.

If it can be shown that the immaterial cannot be found in the universe, such properties as attraction and repulsion must be either separate substances, or merely names applied to characteristics which all matter possesses ; and therefore, if the above qualities are not themselves substances, they are only descriptive, and representative of actual substances.

From the standpoint of this theory, which maintains that sentiency and intelligence are attributable to particular combinations of the various elements, it would appear that each of the coloured rays, the invisible rays discovered by photography, and the Röntgen rays must be single portions of an intelligence ; therefore—to carry out this hypothesis correctly—the fulness of light would have some sort of intelligence, being a compound of a certain number of portions of the complete intelligence.

With regard to heat and electricity, it is not at all improbable that, like light, they may be found to possess a number of distinctive elementary substances.

If some portion of the initiative movement of light and heat is due to the sentiency of the elements in combination, so, it must be supposed, is some portion of that of electricity. But it should be always remembered that these physical forces cannot have what we would describe as full intelligence—they have no organs, no reason ; they are merely portions of a complete intelligence, to which they are entirely subject.

It will be gathered that this theory of the Greater Mind favours the Monistic view of the ultimate unity of substance, maintaining that the elements both of mind and of matter are of the same family; and that the elements of all the physical forces, as heat, electricity, &c., have no separate independent existence, but also belong to the same family as that of mind and matter, and are compounded with them into one substance. But while this and the Monistic theories meet in ultimate agreement they begin from widely different starting-points.

Mankind has always intuitively felt that there is a singleness in everything—the one God, the one universe, the one humanity. But mankind refuses to accept as all in all the oneness of Monism. It is not satisfying, it is insufficient, more detail is wanted. A new oneness is needed—the oneness of Pluralism in Unism.

CHAPTER XIII

SHOWING HOW THE GREATER MIND THEORY DIFFERS FROM OTHER THEORIES

HAVING now described my own theory, I will endeavour to explain wherein it differs from other theories.

The usual practice with metaphysicians is to make an investigation into the soundness of prevailing theories, and subject them to searching criticism, before explaining their own ; but the Greater Mind theory is built up independently of these theories, hence I have not found it necessary as yet for the elucidation of my own, to consider the numerous theories in existence, except in a cursory sort of way.

But I feel now to be in a position to do two things at the same time, for whilst comparing this theory with some well-known theories, and showing wherein I consider they fail, I can also further explain the peculiar character of my own.

The first theory to compare it with is—

THE SOUL THEORY—that is to say, the belief in a unified immortal entity inhabiting only the bodies of Mankind.

My objection to the above is that the word “soul”

conveys to scientists an indefinite and unscientific meaning. If it implies the life's spirit, the vital essence, then it may be simply another name for that part of my commonwealth of life which is represented by the elements of Mind. But the difficulty remains in the term being understood to mean the life's spirit in man only. By people who adopt the word in this restricted sense all other animals are devoid of souls, to this view my theory is distinctly opposed.

The Greater Mental elements comprising the Greater Mind, or life's essences, as shown in the intelligence possessed by the various forms of life is the soul of each life, therefore all life must possess a soul if Greater Mind and Soul are taken to mean one and the same thing ; but if the soul be limited to man, it cannot represent Greater Mind ; while the theory of the soul as a distinct entity is incapable of logically explaining the soul's relation to matter, without bringing up that great stumbling-block, Authority.

THE HYPOTHESIS THAT MIND IS A DISTINCT ENTITY, OR ELEMENTARY SUBSTANCE,—which was the generally accepted theory before the Unconscious Mind was recognised, and before the realisation of the possibility of different personalities inhabiting the same body.

With regard to this hypothesis which is similar to the soul theory, but obviously extends to all animals, the difficulties involved in the conception of Mind as

an elementary substance, irrespective of bodily modifications, are now generally admitted to be so great, that they hardly need be discussed here ; the phenomena associated with multiple personalities, the influence of diseases on the mind, and the varying conditions of the individual, all appear to render it untenable.

THE THEORY THAT THE MIND IS DIVIDED INTO CERTAIN MASSIVE ELEMENTARY SECTIONS, SUCH AS WILL, FEELING, AND INTELLECT, under one or other of which all mental phenomena can be classified. My exception to the principle of this theory is, that any division of the Mind into distinct faculties must be a secondary, and not a primary process ; that it is really a division into certain grouped phases of the Mind (secondary combination derived from primary elements) that in fact, Will, Feeling, and Intellect, describe certain common characteristics which occur when certain primary elements enter into certain particular combinations. It is a classification of combinations of elements, and not of elementary characters of Mind.

THE MATERIALIST THEORY—that there is an underlying stratum which forms the basis of Mind, which varies under many conditions, and manifests itself in secondary phases, as will, feeling, intellect, &c., and is in some way the result of the massed conditions of the material forces of the body at the special moment of consciousness.

With regard to the Materialist conception, I

agree with it that Mind will manifest itself in a series of combinations, the apparent result of so many co-operating causes, and that in fact the conscious mind is phasial, and not elementary, in character.

But I am unable to conceive how the mental forces, when working with intelligence and reason, can be interpreted by terms which apparently can apply only to the blind forces of the Materialist. And I further submit, that the Materialist theory is at fault in maintaining that there were more than a single independent substance in original noumenon; and also that matter is an original substance, fundamentally distinct from mind, force, or motion.

At the same time my theory is more in accord with Materialism than it is with the Spiritualist school of thought. Scientists have been practically obliged to accept Materialism, because of the inability of the Spiritualistic school to explain their position—how their occult forces are capable of elucidating facts, and to account for the known laws of science.

On the other hand, although the Materialistic theory fails to fully and satisfactorily demonstrate the phenomena of Mind, and the evolution of the mental, in combination with the physical, they, the Materialists, at least have a firm basis to argue from. They proceed to the unknown from the known, and are therefore in more logical case than the Spiritualistic theorists, whose researches, being confined to

the undiscoverable and unexplainable, are valueless. For the mere attributing of known effects to unknown causes cannot be accepted as an explanation of them.

No doubt it may appear at first glance that I, in my theory, occupy a position as unstable as that of the above. But when it comes to be considered that I simply adopt all the facts advanced by the Materialists, and substitute for their unreasoning force, a supreme commonwealth of universal elements—the initiative forces already described—it will be realised that I stand on a firmer footing.

I accept the Materialist theory of the use of all physical matter and chemical elements, and of the entire theory of evolution, and, in conjunction with the principle of association, utilise them as the chief factor in the working out of my hypothesis.

Supposing that the physical evolution of the body can be fully explained by the various materialistic conceptions, there remains to be accounted for the exclusively mental aspect of evolution, and it is this mental side of evolution which my theory will, I submit, satisfactorily elucidate. In explanation of this, I have already pointed to the peculiar character of the elements of Mind, how they collectively represent the intellectual aspect of life, and compounding with the elements of force and matter, construct the organism, and control and regulate it.

Thus my theory is complementary to that of the Materialists.

While fully admitting that a purely Materialistic conception is sufficient to resolve the facts of physical development, I maintain that it does not throw light upon the mental (intellectual and emotional) aspect of evolution, and that a theory of mental elements (which tend to greater complexity and differentiation, as the higher is developed from the lower) is necessary to completely explain the whole evolutionary conception.

If the physical forces of heat, generated by an assemblage of people in a closed apartment, cause the bodies of those present to assume an unhealthy—and uncomfortable—condition, then the greater mental elements which are combined in the bodies, proceed to direct the physical parts of themselves in a definite direction, with the result that fresh air is admitted into the room by the opening of a door, or a window, to replace the vitiated atmosphere.

It is a noticeable fact that, although the majority of mankind have an innate conviction that there is for them an eternal spiritual life, or existence, among all the various religions which advocate this belief, there is not one that will successfully stand the test of modern science, while the theories of the Materialistic school prove sound and practical, so far as they go, albeit they are regarded by the world at large with intolerance and resentment.

It appears to me that what is necessary to satisfy

the popular requirement in this respect, is to supplement the practical Materialist theory—founded as it is upon knowledge of material and physical elements—with an equally sound and practical theory based upon knowledge of mental elements, and therefore the point to be considered is whether the elements of Mind, as I define them, will accomplish this purpose.

My theory is not opposed to the Materialistic theory that Mind in its essence is the same as Matter in motion, because it maintains that Mind is a compound material substance composed of the higher grade elements of the universe. Matter in motion, when meaning Mind, is merely the universal elements of the higher class in action.

MONISM. It will be found that, while certain parts of Materialism, and the Greater Mind theory, are opposed to each other in the abstract, they practically agree in detail. On the other hand, Monism and the Greater Mind theory agree with each other in the abstract, but are opposed in detail.

In the course of the evolution of my theory, which begins with the known, and proceeds thence to the unknown, the question whether it was monistic, or dualistic, did not enter into my investigations, and until I approached the subject, I never doubted that there was a wide distinction between mind and matter, and between soul and body; I was not aware of the existence of any theory which, in a rational and detailed way, reduced the two into one; and as

I had a sufficiently difficult task in thinking out the first part of my theory without going outside it, it was not until I was occupied with the subsequent part that I formed a definite opinion with regard to whether the Greater Mind theory was monistic or dualistic. Materialistic it certainly was not.

My theory from the first appeared to me to be in favour of the mental at the expense of the physical, and in the course of its evolution, I became convinced that they could not run in parallel lines. Presently I extended to the physical no initiative in the organism, and there I was wrong. Now, if the physical has in itself no power, only two alternatives (apart from automatism) seemed open to me; either the physical was comprised of a mass of inert atoms, or the physical and the mental were blended into one.

The dogma that all matter is independent of mind, and yet possesses no activity, seemed to me absurd and untenable. How, I asked myself, did it come into existence? The only possible answer appeared to be that the mental created it out of itself. If so, then the physical must be part of the mental. The only alternative then left, is the hypothesis that the physical and the mental are both the outcome of the same family of elements, and that organic matter is only a compound of the elements of life, and that all matter is but the visible part of the elements of the universal noumenon. This, then, is a theory of unity of substance, but the method of its arriving

at this unity is different from the way in which the Monists and the Pantheists arrive at it. The Greater Mind theory achieves this unity, or oneness, by the compounding of all the various universal elements ; thus forming a supreme God, Who is at the same time a supreme Self-Governing Commonwealth.

Monists argue from the hypothesis that "Mind and matter are only different aspects of a common something," and in this reasonable speculation it accords with the Greater Mind theory, which arrives at practically the same conclusion, through a series of experimental analyses, which (although instituted for another purpose) tend to support the theory of unity.

"SPIRITUALISM, OR DUALISM, teaches that Mind in its essence is fundamentally distinct from ordinary physical matter, and its motion, and that Mind and Soul are related."

The Greater Mind theory is opposed to any distinct severance of mind from physical matter, but it maintains that a Greater Mind and a Soul are one and the same, and that all life possesses them in their various degrees of power and intelligence.

PANTHEISM. The resemblance of the Greater Mind theory to Pantheism ends with their mutual agreement that God and the Universe are one, and that the whole universe is a mass of living matter. But Pantheism suggests only a very remote idea of what God is, and nothing whatever of man. And in opposition to Pantheism, the Greater Mind theory

maintains that the elements of life possess qualitative differences.

From this beginning the two theories rapidly diverge more and more widely apart; Pantheism throughout is purely speculative, while I have built the Greater Mind theory on the hypothesis of well-known psychological and mental substances which form the elements of the common basis of all organisms.

Thus the Greater Mind theory agrees with Pantheism only in its leading hypothesis.

MONADISM in some respects resembles the Greater Mind theory, but only superficially; they differ in all essential characteristics.

Merz describes Monad as "a term used by Giordano Bruno, and adopted in a slightly different sense, and brought into prominence by Leibnitz," who conceived "that these were atoms, not physical or extended particles, but mathematical points; their extension was zero, but their intensity was infinite, like that of the human mind. These true unities without extension, but endowed with the depth of eternal life, Leibnitz called Monads, to distinguish them from the atoms of Gassendi."

The term "Monad" "takes the place of the word 'substance,' and is meant to describe the nature and essence of what is, and what constitutes reality."

A monad is "simple unextended substance, that is, substance which has the power of action. All

monads have ideas; but the ideas of different monads are of different degrees of character. Soul is the primitive monad, the primary substance; all other monads are the fulgurative. God has only adequate ideas. Every soul is a monad. Plants and minerals are, as it were, sleeping monads, with unconscious ideas. In plants these ideas are formative vital forces; in animals they assume the form of sensations and memory. In human souls they approach, but do not attain, the clearness of the adequate ideas possessed by God."

The only parts of these quoted descriptions of monads which will apply to the universal elements are those referring to "true unities without extension," which, however, according to the Greater Mind theory, are not independent of one another: to "endowed with the depth of eternal life," and "simple unextended substance which has the power of action." Otherwise monads and the Greater Mental elements are widely different from each other. Monads, according to Leibnitz, are entities, with complex intelligences of varying degrees; the elements of life, including the Greater Mental elements, on the contrary, have the far-reaching difference that they possess no complex, or full, intelligence, that is to say, they possess only a portion of an idea, and, therefore, unlike the monads of Leibnitz, are not entities, and are incapable of any intelligent action.

It has been suggested that I am anticipated in my

theory by Lotze, by Durand de Gros (in his *Essai de Physiologie Philosophique*), and by Barratt (in his "Physical Metempiric"). But one of the many points upon which these psychologists and the Greater Mind theory differ, is that, while they credit the monads with possessing graduated values, or power, after the property of, say, playing cards; or equal value, or power, like coins of one denomination, the Greater Mind theory, on the contrary, maintains that, like pool balls, all the elements are equal in degree and power, but that at the same time each possesses a distinctive character peculiar to itself, and by which it is easily recognised.

The one common characteristic of monads and the universal elements is that both are unextended elementary substances; but their similarity is less than their dissimilarity; and a very slight difference in the character of the elements upon which a theory is founded may make a very great difference in the theory. Alfred Barratt tells us (in his "Physical Metempiric") that "if we take all the monads as originally alike, the Ego of a philosopher differs from a monad of hydrogen only in its collocation with an attendant organism of subservient monads, which, catching a great variety of incoming influences, co-ordinates and prepares them in such fashion, with relics or reproductions of old influences, that, when passed on to the central monad, they possess, in an extraordinary degree, complexity and unity, variety and definiteness, and all the other

qualities which distinguish intelligent thought from the simple rudiments of consciousness.

"Thus a mere centre of the most elementary states becomes a thinking being. A monad has in itself only one property or quality—if such it can be called—namely, that of existence, or being. It is the union of states of consciousness, and these depend on the interaction of many monads. Similarly, an atom is nothing but the union of forces, which again depend wholly upon mutual relations of many atoms."

Passing over the ambiguity of the foregoing quotation—for it is not easy to comprehend how, if the monads are all alike, they can be attended by subservient monads—it is clear that neither Barratt, nor Lotze, nor Durand de Gros, nor any other psychologist whose writings I am acquainted with, ever made monads the simple elements of a thought (of course only during the process of evolution) having a leading element which gives to it its peculiar character.

The leading element, however, of one combination would be only a simple affiliated element in other combinations.

Here then is the dividing line between Monadism and the Greater Mind theory, and from this line the division broadens into a chasm.

Leibnitz tells us that every soul is a monad; the Greater Mind theory maintains that a soul is a commonwealth, comprised of a number of universal

elements. Therefore one of my universal elements must be a very different substance from a monad.

PLURALISTIC MONADISM, unlike the Greater Mind theory, argues that the brain-cells are monads. But as the advocates of Pluralistic Monadism are unable to make a simple and self-contained commonwealth of the monads, they are obliged to have resource either to a central or pontifical (or arch) cell, or to leave some forces out of the commonwealth.

Lotze, in his "Microcosms," says : " From these general discussions we return to our peculiar subject ; we once again take for granted, in the multitudinous connected atoms of the body, that internal psychic life which, according to the view from which we started, must be attributed to all matter. Now, let a common sensory stimulus, as before a motor impulse, act at once ; we can yet seek the rising sensation nowhere else than in the interior of each single atom. It will be present as many times as there are individual beings in the united multitude ; but these many sensations will never coalesce into a joint sensation unless we suppose, in addition to them, a favoured being to which all transfer their states, and then, that will be the soul of such a body."

From this we learn that, unless the atoms are of a different nature from what Lotze, Durand de Gros, and others who have endeavoured to form a pluralistic monadism of a workable character, believe them to be, it is the same thing over again—the

playing cards of different values, or the coins of one denomination, all of equal value. Hitherto no scientist seems to have conceived the possibility of the monads being equal to each other in value, and yet all distinctively different; so that, although single-intelligenced, they can compound, and produce all the various intelligences we find in nature. For although, as single entities, they are no doubt relatively imperfect, like the separated parts of a picture puzzle; nevertheless, when combined, they form like it a single complete and perfect whole.

If we make any one organ superior to any other organ, or organs, or give to one mental element power over another one, or create a power superior to these elements, a theory founded upon such assumption will be found useless for explaining the mysteries of mind or of forming a working commonwealth of life's elements. The Greater Mind theory maintains that there is no force superior to an universal element. We can find no indication of the existence of such a force; all the unextended substance in the soul, or greater mind, form activities of the same kith and kin, and there is no evidence that other activities of a superior order exist. On the contrary, the evidence goes to show that they cannot exist, for a controlling power must be a greater, and more irresistible, and more active power, than that which it controls; otherwise it is unable to control and punish. And without superior force it is impossible to exact obedience.

In this contention lies the chief difference between the foregoing theories and the Greater Mind theory.

Whatever book we may take up, which deals with psychology, or metaphysics, whether the subject be monads, the elements of mind, the relation of mind to matter, the evolution of life, reason, intellect, will, self-compounding of mental units, or whatever else, the defect of stultification seems to pervade it throughout.

It always appears to me, that one simple alteration would shed a gleam of light where darkness now prevails, and that is, to deprive all monads, or elements of mind, of all independent existence, and all complex intelligence, and relegate to every portion of each element its special part in a complete intelligence. Then the corollary would lead to the possibility of perceiving the Greater Ego as an actual self-governing commonwealth, to form which many have tried, but always failed, for the simple reason that they have attempted to build up a unified whole, from out of a number of impossible parts—that is to say, of either the parts of matter alone, or of the parts of matter and force alone, and omitting to include the parts of mind.

PLURALISM is of course no new idea; nor do I claim originality for the discovery that the Greater Mind is constructed on the commonwealth principle. What I lay claim to is the discovery of the nature of the elements forming such commonwealth,

and the method of their compounding and forming all mental phenomena.

THE PERIPATETIC SOUL was also pluralistic, made up of universals, general ideas, &c. But so vague and speculative is this theory, that it can hardly in any way be compared to that of the Greater Mind.

TRANSCENDENTALISM. It appears to me that Kant is justified in denying the possibility of knowledge of what lies beyond the range of experience, with the exception of certain intuitions.

The Greater Mind theory is opposed to the supposition that there is *a priori* knowledge of anything that transpires outside the organism, though the elements of mind are collectively, no doubt, acquiring the knowledge immediately incubation begins. The possession of the *a priori* knowledge necessary for the building up of the organs, and the structures of the organism, is manifest, seeing that there can have been no previous experience in this sort of work to learn from. Therefore the Greater Mind theory agrees with Transcendentalism so far as *a priori* knowledge in the building up of the organism is concerned.

The Transcendental Ego is in some slight degree fairly accurately represented by the Greater Mind, the greater personality, because all the elements of the greater mind are supreme as units; no possible knowledge is superior to theirs, as units. But the forming of the various combinations producing

the various thoughts shown in the outer consciousness of the brain, has all to be learnt from experience.

Experiments testify to the truth of this, tending as they do to show that animals derive all their knowledge, and supposed instinct, from experience. They begin life with nothing but the faculty of being able to learn from both tuition and experience—though of course this faculty is largely developed as time goes on.

Assuming that Professor Lloyd Morgan is correct in his deductions, if we apply this theory of life to the actions of the animal immediately it is born into the world, it would appear that the elements comprising an organism come together for the first time—that is to say, although the elements may possibly have previously inhabited other bodies, here they form an entirely new commonwealth, and happy is their lot, until Experience initiates them into the pains and tribulations to which all mundane life is heir.

Transcendentalism is purely speculative, and therefore touches but very slightly upon the Greater Mind theory, though the elements of mind, when working independently of the brain, may be compared to the categories of Kant, in that they may be independent of experience.

THE UNCONSCIOUS WILL; THE ABSOLUTE SUBJECT; THE ABSOLUTE EGO. All these represent fully intelligenced substance, “a pure and spiritual activity, without a substratum of nerve or brain;”

but none of them can represent the Greater Mind, or one of its elements, because in the one case they are not pluralistic, and in the other they are endowed with intelligence. It is unnecessary to carry the comparison further.

ELEMENTARY UNITS OF CONSCIOUSNESS also in some degree approach the elements of Greater Mind, and yet are far away from them. If the greater mental elements may be properly called elementary units of consciousness, they may with better reason be termed elementary units of unconsciousness.

THE CONCEPT, like the idea of the ancients, is, according to this theory, a combination of elements of mind, and if the combination, or concept, be not preserved, by being spoken, or written, it decomposes, as any other compound may decompose. And when the component parts are disintegrated, and have returned whence they came, the idea, or "concept," cannot be resuscitated unless the component parts come together again in the same way as before, and resume possession of the brain.

The theological theory of an OMNIPOTENT GOD, the maker and ruler of the universe, with all life subject unto Him, and with the world not bodily a part of God, but as it were His footstool.

A blind confidence in the literal accuracy of the theological doctrine of a personal and omnipotent God, having direct control over the human mind, must necessarily obstruct any attempt to elucidate

the mystery of man's mind, through man. The mind of man being, according to the theological theory, the agent or under the control of God, from that standpoint we must seek from God Himself a solution of the problem.

But exhaustively as we may search through the innumerable speculative descriptions of God, according to the theologians we can find nothing that will help the scientist to learn anything of the constitution of the mind ; consequently, if we are to ascertain what mind is, we must go for our information to man, and the other animals. Moreover, the theological theories are based upon the existence of authority, which the Greater Mind theory in Chapter III. maintains is non-existent.

THE ATOMIC THEORY OF THE CHEMISTS. Professor Lewes (following in the steps of Cook, Dalton, and Gay Lussac) says : "A cubic inch of water forms a cubic foot of steam. This enormous increase of volume may be explained in one of two ways : either the cubic inch of water is stretched, like a piece of indiarubber, under the influence of heat, until it assumes the dimensions of a cubic foot, or else the cubic foot of water is built up of an innumerable host of smaller particles, which, when heated, tend to repel each other, and so cause the increase in volume.

"If the first theory be correct, then every part of the cubic foot of steam would be perfectly homogeneous, and, without condensing some of the steam,

it would be impossible for any other vapour to find room in the space so occupied, while experiment proves that one vapour acts as a vacuum to another, so that other vapours can occupy the space already filled with water vapour, a phenomenon which can only be explained on the assumption that the vapours do not completely fill the space they occupy, although equally distributed through it; that is to say, they are built up of particles which, by the action of heat, become widely separated from each other, thus leaving spaces, within which the particles of other vapours may find place.

"The states of aggregation of elementary bodies are, as far as we can ascertain, merely dependent upon temperature, all gases having been condensed by either cold or pressure, or a combination of the two, to the liquid state, while nearly all have been solidified."

Professor Lewes here adopts the common, but surely faulty, method of reasoning, of limiting the explanation of a phenomenon to two theories, when, for aught we know, there may be half-a-dozen of them. He says that "either the cubic foot of steam must be homogeneous, or it must be built up of particles which, by the action of heat, become widely separated from each other, thus leaving spaces," and he proceeds to show that the first theory is not likely to be the correct one, because "other vapours can occupy the spaces already filled with water vapour." And apparently upon this unsub-

stantial foundation the Great Atomic theory is erected.

When the particles of water, in the form of steam, repelled each other, what was the substance which filled the spaces between them ? One can only conceive it to be either air or ether ; if it be air, what becomes of the air when another vapour is introduced into the spaces ? If the spaces are filled with ether, where does the enormous power come from to create these spaces ? for ether is practically vacuo.

A finite mind, when dealing with subjects which are beyond its understanding, holds curiously contradictory and antagonistic views ; for instance, when we take a particle of an element, and continuously subdivide it, our reason tells us that we must eventually come to particles, or atoms, so minute that further subdivision of them will be impossible. And yet at the same time our minds are unable to conceive a particle, or atom, which has been so infinitely subdivided as to be incapable of further subdivision. Moreover, we are unable to conceive matter, of whatever nature, being so infinitely subdivided that nothing remains of it.

The principal objection to the first hypothesis is, that the atoms of elements arrived at by the process of subdivision must be impenetrable, must be self-contained matter, and must be incapable of either expansion or contraction (or they would be capable of further subdivision) ; they cannot compound, but must always lie side by side. This hypothesis, when

examined and compared with well-known facts, appears to me untenable.

The second hypothesis, if substantiated, must, it seems, lead to the third one.

The third hypothesis therefore requires as much consideration as the others, and more than its apparent impossibility would lead us to expect. But I anticipate that further investigation will show that none of these hypotheses is correct.

What led me to examine the Atomic theory, so long accepted as indisputable by some of the world's wisest philosophers, was its apparent inconsistency, when compared with the Greater Mind theory, and with the theory of Montgomery, James, and others, with regard to the self-compounding of elements.

So far, our investigations tend to support the hypothesis that the universe is a perfect unity, with parts which are inseparable from the whole. According to this hypothesis, matter is combinations of noumenal elements which have become consolidated, and are therefore visible. Nevertheless it is not divided from the entirety; it retains its place in the unity, as does the heart in an animal's body; which, although a part of the animal, and like no other part, cannot be separated from the animal without destroying the unity.

If the Atomic theory, which invests atoms with an unalterable nature, be fact, no doubt it strikes a serious blow to the Greater Mind theory, seeing that complete, unalterable, unchangeable atoms obviously

cannot compound and become an individual whole ; they must always remain the same atoms, whether separate or congregated ; with neither sentiency nor initiative—and it is not claimed for them that they possess either—they can have no active share in the ordering of the cosmos, and, since they are impervious to all outward force, they can be nothing but blind, inert agents, under the direction of some superior power.

Moreover, what power do they possess, when under the action of heat, sufficient to repel one another, and so form what is practically a vacuum ? Nature, we are told, abhors a vacuum, and yet, what a great amount of vacuum or ether space a cubic foot of steam must contain if the Atomic theory be correct ! But the power to create such space by mere repulsion of the atoms is beyond credence.

The question is not “Are there such things as atoms ?” but rather, “Have atoms the nature which chemists ascribe to them ? The smallest particle of an element we can conceive may rightly be termed an atom, whilst the smallest particle of a compound may rightly be termed a molecule ; but let us make an investigation into the nature and character of these atoms and molecules. Suppose we divide and subdivide a drop of water until we reduce it to the final molecule, this molecule will of course consist of three atoms—two of hydrogen and one of oxygen.

The molecule will still be water, otherwise the

atoms would have to lie side by side, and this decomposition of water into its elements is inconceivable as being brought about by simply dividing and subdividing the bulk.

Now appears a stultification of the Atomic theory, for on the one hand it is evident to the senses that a molecule of water, consisting of three atoms, can, as regards bulk, be divided into two equal parts ; it is equally evident that in the division the impossible must occur, and one at least of the atoms must be cut in two.

But inconceivable as it may be, if the Atomic theory is the true one, and the molecule cannot be divided, it follows that the three atoms are not truly compounded, but lie side by side ; therefore the atoms must have absolute independence, and consequently, as already argued in this work, there must be absolute stultification.

Moreover, if the atoms always lie side by side and never compound, there can be no such thing as a compound, and therefore the elaborate explanation of the chemists of the difference between a compound and a mechanical mixture must be a delusion, and every so-called compound must be a mechanical mixture.

The originators of the Atomic theory seem to have gone too far. Because they found different particles of an element could be separated from each other, they supposed that these particles could be further reduced to atoms, and that these atoms must always lie side by side, and therefore must always be

uncompoundable in its truest sense. They failed to perceive that there can be no real separation in nature—a bird flying through the air is as truly compounded with all other matter and is a part of the world as is a hill or a valley. They failed to perceive that there need be but one element of each kind in the universe, and that all the particles of this element only appear to be separated, whilst in reality they always remain truly compounded with not only their parent element but also with all other elements. No particle, whether it is in its ethereal state or in its solid state, can be separated from the universal unity—the Universal Ego.

In fact, as before explained, there would appear to be no such a thing as absolute unsentient matter, the elements of the latter being as truly parts of the Universal Ego as are those of Mind and Force, and directly one division of elements is treated as wholly apart from the elements of the other divisions, stultification must result.

This theory, however, would not disturb the whole of the Atomic theory, but only that portion of it which relates to the finality of the atoms. An atom or smallest known particle of H may still be represented by its atomic weight 1, and two of these particles may still combine with one of O and form water. It does not disturb the law of equation, the conservation of the Mass, and the conservation of Energy, and other chemical laws.

I maintain that the hypothesis that atoms have

the finality given to them according to the Atomic theory is unsound.

If an atom can be reduced, as is probable, to the same consistency as the ether which surrounds our atmosphere, why should not this atom be able to compound (whilst in this extremely rarefied form) with another atom and become one though naturally of greater density?

Oxygen and hydrogen in the proper proportions can mingle together without their forming water, so it would appear that there must be certain conditions attaching to the atoms of these elements, something contrary to their supposed unalterable and persistent nature, which cause them to form themselves into water at one time and to remain uncompounded at other times. What can these conditions be? If I understand the Atomic theory rightly it is impossible for one atom to compound with another, hence if the atoms of O always remain apart from the atoms of H how can the two gases truly compound under any conditions? And if they cannot compound, how can they form water at one time and remain free at another?

As these atoms (of H and O) are impervious and unalterable, even if they had the power to attract and repel one another, how can this peculiarity enable them to form themselves into water without compounding?

THE PHYSICAL FORCES AND THE VIBRATORY THEORY.
The assumption that everything must be either a

substance or a manifestation of a substance is a postulate, with which all must agree, and the question is, which are substances and which are manifestations?

Matter is without doubt a substance, with all its elements and compounds, but with regard to the Physical forces, there does not seem to be a common agreement, and the important question remains, Are the Physical forces substances, or are they merely manifestations?

If the Physical forces can be proved to be substances, a great difficulty will be removed.

I will here give a list of some of the Physical forces, and also a list of a few manifestations—the latter being a much more numerous body.

Physical Forces—Sound, Light, Heat, Electricity, Magnetism, and the more doubtful ones of Attraction, or Gravitation, and Repulsion.

Manifestations—Shadow, Gloss, Opacity, Hardness, Beauty, &c.

Though nature rarely draws a sharp line, and generally overlaps, yet practically there can be no dispute about the Physical forces being either manifestations or substances, or a combination—not a compound—of both. And well-known facts seem to negative the supposition that they are solely manifestations; for if we examine a manifestation, it will be found to have no independent existence, it cannot be stored, it cannot produce any effect independently of the substance of which it is a mani-

festation. It is a part of, and cannot be divided from, the substance, and in describing substance of any kind, this can only be done by describing its manifestations. Thus the names of the different manifestations are merely the names used to describe their different substances.

With the physical forces it is quite different, they all produce effects independently of the substance with which they are allied ; take, for instance, Light ; it is quite independent of the glow-worm, or of phosphorus, or of fire, though it is found in them all ; take also Heat, which can be produced both by combustion and friction ; but it can enter and leave matter without altering the nature of the matter ; likewise Sound, which has been proved to be quite independent of the vibrations of air caused by concussion.

In one sense all substances are likewise manifestations, as it is only our senses which realise their existence ; we have no means of realising "things in themselves" except in so far as our individual realisations are corroborated by others, but there is evidently a distinction between a manifestation and a substance, for there are manifestations which are not substances ; thus a shadow of a lamp-post is not a substance, but only a manifestation ; on the other hand the lamp-post itself is manifestly a lamp-post, and therefore both a manifestation and a substance. Likewise lightning is a manifestation of electricity, but it is not a substance. We shall have to go to

electricity to find the substance. If we receive an electric shock we get both the manifestation and the substance. Fire and smoke are manifestations of Heat, and if heat be considered a manifestation, it is, like the lamp-post, a manifestation of itself, just the same as Light and Sound.

"The doctrine or principle that the different kinds of force in the universe are so correlated together, that any one can be transformed into an exactly equivalent amount of another" does not negative the above theory, for it is much easier to believe that the physical forces as substances are correlated together, than that they are merely correlated manifestations; for with regard to those substances about which there is no dispute, we find that solid matter may be transformed into vapour, and that this vapour may produce from out of itself Motion.

This leads me to take a view with regard to Physical forces, which differs both from the material theory and from the undulatory theory of *air* and *ether*. My view is that the physical forces are composite substances to be found everywhere and in everything. This hypothesis, taking sound as an example, may be put in the following words: that the elementary substances of sound are vibratory substances, and are set in motion by stimuli. Sound then speeds its silent way by the recognised undulatory means until it reaches the drum of the ear of a living organism, where it becomes rapport with its

own and the other elementary substances forming life, and comes into the consciousness of the brain.

That sound is not, as some suppose, caused solely by the vibrations of the air striking the tympanum, but that it is a substance, and that it is the vibrations of this substance, not merely the vibrations of air, which strike the tympanum ; this, it will be seen, is not an attempt to revive the exploded dogma that the physical forces are fluids and that they pass through the various substances because it maintains that the forces are already in all substances.

A considerable amount of confusion seems to have arisen in the supposition that a disturbance of the air caused by concussion and accompanied by vibration, is the same thing as sound and its vibrations ; thus Professor Tyndall when alluding to an explosion which forced all the windows of a church in its vicinity inwards, speaks of it as the effect of sound. A hurricane might force the windows inwards, and yet the sound of the crash might travel back in the teeth of the hurricane.

The various elements of sound being found in a greater or less degree in everything, it is manifest that all the vibratory elements of sound must be able to co-ordinate with their kindred elements in every substance.

The contention that sound is incorporated with the air and all substances, seems to be corroborated by the fact that sound does not pass through what we call a vacuum, for sound being the weakest of

the physical forces—when the air is pumped out of the vessel—it (sound) is pumped out with the air; and the inference is, if the experiment be carried further, it would go to prove that all the other forces would be pumped out with air or ether in ratio to their energy.

My views may be summarised thus: Light, Heat, Sound, and all physical forces are manifestations of elementary substances which form Light, Heat, Sound, &c., respectively: the same words having to be used for both the manifestations and the substances. And further—

My contention is, that: if the term “manifestations” be given to the physical forces, the term “substances” ought also to be given to them. To deny the term “substances” to the physical forces appears to me to be a remnant of unscientific times when nothing was considered a substance unless it was visible to the eyes or could be felt by the fingers.

THE BRAIN THE SEAT OF THE MIND. It does not seem at all clear whether all psychologists regard the brain as the seat of both the conscious and the unconscious minds, but certainly many of them insist that the seat of mind is in the brain exclusively—that there can be no mental intelligence save that which emanates from the brain. Thus Professor W. James writes: “The fact that the brain is the one immediate condition of the mental operation is, indeed, so universally admitted nowadays, that I need spend no more time in illus-

trating it." Professor Bowne also expresses the opinion that: "Consciousness is the specific of all mental states. It is possible that the soul may perform many unconscious functions, but they would have no mental claim." And Professor Ladd follows in the same steps, with: "Consciousness as the one characteristic that distinguishes mind from not mind—the physical is the conscious—consciousness, the one universal characteristic of all mental states."

But specific experiments have proved beyond a doubt that intelligent actions in an organism, not merely reflex actions, occur altogether independently of the brain. Now, if there be intelligence which is (admittedly) independent of the brain, to endeavour to discover what the whole intelligence is, while ignoring a specially characteristic part of it, is like performing a play with its principal character left out—"Hamlet" without the Prince of Denmark, or "Othello" without the Moor.

Will psychologists explain the difference between the elements (initiative) of the brain, and those of the stomach? Apparently they content themselves with asserting that all mental states are wholly confined to the brain, which, although it is only going round the circle, fixes, so far as they are concerned, the postulate, by means of nomenclature, that the intelligence which exists in the body, apart from the brain, is not mind, and therefore they make mind to have a much narrower meaning than intelligence.

To this there would be no objection, but that elsewhere they include this same, and *all*, intelligence in the term "mind."

Thus imperfectly thought out propositions have become accepted as truisms through nomenclature alone, and a science erected upon such a basis must obviously stand upon a dangerously weak foundation. Had the premise been a false one, its unsoundness would have been exposed long since, and it is only because it has been mistaken for a truism that it has passed unchallenged until now.

If the word "Mind" is intended to mean consciousness, and only consciousness, let it be applied only to consciousness, and then the professors whose views I have quoted will be correct. But it will be the more necessary to provide another name for both the conscious and (so-called) unconscious activities in the organism as a whole, because it cannot be claimed for them that they are fundamentally different.

Yet despite the opinion of some of the professors, it is advanced that the brain may be the one immediate bodily condition of the unconscious mind also; but if it be agreed that the brain is the seat of the unconscious mind, there yet remain intelligences which repair an injured organ, or cure a diseased one, in comparison to which the most skilful surgeon and physician is but a wretched bungler. The heart, the stomach, the lungs, the nerves, are all intelligences, and their seat is assuredly not in the brain.

These are the intelligences which we find in every animal organism, and they are each as intelligent as the limited part of the organism to which the term "mind" is applied; and to endeavour to learn what Intelligence is, while limiting the field of inquiry to the brain, can only lead to stultification.

The confusion in this instance arises from the absence of unanimity about the meaning of the word "Mind." Some scientists indicate by it all that is not matter, others include matter, others limit it to consciousness, and again others include in it a certain part of the unconscious. If a clear understanding can be arrived at with regard to the use of the word, and its limit, many of the difficulties now prevailing among psychologists and metaphysicians will disappear.

Unfortunately by confining mind and intelligence to the brain, even by inference, psychologists have allowed themselves to be elbowed out by the physiologists of the metaphysical study of the human, and in fact every animal, as a whole: only the brain is left to them, they become merely mental scientists, and, indeed, they have even assisted in their own supersession. Thus, it has always been taken for granted that the soul is something beyond brain power; and although the mind is included in the soul, yet there is something in the soul which is wanting in the mind. But psychologists have avoided the soul, as being too vague and unscientific for their attention, and as they have not substituted

anything in its place, there is only the brain remaining for them. Moreover, to the active forces, represented by the different organs, they have not even given names.

No doubt there is still left for them what is known as the unconscious mind ; but obviously the unconscious mind cannot be an active power if it be always taken literally as meaning unconsciousness, and therefore apart from intelligence.

Though not forgetting the immensity of good work accomplished by the psychologists, the fact of their confining intelligence to the brain prevents them bringing their theories of mind up to date. Modern physiological discoveries have deprived them of their old well known and well worn landmarks, and they have hence become too disorganised to turn the prevailing greater physiological knowledge to their own account.

One of the errors of the present-day psychology, lies in the supposition that the emerged self is a different personality from the submerged self ; that a thought is necessarily manufactured in the brain, from material provided by the unconscious and subconscious mind.

We all accept as indisputable the proposition that mind and brain are intimately associated ; and no doubt the mind appears to proceed from the brain, but all the innumerable attempts which have been made, by experiments on the brain, to discover what mind is, have resulted in failure, because, if

this theory be accurate, the brain does not produce mind, but, on the contrary, is secondary to it.

Would the sound of ponderous, clanking machinery, emanating from a house whence, at the same time, issued a great volume of water, impress a passer-by with the idea that water was being manufactured in the building? Probably not; otherwise his position would be analogous to that into which psychology has been forced, with regard to mind and brain.

The Greater Mind theory maintains that the brain is not the manufactory of thought, but that, like the pumping engine, it is the means whereby it is conveyed from inner consciousness to outer consciousness.

Thus I submit that, so far from brain manufacturing thought, thought (greater mental elements) manufactures brain, and employs it as a transferring agent simply.

CHAPTER XIV

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

To some readers of this theory it may seem as if it gives man no power over himself; that from its standpoint he is helpless as an autumn leaf wafted hither and thither at the will of the elements of which he is comprised. But it should be remembered that there can be no man apart from his elements. The elements are the man—the Unconscious Man when they are working independently of the brain, and the Conscious Man when they are working through the brain.

It is no doubt true that man is as much at the mercy of his elements as is a straw in a wind-storm; but it does not mean that he, as the colony of elements he is here represented to be, has no power to progress and improve; for such discouragement to those who desire and endeavour to lead good and useful lives, and who are optimistic of the future, is very far from being the light and leading of the Greater Mind theory, and, indeed, is directly opposed to it.

The colony of elements, as represented by a man, is open to profit by the teachings of experience. For the performance of a vicious act produces its own punishment, not only to the elements re-

sponsible for the origination and fulfilment of the vice, but to all the elements alike. This penalty is Nature's teaching to the higher grade elements that they must be more on their guard, and exercise greater vigilance over themselves, if they would prevent the formation of combinations which may betray the organism into misfortune. In other words, it warns them of the necessity of exercising and developing their organs.

By way of testing the value of my theory of life's elements, and to estimate its capability of unravelling certain mysteries, I have put to it, among other questions, the following standing problem :—

“How is reason related to the particular impulses which prompt to action ?”

This obviously infers that “reason,” and “particular impulses,” are distinct from each other, and the solution of the problem lies in the discovery of the relationship between them.

Now, if it can be shown that “reason” and “impulses” are composed of exactly similar elements, and that the elements of “reason” and “impulses,” respectively, are equal—seeing that neither possesses any sort of authority over the other; and as they are component parts of a simple and workable self-governing colony, which colony is capable of explaining and coinciding with all the phenomena of mind, the question appears to be no longer a “standing problem.”

I will explain my point through three illustra-

tions, in the first of which the mastery is to "reason," and in the other two to the "particular impulses" which prompt to action.

My first example is the case of a person who is incited by the "particular impulses" to indulge in a greater quantity of alcoholic stimulant than is wholesome for him. He feels lonely and wearied, he is in a state of despondency, having had bad luck; consequently the temptation to drown his worries and cares in strong drink is almost irresistible. But "Reason," as represented by the higher grade elements, tells him that drunkenness is degrading and mischievous, physically and morally, and that he will have cause to regret his self-indulgence if he succumbs to the temptation. The combination of higher grade elements constituting Reason in this case is stronger than that of the lower grade, which constitutes the temptation, and "reason" prevails.

Both reason and temptation, as here exemplified, are made up equally of the elements of Mind, all are of the same kith and kin. But it will be seen that the "particular impulses" come much nearer to being simple elements than "reason" does; in fact, they are identically the Greater Mental elements forming themselves into combinations and assuming consciousness in the brain, which, if not suppressed, will evolve into "reason." Reason is therefore a more developed and complex substance of the same elements.

My second illustration is a young maid-servant who has hitherto been scrupulously honest. But one day she finds a finger-ring carelessly left upon her mistress's dressing-table. Her first feeling is one of admiration, developing into love, of the pretty trinket, and she tries it on her finger. How well it becomes her, she thinks. Here we have three attributes—admiration, love of the beautiful, and vanity. Up to this point not a notion of dishonesty has entered her mind. But now comes its inception—the “particular impulses” desire to have the jewel in their (her) possession for a little while, which leads the maid on to think of taking it into her own room for a time, that she may wear and admire it amid her own surroundings. The moral elements, of course in combination, representing the higher kind of “reason,” are opposed to such yielding to temptation, telling her that it would be little less than theft. But to combat this reasoning the “particular impulses” ally themselves with the elements of false logic, sophistry, and deceit, which urge that the mere borrowing of the gem for a short time, and bringing it back before it is missed, cannot be theft. These powerful combinations of elements have now obtained the mastery of the girl, she yields to them, and leaves her mistress's apartment with the ring on her finger, practically a thief.

Of course here we have, in addition to the “particular impulses,” two kinds of “reason,” or rather two sides, the moral and the immoral, and as the

"particular impulses," in this instance, are those which if unrestrained would lead to the immoral, they naturally ally themselves with those elements nearest akin, and thus constitute the immoral side of the girl's "reason."

But let it not be supposed that "particular impulses" are always of the immoral order and that "reason" is always moral. We will take as our third illustration the case of a man whose "particular impulses" urge him to relieve a case of dire distress which in this case is his duty, but "reason" steps in and argues that he is not obliged to give this money away, there are others who would not do so in the same circumstances, moreover he has himself to look after, and "Charity begins at home." Accordingly such "reason" as the above conquers the "particular impulses" and the man stands guilty of selfishness and cruelty.

Hence if we trace the "particular impulses," and "reason," to their respective elements, and find, as we shall, that all those elements are of the same family and form one complete colony within which, and by which, is not only all reasoning done, but all temptation, from the initial promptings onwards; the solution to the "standing problem" is easily discovered.

It thus becomes simply a contest between two rival combinations of elements, in which the stronger one is victorious. What is called "reasoning" going on in a single mind, is no more than a conflict between the elements; now one combination, and

now another, will gain the dominancy, and assume consciousness in the brain; and the combination which is temporarily allowed to assume power is for the time being the ruler of the organism.

Although the elements in the protoplasmic cell in the human ovum are necessarily different from the elements in the ovum of a barn-door hen, and those again from the elements in the ovum of a fish, or a reptile, yet the embryo physical organs in ova cannot be differentiated; and hence the original cell, from which emerges a Caesar or a Shakespeare, is in no way to be distinguished, by appearance, from that which produces an idiot or a hooligan.

But we have the testimony of experience to prove that, although no sign of any organs appear in the original cell, even under the most powerful microscope, and despite the fact that the cells which produce men of opposite natures are exactly alike, yet the elements do actually vary in every original cell, and this differentiation is of course much greater than that which is subsequently produced by development; which goes to indicate that the old axiom, "What is bred in the bone will come out in the flesh," is the expression of the result of long and close observation and experience.

It is almost as difficult to conceive the production of a Rafaelle by two persons of debased tastes, as it is to imagine the production of a nightingale by a pair of mating sparrows. I do not mean by this that accident and education are not material

factors in the development of an organism, but it is plain that the various qualities and characteristics observable in different persons, and sometimes peculiar to them, are due to qualitative differences in the original cells, rather than to after circumstances.

But although man cannot consciously effect any variation in the elements in the original cell, of which he has his share in the producing, he may, by education, considerably alter the direction of the developing mind from the course which it might otherwise take.

It has often been urged that no man, however debased he may be, is utterly bad ; that he always has at least some remote, if ineffective—until perhaps a favourable opportunity for deploying it occurs—desire to do what is right ; that he does not really feel that the vices are, in the abstract, preferable to the virtues, though, by reason of the paucity of higher grade elements in his original cell, and the education which has been unconsciously transmitted to him from his surroundings, the organs of his higher grade elements have become so enfeebled, through disuse, that they have ceased to exert much influence over him. But his non-possession of the normal quantity of higher grade elements may no doubt be remedied, or counteracted, by the proper education and development, through their respective organs, of those he has, and the restraint of his lower class elements. In this way evolution may improve mankind, and so diminish crime and misery.

Crime and madness resemble each other in the sense that both may be traced to one of two causes, namely, either a deficiency of the higher grade elements in the ovum from which the individual was produced ; or to the fact that some of the organs of the higher grade elements have become weakened, or diseased, from decay, or accident, or want of use.

No doubt education is preferable to punishment as an eliminator and preventive of crime ; but as its advantages in that respect can only be developed by slow degrees, it is useless as an immediate corrective for a discovered offence against the well-being of the community, and therefore punishment is necessary, as well for the criminal lunatic as for the ordinary law-breaker—always providing, of course, he can be made to understand that it is on account of his wrong-doing, and a consequence of it.

All persons, whether lunatics or otherwise, who criminally break the law, should be punished alike —just sufficiently to act as a painful warning to them not to repeat the offence. But the main endeavour for the culprit's reformation should be in the direction of bringing the higher grade elements into healthy working order. I am not here advocating that the lunatic should be treated as we now treat a criminal, but rather that the criminal should be treated in a similar way as we now treat the lunatic.

I have elsewhere pointed out that persons ordi-

narily possess the organs of both higher and lower grade elements, and that the individuals in whom both grades are evenly balanced are the well conducted and sane members of society. But if any of the superior organs, from any cause, fall out of order, the individual, however circumspect and honourable he may hitherto have been, will probably either develop criminal tendencies, or be subject to delusions which may lead to them. In such case punishment alone is not enough to restore the organs to their normal condition, for that can only be effectually accomplished by regularly and systematically exercising them.

Microscopic examination of the brain of a patient who died from paralysis of that organ, showed that its cellular structure differed from the normal. From which some physiologists infer that mental action is purely physical. But that does not follow, because the elements work through their physical organs; and if the physical organs are diseased, the mental elements are unable to act. As well might it be said that, as it is not possible to play cricket with a broken bat and a worn-out ball, the whole game of cricket is centred in the bat and the ball, and that the minds of the players go for nothing.

The bat, the ball, the wickets, the prepared ground, may all be in evidence, but there will be no cricket unless Mind appears and puts the apparatus into use; while, on the other hand, all the

forms of cricket may be executed, and a good idea of the game obtained, without the aid of bat, ball, or wickets.

The Greater Mind, having control over all its organs, is constantly occupied with maintaining them in serviceable condition. It has to suppress individual groups of the elements which, to attain their own desires, would lead the organism into mischief, and generally affect the organs injuriously.

Thus, if a man is intemperate in eating, the elements of his stomach become disorganised through having forced upon them more labour than they are able to perform ; their work is delayed and digestion is retarded, with the result that the entire organism suffers ; just as the working of a steam-engine may be interfered with by charging the furnace with a superabundance of fuel.

In some sorts or phases of madness, the organs of the lower grade elements are too greatly developed ; in others, not more than normally ; but the organs of the higher grade elements will be found to be in an enfeebled, or healthless, condition, and are consequently unable to exercise full power, not merely as controlling forces, but as elements necessary to the maintenance of the balance of power, in order to produce, and sustain, what is commonly known as an "even mind," or a "level head."

When a criminal is occupied with burgling, embezzling, or pocket-picking, he is merely giving undue licence to good and useful, although low grade,

elements. If, in addition, he possessed the fully developed and healthy organs of the higher grade elements, which comprise honour, self-respect, prudence, and so on, they would effectually restrain those of the lower grade, and keep them in proper order. But to be without the first mentioned elements would be equally disastrous to the individual, for the elements of the highest grade—those necessary to resist temptation—would be superfluous, and the result would be, an individual without passion, without sexual desire, a sort of colourless, characterless person, who could only be an object of pity.

The idiosyncrasy of the “harmless lunatic” who imagines himself to be some other person—Julius Caesar, for instance—is thus explained. Every sane individual is of course conscious of his own identity; he knows his own name and occupation, who he is, and all about himself, generally. But the machinery which works this self-recognition sometimes gets out of order, as, say, in delirium. Even a mentally healthy person may occasionally momentarily forget who he is, as on awaking from sleep, for instance; and excessively nervous people who are suddenly asked their names, often hesitate for an instant or so before they are able to make answer. Now, if the inability to resuscitate the combination of elements which are responsible for self-identity, were permanent instead of momentary, they would have no consciousness of their own personality, and then

might easily suppose themselves to be any prominent personage whom their disordered organs were able to distinguish.

It must not, however, be imagined that the two grades of elements are divided into separate groups, or—as it were—camps, and are constantly waging war against each other ; on the contrary, they generally work together in harmonious accord, and it is only when either of them exhibits a tendency to assume excessive power, to the disadvantage of the commonwealth, that the Greater Ego interferes, and urges forward the other elements, to counteract the otherwise harmful influence.

Crime—including that of lunatics—is always the result of super-development of some of the mental organs, and deficient development of others. Lunatics whose organs of the lower grade elements are ill-developed, have no tendency to commit criminal actions, and are therefore harmless.

I do not anticipate for this work much welcome from the conventionalities, seeing that it is scientifically opposed, more or less, to all known creeds and religions, and, if accepted, would efface all existing theological landmarks. But science is already opposed to that which disregards and defies it, as creeds and religions generally do. Yet true science does not, nor ever will, thoroughly satisfy the world at large ; and no doubt rightly, from one point of view, since there is something in ourselves, and in the universe, which is beyond science, and which

is equally, or more, important than it, to us, to our happiness, and our lives.

But no true science is opposed to any moral law. The Sermon on the Mount, and all the written wisdom of our ancestors which has come down to us, are as efficacious in their teachings, and can act as allies to this theory in the same manner as they do to the theories of the theologians.

A religion, to be a religion, must be founded upon a spiritual basis : a code of morals founded upon science cannot properly be called a religion. But although a religion must be something more than a mere code of morals, it must not be opposed to known science, or it will flicker out, and die. Whether it is possible to have a religion founded upon a firm scientific basis is, of course, difficult to say, although we can conceive that an ideal may be so formed. But give pre-eminence to the truth, for from that there cannot be anything to fear. An ideal, or a religion, which is founded upon error, however beautiful it may otherwise be, obviously cannot recommend itself for belief to any thinking mind. What is needed, therefore, is a spiritual religion which is founded upon truth, and which can never die.

Possibly some man may presently appear, not necessarily, perhaps, endowed with the evenly-balanced mind of one of simple common sense, but with the higher grade elements so efficiently developed, that he will see, and understand, the higher

spiritual part of the Universal Ego, and give the world a religion founded thereon, the which will be welcomed and accepted by all.

It appears to me that God, as I (in another part of this work) have described Him, is a far more reasonable, worshipful, and lovable Being, than a god who, though having no evil within him, has yet created evil.

Although we may reasonably assume that man is made in the image of God, and consequently that as man is, so is God; yet we must also assume that there is something in God which is not in man.

There is, it will be observed, a similarity between the conception of God according to the various religions and the conception of God according to this theory.

In those religions which regard God as a separate entity, as the Jewish, He is represented as possessing and exercising the ungodly vice of revenge, and as unjustly favouring one nation at the expense of others. With that view this theory only goes so far as to attribute to Him the possession of the elements which *may* lead to vice. With the religions which regard God as a Trinity, or Republic, however, it is perhaps somewhat more in accord.

But it is not necessary here to examine into the fundamental question of religion, as that has been done voluminously and often, and moreover the essential differences between this theory and others, with regard to the conception of a Supreme and all-

powerful Being, have probably already disclosed themselves to the perceptive reader.

But besides religion, as being apart from what may be described as unsympathetic science, there are also the Arts ; the sense of justice ; love, compassion, morality, conscience, beauty, sin, suffering, the why and the wherefore of life, the progress and ultimate fate of the human race ; all actual living things which are hardly touched upon by science, and which can be viewed in a light altogether independent of it ; they must be reckoned with. The poetic and the artistic elements, forming part of the Greater Mind, are some of the most beautiful we possess ; and the cultivation in the Greater Ego of the organs of these elements must leave the world infinitely the richer. For what would the world be to us without the work of poets and artists—of our famous writers, painters, sculptors, architects, and musicians ?

This theory of life naturally leads us from the known into speculative metaphysics and theology, for it argues that there is only one kind of elements, the inference being that those elements which form in man a lesser and imperfect commonwealth, must, when relegated to the space whence they are drawn, form an universal Ego, compared with which our terrestrial commonwealths or greater Egos are feeble and insignificant.

I believe that no spiritual theory yet advanced goes beyond the individual God ; but this theory of the

Universal Ego transforms God into a great and perfect colony of elements : it dissects, and, as it were, makes an analysis of His component parts. This Universal Colony, which is nevertheless God, is possessed with not only all the elements which belong to man, but possibly—and probably—with a great many more than man has ever dreamed of. It must not only possess those elements which, when in combination, are recognised by us as virtues, but it must also have all those which, if uncontrolled, lead to what we know as vices. But we may presume that in It all the elements are evenly balanced ; thus making a perfect Individual Whole.

If we regard the God, or Universal Colony of Elements, from this standpoint, we get an answer to questions which have long puzzled the world—or at any rate that representative part of it which has taught the orthodox faith—namely :—

Is God a separate entity, and independent of our lives ?

If God created the universe, why did He create the Devil, and consequently, sin, misery, and suffering ?

Why has He given the greater portion of mankind over to His enemy the Devil ?

“ Wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereto : because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life ; and few there be that find it ” (Matt. vii. 13, 14).

But by transforming God into a great colony of elements, these otherwise difficult questions almost immediately answer themselves. God is not individual, in the sense of the Jewish conception. He did not create the Devil, nor sin, and misery, and suffering. For all and everything are contained in Him: the same pains, the same emotions, and the same temptations go on within Him as within ourselves; but as His elements are perfectly balanced, His actions must be perfect.

To the innate appreciation of justice, this theory must surely be more satisfactory than that of the all-wise-and-omnipotent-providence school, at which even its staunchest supporters, when they think, are obliged to look askance, although, no doubt, they may seek comfort in the reflection that, despite the apparent injustice and inconsistent state of things, somehow in reality there must be universal fairness; albeit beyond the range of human vision. Either they must believe this, or they must disbelieve in the wisdom and justice of providence.

If it can be realised that, when all the elements in the universe are combined, they must make a perfect whole, the which is omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient, it will be evident that in other degrees of combination they cannot be perfect, and that consequently perfection can only be reached in the universe as a whole.

No doubt the individual elements, when judged from their own position as units, and not compared

with anything else, would be perfect enough, respectively; but if they fail, when combined, to at once form a perfect whole, the combination must necessarily be imperfect. And this is precisely what we find everywhere in nature, nothing perfect, only an ever-constant striving after perfection, which is never reached except in the Universal Ego.

It may possibly be objected that, according to this theory, there can be no continuous progressing; that the elements returned to space cannot be improved, and that they must therefore always be the same, since elements are elements, and can be nothing else. Well, of course it is true that the elements as elements cannot be improved; but they may easily be debased, or combined with debasing elements. In dirty water we have the elements of water temporarily defiled; but the water can be decomposed and its elements reduced back to their pristine purity. And similarly we may keep our elements pure and undefiled.

But the matter by which the water is defiled is not therefore to be despised. Dirt has been epigrammatically described as "matter in the wrong place," and when we permit ourselves to become mentally impure, we are but allowing dirt, in the shape of the lower grade elements, to usurp a place which properly belongs to those of the higher grade. But be it remembered that both grades, in their respective places, are equally necessary to us—as much so, indeed, as what is called dirt is to the world. The position

of the lower grade elements must, however, always be subordinate.

But, it may be objected again, what can it matter how we conduct ourselves—How can anything matter if we are composed of mere elements? To this the answer is that the elements which comprise justice, mercy, compassion, regard for our brethren and neighbours, love of the beautiful in nature and art—in short, all that is admirable in the world, are surely not to be despised. Nothing in this world, as we know it, is better, or imparts greater beauty and happiness to life, than the cultivation of these elements through their organs.

But, the objector may continue, if our elements are disintegrated at death, where can be the advantage of following an ideal?

The reply to this is that, by following an ideal, not only do we contribute to our own individual happiness, but by keeping our lower grade elements in subjection, we help to make the world happy, and assist mankind in its progress towards a higher type of being. It is conceivable that this can be achieved through the Greater Mind theory; for if the organs of the higher grade elements are exercised and developed, and those of the lower grade kept suppressed, by all, every generation of human beings will leave the world for their successors in a better condition than it was before; and as environment makes so great a difference in the education of the child, it will be evident that if the higher grade ele-

ments exert their influence for the advancement of the individual, the human race must progress, as long as the cosmogony of the universe allows man the physical conditions necessary for his improvement.

The discoveries of modern science seem opposed to the common idea that at dissolution the soul leaves the body as a separate and indivisible entity, or permanent disembodied soul; and observations on the decay of the faculties in old age, together with an unexhaustive catalogue of the improbabilities concerning the commonly accepted ideas upon the subject, induce me to return to the subject, it having already been considered in Chapter V., and I am inclined to believe that the elementary substances forming the soul do not, after the demise of the body, remain as a fixed and permanent entity, but that, on the contrary, they are free to form other combinations with other elements. But, as I have shown, when a combination of elements has once been formed, it is easier to re-form it;¹ consequently the combination forming an organism, and which has been for some years resident upon the earth, would naturally be more likely to re-form itself when disembodied, and so become, for a time at any rate, an incorruptible presentment of its former self.

Therefore the popular belief in a "future state" is not contrary to the peculiar tenets of this theory.

The unreasonableness of the view that the soul as

¹ See Chapter II.

a separate entity is perpetuated for all eternity, seems to become apparent when the arguments on both sides of the question are dispassionately examined.

The theory of evolution teaches us that man came to his present state slowly and by degrees, and through inferior forms of life. When, then, did he begin to have an eternal and indivisible soul? Has an idiot an eternal and indivisible soul? And if so, why may not the other animals which we call "inferior," but many of which are infinitely more intelligent than idiots, also have souls? Do infants who die before they have intelligence, possess eternal souls? When a very old man dies, after losing most of his faculties, is his soul perpetuated with only the few decayed faculties remaining to him, or is he rejuvenated?

These appear to be extremely difficult questions to answer.

Whether upon the dissolution of the physical part of life the elements temporarily disintegrate, or whether they emerge from the body altogether in the form of a personality, seems to me to depend in great measure upon whether, when the living body is gradually decaying, as in senility, and many of the elements are apparently missing, have they really disappeared, or are they still in the body, although not apparent?

In Huxley's experiment with the decapitated frog previously referred to, it is plain that the elements, perhaps the whole colony of them, were still in the

body after the brain had been removed. It is also clear that after a limb—say the lower part of the leg—has been amputated, the elements dominating the muscles of the foot and toes remain in the body, although they are useless for the fulfilment of their original purpose.

But the organs of the decapitated reptile are still in a healthy condition, and so also is the upper part of the amputated limb. The nerves, and sinews, and muscles remain. They have been severed, but they are not decayed.

I believe that careful observation and experiment will in time reveal to us whether the whole commonwealth of elements remain in the body after the decay of their organs, or whether, when the organs are decayed beyond recovery, the elements using and directing them, quit the body before dissolution; thus at least temporarily disintegrating the Greater Mind.

For reasons which I have already expressed, it appears to me more likely that the elements may disintegrate themselves.

It has been suggested that upon the dissolution of the body, it is the colony of elements in its entirety (that is, the personality of the individual, not as he appears to us through his brain, but in what I may call his greater personality) which is launched into eternity. The purport of this assumption is to account for the supposed perpetuation of the idiot's personality, not as an idiot, but with all the ele-

ments as transmitted by his immediate ancestors to the ovum, and which were probably perverted by accident or disease. An objection to this argument, however, is that it ignores the effects of education, restraint, and the subjugation of the lower grade elements generally, the which, since all religions appear to attach so high a value to them, ought surely to be regarded as of some importance to the soul's future state.

If it be allowed that every human individual has an eternal and indivisible soul, idiots and lunatics cannot be exceptions. And while it seems incomprehensible that the souls of idiots and lunatics can be perpetuated to all eternity *as* idiots and lunatics, it seems equally incomprehensible that they should be different then from what they are here. Because if their mental conditions are altered in the future state, so also those of all sane persons must be.

The normal life of man pertains almost entirely to this world. We recognise him individually by his form, his actions, his speech, his habits, his temperament, his temper, and even by the style of his dress, all belonging to earth, and of flesh and blood. Even the affection of parents and children is centred in their flesh and blood; and as it is never supposed or suggested that the corruptive part of our lives is perpetuated, it may logically be presumed that something very different from popular imaginings will transpire.

CONCLUSION

Absolute proof of the soundness, or otherwise, of any theory of life is impossible ; for even our very existence is questioned.

The proof of a theory appears to rest entirely in whether the conviction of the originator is carried into the mind of the student ; and until those who are capable of judging become convinced of its value, proof cannot be claimed for it ; and even then, time must be allowed to elapse for new objections and arguments to be met, or for the reconsideration of some point which has been insufficiently examined.

No doubt material discoveries, as photography, the telephone, the phonograph, the Röntgen rays, and so on, are manifest enough to all who have had experience of them ; but when we come to discoveries of a higher class, as the circulation of the blood, and the laws of gravitation and evolution, although we are now satisfied that the philosophers who revealed these secrets of nature to the world amply proved their contentions at the time, we must not forget that they were denounced as madmen and charlatans by some of the most prominent and respected scientific men of their period ; and even now the theory of evolution is not established with the firmness of the theories of gravitation and the circulation of the blood, although no doubt it will presently be generally accepted in its entirety.

But after all, proof is only a question of degree.

When astronomers explain that there is no atmosphere to the moon, sufficient proof can be adduced to convince most people that the statement is true. But there may be circumstances in the lunar conditions of which we know nothing, and which may negative our convictions. So, if we take a picture puzzle, and succeed in fitting its parts properly together, we may fairly regard it as sufficient proof that the puzzle is solved. But in itself it is not absolute proof, although no doubt the odds may be immensely in favour of its being correct.

And now, to compare the proof of this theory of the elements of life with that of the solution of the picture puzzle, I would ask: Have I described it so that its various and dissimilar parts fit into each other easily, accurately, and without forcing, and make a complete whole?

Then, with regard to its foundations: Do all thoughts, feelings, sensations, &c., each contain an elementary essence which qualitatively differs in every one? Are such essences the elements of mind? Do the elements of mind compound with those of force and matter, and constitute the elements of life? Can an unity be formed of those elements without Authority being included, and has a method been discovered by which such an unity may be constituted? And is my theory of the compounding of universal elements more probable than the Atomic theory of the chemists? If any of the premises involved in these interrogatories, and ex-

plained in this work, are shown to be erroneous, then all I can say is, so much the worse for my theory.

Finally, I will add that this theory, when mastered, will be found so simple that investigation and analysis ought effectually to prove its value, or otherwise. But, of course, a mere superficial reading of the letterpress will not enable the seeker after knowledge to form a sound opinion of its contentions. For at first glance it may appear to be merely speculative and transcendental, and many other objections will probably arise in the reader's mind. Closer examination, however, will show that it in every way accords with the laws of natural science. Its fundamental conceptions are founded upon experiment, and to experiment and time must be left the testing of its worth.

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